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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the foundations of natural language semantics. Two
issues of central importance in semantic theory, namely intensionality and
nominalisation, form its central themes. We offer a perspective in which the
semantics of natural language constructs are unpacked in terms of Peter Aczel's Frege
structures. Along the way we investigate other issues in natural language semantics
such as generalised quantifiers, truth, the question of types and the
intensional/extensional distinction. This work starts by assessing the foundational
problems of the semantics of nominalisation which are classified as mathematical and
logical. A new solution to these problems based on Frege structures is offered and is
shown to provide promising results for both nominalisation and intensionality. We
illustrate how this general framework (using Frege structures) throws light on many
puzzling semantic issues.
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NOTATIONS
I use the following notations:
==> stands for meta-implication.
a=b >d,e stands for If b is true then a=d else a=e.
Bold face words are used to denote objects inside the model rather than inside the




This work is divided into seven chapters and an appendix as follows:
Chapter 1. This chapter consists of two parts:
Part A: Two problems of the semantics of nominalisation are considered. The semantic
interpretation of nominalisation requires both a theory and a model: from the
theoretical point of view, we are challenged by Russell's paradox, whereas from the
other (model existence), we are threatened by Cantor's diagonal argument. (I am not
claiming here that they are two separate problems; indeed our syntax and semantics
should be tightly related. No inconsistent theory can have a model and sometimes,
although a theory is consistent, we cannot readily see what the models look like.)
Part B: The two problems explained in part A are problems of theories of predication
(set theories) and of models of the lambda calculus respectively. We survey some of
the solutions offered so far to overcome these problems in the general sense (i.e. as set
theories and models of the lambda-calculus), and then discuss briefly their
applications to nominalisation. The solutions to the theoretical problem are to restrict
one of the following: the logic, the language or the axioms. Frege structures restrict
the logic and thereby solve the theoretical problem, but they have not been applied to
nominalisation before. For the problem of model existence, the solutions discussed are
Scott domains and Aczel's Frege structures; only Scott domains have previously been
applied to nominalisation.
This chapter finds Frege structures to be suitable candidates for solving both
problems. One of their advantages, as we shall see in Chapter 2, is their full
comprehension principle, which allows us to avoid restricting our nominalised
formulae while still evading Russell's paradox. Another advantage (in addition to
their being a solution to Cantor's argument) is that they are easy to work with
because we can visualize them; they are elegant and simple.
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Chapter 2. This chapter consists of two parts, as follows:
Part A: We start with an informal introduction to Frege structures concentrating on
mathematical and philosophical motivations. A more formal account of the structures
and of how they can be built is then given; finally, a comparison with Scott domains
is made.
Part B: A new theory, which has in it a predicate for propositionhood is
introduced. The semantics and the proof theory are discussed in detail and it is shown
that this theory is sound and complete.
Chapter 3. In this chapter we discuss the property theory obtained in this thesis and
study the domain of decidable properties. We also introduce a concept of predication
which is distinctive from functional application. The concept of truth is dealt with
and various familiar theories of truths are accommodated within the framework.
Chapter 4. In this chapter we discuss determiners and quantifiers concentrating on the
internal definability of determiners and showing that the lack of second order
quantification is harmless.
Chapter 5. In this chapter we consider the problems of intensionality; Montague's
incomplete success in dealing with prepositional attitudes was due to his use of a
weakly intensional approach based on possible world semantics. Our approach is
highly intensional and this allows many problems of belief sentences to be solved.
We discuss the problem of trying to construct extensionality out of intensionality,
and whether there is a congruence relation which defines extensionality while enabling
us to remain consistent. Possible worlds and modalities are also discussed within this
highly intensional framework.
Chapter 6. This chapter deals with type theory inside our type free framework. We
build domains inductively inside a Frege structure and build a typed theory T ^
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where the various types take denotations in the constructed domains. We also present
a small Montague fragment of English which deals with nominalisation and
intensionality.
Chapter 7. In this chapter we summarise the work and compare the concept of
quantification in both Frege structures and Scott domains.
Appendix I: This appendix is a self-contained introduction to Dana Scott's domain






SUMMARY OF THE WORK 6
TABLE OF CONTENTS 9
CHAPTER 1. SET THEORY AND NOMINALISATION 14
PART A- THE PROBLEMS 14
A.1 The problem of the formal theory 14
A. 1.1 Ontology, Concepts, Predicates, Properties, Sets 14
A.1.2 A language of nominalisation and the problem 20
A.1.3 The ontological status of sets 24
A.2 The problem of the existence of the models 27
A.2.1 What a model should look like 27
A.2.2 Difficulties with such models 31
A.2.3 Existence of models 31
PART B. THE DIFFERENT ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION 33
B.1 Solution to the theoretical problem 33
B.1.1 Notes on set theory 33
B. 1.1.1 Altering the language 33
B.l.1.2 Altering the axioms 35
B.1.1.3 Altering the logic 39
B.l.1.4 Feferman and the foundational issues 43
B.1.2 Effects of set theory on nominalisation 44
B.l.2.1 Language and nominalisation 44
B.l.2.2 Axioms and nominalisation 45
B.l.2.3 Logic and nominalisation 47
B.l.2.4 The place of logic in the above applications 48
B.2 Solution to model existence 50
B.2.1 Lambda calculus and its models 50
B.2.1.1 Frege structures 52
B.2.2 Using those models for nominalisation 53
B.2.2.1 Scott domains and nominalisation 53
Conclusion and Comparison with Cocchiarella 54
CHAPTER 2. FREGE STRUCTURES AND NOMINALISATION 57
PART A. SUMMARY OF FREGE STRUCTURES 57
A.1 Informal introduction 58
A.2 The models 62
A.3 Frege structures as models and comparison with Scott domains
PART B. A THEORY OF PROPERTIES, ITS SEMANTICS
AND PROOF THEORY 79
B.1 The theory T^ 80
B.2 The metatheory of T^ 86
B.3 The semantics of T^ 92
B.4 Soundness and completeness 94
- 10 -
CHAPTER 3. A THEORY OF PROPERTIES AND THEORIES OF TRUTH 102
PART A. A THEORY OF PROPERTIES 102
A.1 Closure conditions on properties 102
A.2 Decidable properties 111
PART B. THEORIES OF TRUTH 117
B.1 Various truth theories 120
CHAPTER 4. DETERMINERS AND QUANTIFIERS
IN A FREGE STRUCTURE 126
PART A. TWO EXAMPLES OF DETERMINERS 127
PART B. NON INTERNAL DEFINABILITY 129
PART C. THE DETERMINER "the" 132
PART D. HOW TO SHOW SOMETHING IS A DETERMINER 133
PART E. CHARACTERISTICS OF DETERMINERS AND QUANTIFIERS 135
PART F. NO LOSS OF QUANTIFICATION WITH FIRST ORDER THEORIES 138
CHAPTER 5. INTENSIONALITY AND EXTENSIONALITY
USING A FREGE STRUCTURE 141
PART A. AN INTENSIONAL SOLUTION TO PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 141
PART B. AN EXTENSIONAL STRUCTURE 148
PART C. THOMASON'S APPROACH 158
PART D. POSSIBLE WORLDS 160
CHAPTER 6. TYPE THEORY AND THE MONTAGUE FRAGMENT
IN A FREGE STRUCTURE 162
PART A. MONTAGUE'S IL 162
PART B. A TYPE THEORY T , 165
PART C. INTERPRETING PT§ in Tpol 172
CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON 185
PART A. QUANTIFICATION 186
PART B. FURTHER ADVANTAGES 190




Nominalisation: Semanticists tend to define nominalisation as being the process which
transforms what acts semantically as a predicate into something which acts
semantically as an object and is subject to predication. The following pairs of
sentences illustrate the phenomenon of nominalisation:
(la). The dress is red.
(lb). Red is a colour.
(2a). The necklace is diamond.
(2b). Diamond is a stone.
(3a). John went home.
(3b). I love going home.
(4a). Mary swims regularly.
(4b). Swimming in the warm Mediterranean is something I miss.
(5a). John runs regularly
(5b). To run is fun.
(6a). I always disliked John.
(6b). That I always disliked John used to upset my mother.
(7a). Bill is honest.
(7b). Honesty is a virtue.
There are many other criteria that should be taken into account by a theory of
nominalisation. For example, linguists have drawn attention to a semantical
distinction between infinitives as in (5b) and gerunds as in (3b) and (4b).1 It has also
been argued that bare plurals and mass nouns are cases of nominalisation, but it is not
clear whether they act in such a way that a single theory could fit both. However,
these distinctions are not going to be taken into account in this thesis. I intend instead
1 Cf [CH3].
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to assume the above definition of nominalisation and work out some applications of
my proposal to its semantics.
Intensionality: Both extensional and weakly intensional theories (e.g. Montague's
PTQ) face a problem concerned with propositional attitudes. The problem can be
illustrated as follows:
Consider the two concepts groundhog and woodchuck.
According to extensional interpretations, we have:
for any x, groundhog(x) is true iff" woodchuck(x) is true.
Also, according to possible worlds semantics, we have in any possible world:
for any x, groundhog(x) is true iff woodchuck(x) is true.
Hence, according to extensional theories, the two concepts groundhog and woodchuck
are the same and therefore:
(1) John believes that groundhog(a) -* John believes that woodchuck(a).
Also, according to possible world semantics, two concepts are the same if they hold of
the same objects in the same possible worlds. Therefore according to possible world
semantics (l) above is true.
From a certain perspective on the nature of belief statements, namely one which
insists that John might believe that something is a groundhog without believing it to
be a woodchuck, this state of affairs is unacceptable.
The approach that I put forward in this thesis is highly intensional, and hence throws
some light on the above problem. The solution can be summarised as follows:
groundhog and woodchuck are two propositional functions which give equivalent
values for all objects, but this equivalence does not entail equality. According to our
approach, two objects cannot be equal unless they are the same object. They can both
have the same truth value but this will not make them equal as objects.2 Working
2 Note that our approach is not committed to non-extensionality of functions and we assume our con¬
struction of a Frege structure to be based on extensional domains such as E .° OO
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with intensional problems creates a host of interesting puzzles, and I try to
accommodate solutions to many of these in the thesis. For instance, the concept of
truth is given a lot of attention, as is the definition of extensionality in terms of
intensionality and the relationship between Montague's intensional semantics and the
one proposed here.
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CHAFTER 1. SET THEORY AND NOMINALISATION
The main, thesis of this chapter is that the basic problems of nominalisation are
those of set theory. We shall therefore explain the problems of set theory and their
various solutions; we shall then assess the influence of these matters on
nominalisation.
PART A. THE PROBLEMS
Let us start by examining the problem of the semantics of nominalisation. I shall
look at it from two angles, the first related to the formal theory, the second
concerned with the existence of models.
A. 1. The problem ofthe formal theory
Any theory of nominalisation3 which is to be interpreted should be accompanied
by some ontological views on concepts - for predicates and open well-formed
formulae act semantically as concepts. This is vague, however, if only because where
I use the word concept, someone else might use class, predicate, set, property or even
system (Dedekind). This terminological profusion is hardly surprising, for we are
touching on the problem of universals. a problem philosophers have been debating for
hundreds of years. (This new term - universal - may be more confusing than any of
the others, but we may use Aristotle as a preliminary guide and define a universal to
be that which can be predicated of things.) The aim of this section is not to take a
standpoint on any of the philosophical theories of universals; rather it is to show
that, no matter what approach we adopt, nominalisation is going to generate a
problem.
A.1.1 Ontology, concepts, predicates, properties and sets: It does seem that the main
3 I consider nominalisation here to be defined as in the introduction to this thesis.
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problem of nominalisation is an old problem of set theory. If one takes an open
sentence, according to Quine in [QU3], page 1,
"the notion of a class is such that there is supposed to be, to the various things
of which that sentence is true, a further thing which is the class having each
of those things and no others as member."
As an example we take the sentence being an x_ such that the colour of x_ is red. We
have in our universe various things of which this sentence is true; but perhaps we can
also say that the class of all those things which are red also exists in our universe. I
say perhaps because it will be shown shortly that if we let any open sentence
determine an object which is the class of all those things of which the sentence is true,
we run into difficulties.
To see this clearly it is important that the reader bear in mind the following four
notions: the Comprehension Principle, Quantification, Interpretation and Russell's
Paradox. I shall comment here on how each such notion is to be understood in the
present context.
The Comprehension Principle: This is the principle which decides which open sentence
in our theory determines a class (or set) of precisely those entities that satisfy it.
Quantification: Take a class which stands for an open sentence (i.e. the class of all
those objects which when substituted for the free variables in the open sentence
returns true). Does this class act exactly like any other object in our universe? If so,
should we be able to quantify over it?
Interpretation: Should we keep to a full classical interpretation or use a non-classical
one? If we keep to a full classical interpretation, and assume that the comprehension
principle applies to each open sentence and that we have full quantification, we will
fall foul of Russell's paradox. (It is worth mentioning, however, that the paradox
does not occur only under the classical interpretation but under many other
interpretations, as we shall see later.)
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Russell's paradox: The paradox derives from assumptions similar to the following: Let
S_ be the set of all sets that do not contain themselves. Such an assumption is
contradictory for we can deduce from it that S_ is in S_ iff S_is not in SL
The important point to concentrate on is how these four notions interact, and in
particular to note that an assumption of full comprehension (i.e. every open sentence
determines a class) and of full quantification (i.e every class acts exactly like any
object and can be quantified over) will, under some interpretations, lead to Russell's
paradox. This point will be presented in more detail in the following section.
We will now describe the four main conceptions of universals, all of which will have
to face up to this sort of problem.
1. Realistic conception (Platonism): Platonists take concepts to be real properties. That
is, concepts are language/observer independent entities. Platonists also subscribe to
an unrestricted (or full) comprehension principle, i.e. to each well defined condition,
there exists a set (or class) of all entities satisfying the condition. Moreover, this set is
an entity in its own right and can be quantified over. According to this conception,
interpretation is much more important than language and therefore it seems
obligatory to use the referential interpretation.
2. Formalist conception (Nominalism): Formalists, of whom Hilbert was the father,
insist on the paramount importance of language.4 According to the formalists,
concepts are predicate expressions which do not exist beyond our linguistic
expressions. Open sentences are excluded from standing for concepts, and
furthermore the comprehension principle is restricted. As language is the most
important thing for them, interpretation is secondary. Thus it seems that the
4 Hilbert's program, as it is well known, consisted of separating signs and meaning and only allowing
Unitary arguments in the proof theory. Had the program worked, it would have made it easy to prove
things about the theory inside the theory itself. Godel's result made apparent the impossibility of carry¬
ing out this aim - and as has been said by Quine:
"Godel's proof is beyond doubt, we can philosophise about it but we can not philosophise it
away."
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obvious semantics should be based on a substitutional interpretation. (A
substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers involves truth clauses of the following
kind:
[[ 3 x<£>]]q _ is true <->for some name a,in the language, [[<l[a/x] ]]~ is true.
[[Vx<I>]]Q is true <->for every name a,,in the language, [[<l(a/x] ]L is true.
By contrast, Referential interpretation treats quantifiers as follows:
[[ ] X<I>]]R ct is true <->for some object a.in the model, [[<l(a/x] ]]R is true.
[[V x<l>]]R is true <->for every object a.in the model, [[${a/x] ]]R is true.)
3. Conceptualism: Borrowing a sentence from Fraenkel (at the end of [FR2], page 336):
Conceptualists are
"attracted neither by the luscious jungle flora of platonism nor by the ascetic
desert landscape of neo-nominalism."
Concepts here are neither predicate expressions nor real properties. They are not
objects but unsaturated entities, the saturation of which results in a mental act and
not necessarily a truth value. Some conceptualists are constructive and construct only
those sets that correspond to predicative conditions; some others accept an
unrestricted comprehension principle. However all of them care for interpretation,
and in a semantics for a conceptualistic theory one should consider a referential
interpretation where the meaning of a concept applied to an object does not necessarily
have to be a truth value.
4. Fregean conception: It might be said that Frege is both a realist and a conceptualist
but; he is anti-formalist and tends to lean towards conceptualism. The ontology
assumed by Frege of concepts was that they are functions of one argument whose
values are always truth-values. Concepts, according to him, are unsaturated, and the
behaviour of a concept is predicative even if something is being asserted about it. The
unsaturation of a concept comes from the fact that concepts can never themselves be
objects and only by applying the concept to an object can we obtain a saturated
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element (an object which is a truth-value). Assertions that are made about concepts
do not apply to objects: for example, existence is a property of concepts and not of
objects. However, the way we attach properties to concepts consists in predicating the
property not of the concept but of the concept-correlate. This concept-correlate is the
extension of the concept, according to Frege, and is an object. We said that concepts
here are functions: thus the graphs of functions are objects even though functions
themselves are not. This is exactly the case with concepts and their extensions. The
extensions are objects but the concepts themselves are not. The extension of a concept
does not fully determine the concept, for we can have two extensions which are the
same while the concepts themselves are not. Frege always warned against confusing a
concept with its extension and defined sets and classes to be the extensions of the
concepts, not the concepts themselves:
"sets and classes are objects whereas concepts are anything but objects."
Something falls under a concept and the grammatical predicate stands for this
concept. A name of an object is incapable of being used as a grammatical predicate. For
Frege, the saturation of a concept results in a truth-value and according to him each
open sentence denotes a class. Those classes are objects and can be quantified over.
Being an anti-formalist he insisted on interpretation, but as is well known he paid a
high price for these relaxed conditions: his theory, known as the naive theory, was
found to be subject to Russell's paradox, since the concept set of all those things that
do not belong to themselves has an extension K which is a proper object. Thus his
theory is contradictory.
These then are the four main conceptions of universals. In constructing a theory
of nominalisation corresponding to any of those conceptions, we have to embody its
distinctive features either in the language or in the interpretation or both. However
problems can occur in any of these theories if we are not careful about the way we
bind together the comprehension principle, the quantification techniques and the
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interpretation (no matter what philosophical background we assume). To avoid
inconsistency, some people restricted their comprehension principle but still allowed
unlimited quantification; others restricted both quantification and comprehension. Yet
if one is not careful in setting out the theory, a paradox can still be derivable.
I shall in most of this thesis use Frege's views on concepts and objects, with a
relaxation of both comprehension and quantification, without falling into Russell's
paradox: Aczel's Frege structures enable us to maintain this stance while staying
paradox free. I adopt Frege's conception for three reasons. The first is that all the
scholars whose results I intend to compare with my own seem to have used it. The
second is that formalism has lost its attraction after Godel's famous results. The third
reason is that the Fregean conception seems to be a solution between conceptualism
and realism, and I do not have anything against either of the two latter conceptions.
Adopting the Fregean stance means that I am committed to defining nominalisation as
the phenomenon of turning what was at one stage a predicate into something which
will act as an object - something to which properties can be attributed. This new
object is different from our initial objects and will act as a concept-correlate in our
semantics. What in the language acts as a name should be mapped in the semantics as
an object. What in the language acts as a predicate should be mapped as a concept.
And what in the language acts as a nominalised predicate should be mapped as a
concept-correlate.
Once again, it is vital to keep in mind that a concept-correlate is an object and not a
concept. As an example, consider the syntactic discourse which has the following: tall
(a predicate), being tall (the nominal of tall ), John (a name). The semantic universe
has: a property tall which holds of all the tall things in the universe, a set A of all
tall things and a man John called John. Then we have the following semantic
interpretation: tall is mapped into tall, being tall is mapped into A and John is
mapped into John.
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We shall now examine in detail how the Russell paradox can threaten theories of
nominalisation; and in section B we shall meet the solutions to the problem.
A.1.2. A language ofnominalisation: If we are going to assume a first order language of
nominalisation and we are going to let any open well-formed formula stand for a
concept, then we might fall into the paradox. This is shown as follows: take a first
order calculus and add to it a new primitive relation € and the two axioms:
Comprehension: For each open well-formed formula <!>,
3 y Vx [(x€y) <- > $(x)] where y is not free in <£(x).
Extensionality: Vx Vy [Vz [(z€x) <->(z€y)] —► x = y].
This theory is obviously inconsistent, for take <f(x) to be (x 6x). Then we get:





Is5 it the assumption that the class x exists? In this theory of nominalisation, we
assume that each open well-formed expression determines a concept whose extension
exists and is the set of all those elements which satisfy the concept. We could restrict
our comprehension principle so that <$(x) stands for everything except ->(x€x); but
this will not save us from paradox. To see this let <E(x) stand for -> (x^x) where
(x^y) abbreviates (3 z) ((x6z) & (z€y)).
Again, ruling out this instance is not enough for we will still get the paradox if we
take <$(x) to be ->(x€,jx). This process continues ad infinitum. We could rule out all
such instances - but the problem will persist, for take a sentence <$(x) like:
->(3 ZJ.ZJ,—) [...(zg€z2) & ^Sz^) & (z^ex)}
and let y be the class obtained from the comprehension axiom for <$(x).
5 Note here that the axiom of extensionality did not have any role in the proof of the inconsistency.
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If Cy6y) then ->G Zj^,..) [...Gzj) &■ (z2^zi^ &(zj£y)].
But we can take z^ = Z2 = ... = y, and get a contradiction.
If -i(y6y) then G Z-^Zj,..) [...^2) & ^Gz^) &(z^€y)].
But as (zj €y) then <f(y); but we have that -> <J(y). Contradiction. □
We have assumed above a first order language of nominalisation. Although I shall
leave the discussion of whether we need higher order languages for later chapters,
allow me to remark en passant that it seems we do not need to go higher than second
order languages for the semantics of nominalisation - for according to Frege's
conception, we stop at second level concepts, but these can be mapped into first order
concepts which in turn can be mapped into objects. So when we come to quantify over
properties, we really quantify over their extensions which are objects. We shall
discuss quantification in Frege structures in more detail in Chapter 4, but we shall
here try to answer the question of whether we still face the problem with higher
order languages. I cannot find a better way to show that we do than by looking at a
second order theory due to Cocchiarella. This language essentially embodies Frege's
conceptions of concepts and objects summarised above, according to which we need to
quantify over our predicates, and predicate quantifiers have a referential significance,
even though predicates themselves are not singular terms. I shall start by writing
down the axioms and rules of a second order language which will accommodate
nominalised predicates. If this language is to allow us to talk about nominalisation, it
should have a device which can turn any sentence, open wff (well formed formula) or
predicate into a singular term. For example, we should turn run into to run, the sun is.
grey into that the sun is grey and so on. I shall add such a device to the language and
refer to it by As I said earlier the language used here is based on Cocchiarella's
formulation of second order logic with nominalised predicates and will be used to
illustrate the problem.
The typing ofthe language is as follows:
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0 represents the type of all singular terms,
1 represents the type of propositions,
n+1 represents the type of n-place predicates.
For each n> 0 assume the existence of denumerably many variables. I shall use the
following metavariables:
M, N, ... refer to both individual and predicate variables
F ,G ,H ,... refer to n-place predicate variables, We can get rid of the
subscript when no confusion occurs,
x, y, z, w,... refer to individual variables,
a, b,.. refer to singular terms.
The primitive symbols ofthe language are: V, X. The others are defined in the
metalanguage.
The meaningful expressions of any type n, MEn are defined recursively as:
(1) Every individual variable is in MEq.
Every n-place predicate is in both MEq and MEn+j.
(2) For a, b in MEq, (a = b) is in MEj.
(3) F in MEn+p aj,..,an in MEq ==>F(a^,..,an) in MEj.
(4) 4>in MEj and x^,..,xn are pairwise distinct variables, where n^l,
==>[Xx1..xn<I>] is in MEn+1.
(5) <£> in MEj == > -> <F in ME^.
(6) in MEj ==>(<!>-> 'T) is in ME^.
(7) $ in ME^ and a is an individual or predicate variable
==>Va<J>is in ME^.
(8) <Fin MEj ==>[X<F] in MEQ.
(9) For all n>l, MEn is included in MEq.6
6 Note that 9 does not follow from 1
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AXIOMS:
(AO*) All tautologous well formed formulae.7
(Al*) Vu(4> -»¥)-♦ (Vu<3> -»Vu^)
where u is an individual or a
predicate variable.
(A2*) <1> -» Vu<F where u is an individual or a
predicate variable not free in <F.
(A3*) 3 x (a = x) where a is singular term in which
x is not free.
(XL*) (a = b) -» (<1> <- > "$) where a, b are singular terms and
Uf comes from <I> by replacing one or
more free occurrences of b by free
occurrences of a.
(CP*) ] Fn Vx1..xn[Fn(x1,..,xn) <-><b]
where F does not occur free in <F
n
and x.,..,x are distinct vars.1 n
(X-CONV*) [\x^,..,xn<I>] (a^,..,an) <- > $(aj/xj,..,an/x11)
where a^,..,an are singular terms
and each a. is free for x- in <E>.
(IDX*) [Xx1>..>xnR(x1,..,xn)] = R
where R is an n-place predicate
variable or constant.
Inference Rules: The two inference rules are MP and UG.8
Note that (CP*) is an instance of (CPX*) where :
(CPX*) ] Fn ([Xxj,...xn<E>] = F ) where F^ is not free in <1>.
7 Classical tautologies.
8 Modus Ponens and Universal Generalisation, where MP is: infer from $ —► and <t> that UG is
infer from <E> that Vx<E>.
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The system (just described) is subject to Russell's paradox, for take the special
instance of:
(CP*): j F Vx [F(x) <- > -i x(x)],
one can then derive: F(F) <- > -• F(F).
So the system is inconsistent and we need ways of making it consistent. In part B, we
shall come to solutions for such a problem. For the moment, note that the presence of
(CP*) is necessary for second-order logics with nominalised predicates and that the
problem comes from (CP*) together with (A3*) under various logical laws. We shall
see in part B the dilferent solutions that have been offered and the effects on
nominalisation. However, before closing this section, I would like to comment on the
ontological status of sets and on the nature of Russell's paradox, as the solutions
depend on both issues.
A. 1.3. The ontological status of sets: There are two main views of sets: the
mathematical conception of set and the logical conception. According to the
mathematical conception, a set is determined by the elements that belong to it. E.g.
{1,2,3} is the set of the numbers 1 2 and T. The logical conception, on the other hand,
regards sets as existing according to their defining concepts, and not their constituent
objects; so here {1,2,3} might be the set of positive integers less than 4. Frege's
conception of set was a logical one, and is known in the literature as the naive
conception of set. According to this view, any predicate has an extension and sets are
extensions of predicates. However, under the classical laws of logic and especially the
law of excluded middle (LEM) and non-free logic (where not necessarily each element
denote), this notion of set is subject to Russell's paradox.9 I shall illustrate the
occurrence of the paradox by assuming both LEM and that every predicate has an
extension. Now, if one chooses P(x) to be ->(x€x), then {x: ->(x6x)} is an r to which
LEM applies. So we have either (r€r) or ->(r€r). In both cases we get a contradiction.
9 However, the paradox holds even in minimal logic and other non-classical logics, e.g. we can derive
the paradox without the use of LEM which means that the paradox is intuitionistically derivable.
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So the theory contains a paradox (a contradictory statement is provable in it) even
though the axioms seem true and the rules of inference valid. We get a theory that is
inconsistent even though we were very careful in building it.
After Frege's naive set theory was shown to be inconsistent, set theorists were
anxious to solve the problem, and many directions were followed to overcome the
paradox. Frege himself had something to say about the paradox. He stated that if one
abandoned the naive conception and the use of full comprehension, it would not be
obvious how to define numbers (see [FR3], Frege on Russell's paradox). This follows
because the essential definition of numbers in Frege's theory was based on the
existence of extensions of concepts - thus the paradox shook Frege's whole theory.
Frege suggested that the solution lay in either banishing LEM for classes, or forbiding
some concepts from having extensions. He was not satisfied with the first solution
because he wanted classes to be full objects - and full objects obey LEM. If classes are
to be considered as improper objects then this will create an infinite number of types
in the theory, for we are going to have functions that apply to proper, improper or
mixed arguments. Frege was not in favour of that solution, and preferred to
acknowledge the existence of concepts that have no extensions. This would affect
axiom (V)10 (in [FR3], which Frege was not satisfied with from the beginning) and in
particular (Vb) which is:11
(Vb) z'f(z) = z'g(z) ==> Vx (x falls under f <->x falls under g)
This axiom states that if two concepts are equal in extension then whatever falls
under one falls under the other. Frege made only general remarks about the
inconsistency and did not pin down what caused the problem. He sometimes felt the
problem lay in (Vb) and at other times thought that the assumption of the existence
of an extension to each concept was to blame. (Va)12 is acceptable as it takes us from
10 (V) z'f(z) = z'g(z) <==> Vx (x falls under f <->x falls under g), where z'f(z) stands for the ex¬
tension of f.
11 See [FR3], pages 214-224 for a good account of the following discussion
12 I.e. the opposite direction of (Vb): Vx (x falls under f <->x falls under g) == > z'f(z) = z'g(z).
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equality that holds in general to an equality that holds of graphs (or extensions). But
according to Frege (in [FR3] page 219),
"We cannot in general take the words
the function <£(£) has the same graph as the function MK£)
to mean the same thing as the words
the functions <£(|) and M>(£) always have the same value for the same
argument;
and we must take into account the possibility that there are concepts with no
extension (...)."
However, Frege did not realise that his domain of concepts was far too big. Concepts
are propositional functions but according to Frege's conception, there are far more
propositions than there should be. For each object a, —a (the content of a ) is a
proposition even though a was not. Thus Frege has far too many concepts and some
paradoxical sentences stand for concepts when they should not do. Accordingly, a
way of ruling out the paradox might be to restrict the number of concepts. Let us
look again at the paradoxical sentence: the set of all things that do not belong to
themselves. Under the restriction strategy, we cannot tell whether this sentence
stands for a concept or not, as we do not know if this is a propositional function or
not so we cannot think of its extension.
We could say that there were two ways of reformulating set theory. One is to
abandon Frege's definition of set and use the mathematical notion of set. The second is
to keep to the logical definition of set and try to make it consistent. We shall, in part
B, see reformulations of set theory in both directions.
To conclude this section, it is worth drawing attention to the role self reference plays
in these set theoretic paradoxes. Paradoxes involving self reference are well known in
the literature, and are of two kinds: logical and semantical paradoxes. Russell's
paradox has been classified under the logical category, as have the barber's paradox
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and Cantor's paradox. So far we have not said anything about the semantical
paradoxes. As they are important to intensionality I shall illustrate them with
some examples:
Grelling's paradox: Some adjectives possess the property that they denote (e.g.
English. Polysyllabic) and some do not (eg French). Call the second type heterological;
then
heterological is heterological iff heterological is not heterological.
Another example of this paradox is: A concept is predicable if it can be predicated of
itself, otherwise it is impredicable. Hence,
impredicable is impredicable iff impredicable is not impredicable.
Another very important semantical paradox is
The liar's paradox: Assume that John Doe utters on December 1st, 1970 the following
English sentence and nothing else all day:
"The only sentence uttered by John Doe on December 1st, 1970 is false."
This sentence is true iff it is false.
Paradoxes of this sort should not lead us to reject self-reference, which is needed for
many disciplines. We have to find a solution which will allow self-reference without
any contradiction.
A. 2. The problem ofthe existence ofmodels
The theory discussed in A.l. is inconsistent, so it does not have models. But even
in the case of a theory whose consistency we are sure of, we still sometimes cannot
imagine what the models look like. This section describes what a model of
nominalisation should be, and what the difficulties of constructing such models are.
A.2.1. What a model should look like: A model of nominalisation will be roughly as
follows: M = <U, P, f> where U is the domain of objects, P is the domain of functions
from U into {0,1} and f is the nominalisation function, f is a function from P into U
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which should be injective. This implies that P is a subset of U up to an isomorphism.
Let me describe in more detail what this means. In trying to build our semantic
function which maps each syntactic entity into a semantic one, we should do the
following;
(1) Map individual variables and singular terms into objects in U.
(2) Map the predicates into P, the domain of the first order properties. The
nominalised items are singular terms and they are mapped into U. The
function f acts as a nominalisation function, assigning to each element p of P,
an element in U called the correlate of p. This correlate is the denotation of
the nominalised item that corresponds to the predicate.
f.P—>j(P) is an isomorphism because:
(i) f is a well defined function: We assume that each property has a single
correlate.
Cii) f is injective: We assume that each two distinct properties in P have
distinct correlates in f(P).
(iii) f is surjective: Because every element in f(P) corresponds to an element in
P.
So in constructing a model of nominalisation, we should construct three domains
such as U, P and f(P) satisfying the condition that P (or f(P)) is a subset of U.
According to Cantor's diagonal theorem, we cannot take P to be the set of all
functions from U to {0,1}. We have to restrict P, but we should not restrict it too
much, for we would like to obtain the nominalisation of all the desired items.
In the above construction of f, I assumed that two distinct predicates have
distinct nominals. It should not be assumed that this requires the principle of
extensionality to hold in the domain P. If we have two predicates which are both true
of the same objects but are distinct then their extensions, and hence nominalisations,
must also be distinct. In fact one of the main issues in a Frege structure is, as Aczel
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puts it in [AC3]:
"The point is that extensional equality between sets must not be confused
with the equality relation between sets as objects."
The above construction of f in no way assumes extensionality. To see this consider
the following example: take the two concepts positive integer less than or equal to 2_
and positive integer which divides 2. We know that the extension of the first concept
contains 1, 2 and only those numbers. The extension of the second concept contains
also 1, 2 and only those. However, this in no way implies that the two extensions as
objects are the same. So, although the theory of properties itself is intensional, the
principle of extensionality still holds of predicates. In [AC6] for example, this line is
assumed. There, properties are propositional functions, yet the predication of a
property to an individual is not necessarily function application except in the case
where the property P is itself basic. In this theory, although properties should be
treated intensionally, we can still assume extensionality on predicates. This is because
the predication of a property P to an object a is not always the application of the
propositional function P. It is only application when P is basic, which is fine because
we obviously know everything about basic properties. (Basic properties are things like
red, tall, etc whereas non-basic properties are those obtained from open formulas.)13 I
hope by now it is obvious that assuming that the function f above is injective does
not entail assuming extensionality of properties: our example [AC6] demonstrates this;
if this is still not clear, the reader can refer to part C of Chapter 2.
I am trying to say here that two distinct predicates have two distinct nominals,
yet we can assume that two sets have the same elements without being equal as
objects (i.e. the principle of extensionality does not hold for sets). I am also
interested in having extensionality between functions and the reasons for that are
two:
13 Clearly models of the above sort exist if one does not require that there should be denotations for
all open wffs.
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(1) Things get quite complicated if we did not have extensionality on
functions, see for instance [SCl].
(2) Extensionality on functions facilitates the identification of properties with
classes.
[BE6] has many examples of theories where the principle of extensionality is assumed
on functions yet the theory of properties is intensional. Also Aczel's work in [AC6]
concludes that properties are propositional functions yet predication is functional
application only when the property is basic. The main reason that Aczel gave to
defend his thesis was to do with intensionality. Take
S-PFT: Vx(pred(P,x) = <D) <==>(P = xO>).
This principle which is rejected for reasons of intensionality, asserts that predication
and property abstraction are inverses of each other. Aczel also presents an alternative
operator pred', where
Vx(pred'(P,x) = <I>) <==> (P = x$).
And this pred' is really functional application.
Some might argue here that there is no relation between intensionality and the
distinction between predication and functional application. For instance, in [SC2],
Scott only wanted the three axioms:
(a) Xx.t = Xy.t[y/x]
(|8) (Xx.t)(y) = t[y/x]
(y) Xx.t - Xx.t' <== > Vx.(t=t')
and did not insist on (e) : t(x) = t'(x) -»t = t'. But in there, even though he did not
study intensionality, he made a distinction between predication and application.
Also14 one can build a fine grained meaning algebra of the Carnap-Lewis type starting
from extensional primitive entities. This is no reason however to deny that in [AC6],
the distinction between predication and functional application was due to
14 This was drawn to my attention by Uwe Monnich.
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intensionality matters.
A.2.2 Difficulties with such models: Cantor's Theorem will pose a difficulty to any
theory which aims to make functions play the role of objects. According to Cantor's
theorem, the cardinality of a function space is bigger than the cardinality of the
domain itself. Cantor's argument goes as follows:
Cantor's theorem: Given any finite or infinite transfinite cardinal, there exists a greater
one. More precisely, if S is any set, then the set PS whose elements are all the subsets
of S has a greater cardinality than S. (PS is the power set of S and we know that the
power set of any set is isomorphic to the set of all the functions from S into {0,1}).
Proof:
If S— >PS is bijective then the elements are classified in two categories: The
first is when s belongs to $(s) and the second is when s does not belong to
<Ks). Let A = (s: -• s €<K{s)}. We have that ASPS therefore A = <Ka) for some a.
Hence a€A iff -> a6A. Contradiction. □
The above argument does not only apply to the characteristic functions of S. We can
also prove that for any V with at least two distinct elements, the set of functions
from V to V has greater cardinality than V. The proof is as follows:15
Assume that V is isomorphic to [V— >V], he. there exists an F from V to
[V— >V] which is bijective. Let us define G: V— >V such that:
G(x) = 1 if F(x)(x) = 0
= 0 if F(x)(x) - 1.
We have assumed that V contains {0,1} (Actually, we could take any two
distinct elements of V). As F is surjective, there exists a v in V such that F(v)
= G. This implies that: G(v) = 1 iff G(v) = 0, which is absurd. □
A.2.3 Existence of models: The above shows that we are going to have problems
15 It may be sufficient here just to point out that 2^CV^ and this implies that card(V^) > card(V).
constructing models of nominalisation - recall that we previously wanted P to be a
subset of U, but by Cantor's theorem the cardinality of P is greater than that of U. In
essence, we need to find ways of restricting P without either lapsing into triviality or
running foul of Cantor's theorem. That is, we are looking for interesting restrictions -
restrictions which leave us with enough functions for nominalisation. We must
break the ties created by the old tradition and build somewhat more original models.
In part B, we shall talk about different ways of proving the existence of non-trivial
models which are not susceptible to Cantor's argument. Those models will contain
denotations for all nominalised items. Scott models and Frege structures both possess
this property; but as we shall see, the former have a difficulty regarding
quantification, while the latter do not.
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PART B. THE DIFFERENT ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION
We have seen the problems of the semantics of nominalisation from the
theoretical side and from the perspective of those issues pertaining to model
existence. In this part we meet some of the solutions that have been offered to those
problems, and comment briefly on their application to nominalisation.
B.l. Solution to the theoretical problem
We said that the theoretical problem is mainly a problem of set theory and of
predication theory. The following is a summary of various set theories and their
application to the development of theories of nominalisation. This summary looks at
these issues from three different angles. The first has to do with the language of the
theory, the second is concerned with the axioms and the third deals with logic.
B.l.l Notes on set theory:
B.l.1.1. Altering the language: Since Russell's letter to Frege, concerning the
inconsistency of Frege's system, there have been many attempts at overcoming the
paradox. The first two accounts of avoiding the paradox by restricting the language
were due to Russell and Poincar£. They both disallowed impredicative specification:
only predicative specification (as will be defined below) was to be permitted. Russell's
own solution (in [RUl]) was to adopt the vicious circle principle which can be roughly
stated as follows:
"No entity determined by a condition that refers to a certain totality should
belong to this totality."
PoincarS (in [POl]) took refuge in banning "les definitions non predicatives" which
were taken by him to be:16
16 Definitions by a relation between the object to be defined and all individuals of a kind of which ei¬
ther the object itself to be defined is supposed to be a part or other things that cannot be themselves
defined except by the object to be defined.
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"Definitions par une relation entre l'objet a clfefinir et tous les individus d'un
genre dont l'objet a dfefinir est suppose faire lui-meme partie ou bien dont sont
supposes faire parties des etre qui ne peuvent etre eux-meme definis que par
l'objet a definir".
So both Russell and Poincare required only predicative sets to be considered, where A
= {x: <£(x)} is predicative iff <3> contains no variable which can take A as a value.17
Russell's and Poincare's solution was to use predicative comprehension, instances of
which start with individuals, then generate sets, then new sets and so on as in the
following example: Take 0 at level 0, {0,{0}} at level 1, {0,{{0}},{0,{0}}} at level 2 and
so on. Russell's simple theory of types in Principia Mathematica applied the vicious
circle principle, assuming all the elements of the set before constructing it. This
theory obviously overcomes the paradox, but it is rather unsatisfactory, for the
following reasons:
1. We need formulas which are not stratified (i.e. where we have
impredicativity), and there are many sets we would like to have but cannot be
provided within this theory.
2. A class can have members only of uniform type. Also, sets here can neither
belong to themselves, nor contain other sets from the same level.
3. There are infinite series of universal classes, one for each level; but no one
unique universal set.
4. -x (the complement of x) comprises all members of x of next lower type
than x; and not everything that does not belong to x.
5. There is an infinite number of null classes, one for each level.
6. Boolean algebra is reproduced in each type.
7. Numbers are no longer unique as we have different sets of natural numbers
at each level.
17 This helps because it is otherwise very easy to get a vicious circle fallacy if we let the arguments of
a certain propositional function (or the elements of a set) presuppose the function (or the set) itself.
Note however, that the theory offered by Russell is quite different from what we
know today as the simple theory of types. For Russell, a sentence is to be placed
(within a context) into a hierarchy according to €, so xGy would be acceptable if the
variable x is going to take values of lower range than that of y and formulae like
(xGx) or ((x€y) & (y€x)) would be unacceptable. Those sentences that satisfy this
requirement of '€' are called stratified and Russell only accepts stratified formulae.
This is how the paradox is overcome, for the sentence <1> denoting ->(y€y) is not
stratified.
Here I should stop to explain the concept of stratification for it is going to form an
important step in our discussion and assessment of our theory in terms of the others.
There are two types of stratification: homogeneous stratification and heterogeneous
stratification. Frege and Russell used stratification in the second sense but Cocchiarella
stuck to the first type. A well formed formula $ is said to be heterogeneously
stratified if there is a function f from the variables and constants of 4> to the natural
numbers such that for each atomic well formed formula F(x.,..,x ) of <E>,I n
f(F) = 1+ max [fCx.)].
$ is said to be homogeneously stratified if the function f is further restricted so that
f(xp = f(xj) for O^i, j^h. As an example of a non-stratified formula we take: It is nice
to be nice. We also take John loves Mary and running as an heterogeneously stratified
formula and John loves Mary as an homogeneously stratified one.
B.l.1.2 Altering the axioms: We can avoid the paradox by altering not the language
but the axioms of the theory. The most straightforward such theory is ZF (Zermelo-
Fraenkel) where the axioms are made to fit the limitation of size doctrine; that is, sets
are not allowed to get too big too quickly. Take the system of first order logic
provided in A.1, and alter comprehension to the following:
For each open well formed formula <I>,
3 x Vy [(y£x) <->(y€z)&<!>] where x does not occur in $.
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It is exactly this new axiom which is responsible for the elimination of the paradoxes.
Take Russell's paradox: to prove the existence of {x: ->(x€x)} we need a z big enough
so that {x: -> (x€x)} is included in z. But we cannot show the existence of such a z.
Russell's paradox is restricted in ZF as follows:
Take <J(t) to be -i(t€t),
take n = {t: (tSx)^ (t€t)}
If n€n ==>(n€x) and ->(n€n) contradiction,
If ->(n£n) ==>if n€x ==>n€n contradiction,
if -> n 6x then we are fine.
So the limitation of size doctrine exemplified by the above axiom is how we avoid the
paradox.18
It is worth pointing out that although very different conceptually, both the simple
theory of types and ZF give rise to an iterative concept of set. That is, both require
the elements of a set be present before a new set can be constructed. (For a precise
formulation of the iterative conception of set, and a proof that ZF is a typical iterative
theory, see [BOl])
ZF is not the only axiomatic approach aimed at restricting the paradoxes. In NF (New
Foundations), Quine restricts the axiom of comprehension of A. 1.2, to obtain the
following:
SCP: } y Vx [(x€y) <- > <f(x)] where x is not free in $(x)
and <£(x) is stratified.
Thus it applies only to stratified formulae and now the only concepts that are allowed
to have extensions are the concepts that correspond to these stratified formulae. In
ZF, we did not have a universal set whereas in NF we do, for take x=x. this is a
18 To avoid the paradox, we do not accept very comprehensive sets.
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stratified formula.
NF has only one universal set, one complement of each set, and one null set.
Furthermore, Cantor's theorem does not hold in NF (the universal set is
equinumerous to its power set.)19 However, NF is said to lack motivation because its
axiom of comprehension is justified only on technical grounds and one's mental image
of set theory does not lead to such an axiom. To overcome some of the difficulties,
Quine adopted similar measures to B-G (Bernays-Godel) set theory. Like B-G, ML
contains a bifurcation of classes into elements and non-elements. Sets can enjoy the
property of being full objects whereas classes cannot. ML was obtained from NF by
replacing SCP by two axioms, one for class existence and one for elementhood. The
rule of class existence provides for the existence of the classes of all elements
satisfying any condition O, stratified or not. The rule of elementhood is such as to
provide the elementhood of just those classes which exist for NF. Therefore, the two
axioms of comprehension of ML are:
The axiom ofcomprehension by a set:
(1) ] y Vx (x£y <->$(x)),
where <E(x) is a stratified formula with set variables only
in which y does not occur free.
The axiom ofimpredicative comprehension by a class:
(2) ] y Vx(x£y <-><Kx)),
where <t(x) is any formula in which y does not occur free.
ML was liked both for the manipulative convenience we regain in it and the
symmetrical universe it furnishes. It was however proved subject to the Burali-Forti
paradox: (The well ordered set a of all ordinals has an ordinal which is greater than
any member of a> and hence is greater than co.)
19 However, NF is weak for mathematical induction and the axiom of choice is not compatible with
NF. We cannot prove Peano's axiom [s(n) = s(m) —»n = m] in it, unless we assume the existence of a class
with m+1 elements.
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Suggestions for making ML consistent:
(1) Fitch suggests staying within the dependable realism where we are assured of
consistency and expanding it as far as possible. Fitch's suggestion comes under non¬
standard logic which we shall meet in the next paragraph.
(2) The other is Black's suggestion to construct a system similar to ML but in which
the contradictions are no longer derivable. Wang's system P fits this program.
Wang keeps to ML except that the axiom (l) is restricted further to the requirement
that <1> should not only be stratified as in NF and ML, but $ should also be normal,
where a normal formula is one in which all bound variables are element variables (so
quantification is restricted). Wang claims that P is the system Quine originally
intended, and proved P consistent relative to NF.
Note that the axiom of infinity can be proved in P and that everything provable in
type theory is also provable in P. Note also that Burali-Forti's paradox is no longer
provable in P; this is because, to prove such paradox, non-normal formulae are used,
but these are excluded in P.
Our description above of Russell's type theory, ZF set theory and Quine's NF
and ML, has been brief, but should suffice to convince the reader of the need to have
as many sets as one can. It has been argued by those who favour the iterative
conception of set that we do not need self-application (see [BOl]). But we have seen
the necessity of type-free theories and the development of many type free systems
such as Feferman's (in [FE2] and [FE9]). Kripke's work on the theory of Truth [KRl]
is further evidence that we should not rule out self referential statements and that we
must look for a theory which allows for it. Godel's work and especially his proof of
the incompleteness theorems, showed that self-referential statements are as legitimate
as arithmetic: and is not set theory the domain with which we study such statements?
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Natural language is full of self-reference and self-application like: There is nothing
more beautiful than beauty. All this points to the need for as many sets as possible,
including sets that belong to themselves.20
B.l.1.3. Altering the logic:
Rejection ofthe law ofexcluded middle: The paradox we faced was of the form:
CxGx) <->->(x6x).
Clearly the paradox can be avoided by dropping the assumption of LEM that any one
place predicate either applies to a given object or does not. Fitch offered a system
which did just that. Note that here we can stick to two valued logics and that this
system is not necessarily intuitionistic. If we go back to the example of impredicative
specification given at the beginning of this section, according to this approach we can
assume the existence of R, the set of all elements which do not contain themselves.
What we cannot do though is assume that we have either (RGR) or -< (R6R).
Many valued logics: (x6x) <-> ->(xGx) would not be contradictory if a consistent set
of truth values was chosen. Consider as an illustration a three valued logic where the
truth values are 0 (truth), l(false) and u(undefined). The above sentence21 is not
contradictory for we associate with (xGx) the value u and we define in the semantics
that the negation of u is u. Therefore u <- > -> u is not contradictory and the paradox
is avoided. Note here that there are many three valued interpretations and that the
status of u varies from one interpretation to another. For some, u acts as not vet
known, for others it is undefined. If we take the view that u is not yet known then
we can order our models according to the state of our knowledge. Knowledge is
cumulative whereas ignorance is not. What we know up to a stage, will always
20 All the above set theories reject the impredicative specifications and assumptions of classes and
class existence, except ML which assumes impredicative clauses due to axiom (2) above. However, both
the axiomatic approaches and type theoretic approaches to set theory are in need of a model which is
infinite, and we do not know how to construct one in such a way as to avoid the antinomies.
21 According to some interpretations of <->, this sentence has no truth value; this is the case in
Kleene's 3-valued logic.
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remain known after that stage, but we will also know more things. Domains looked at
in this way are ordered and the fixed point theorem is applicable; this enables the
construction of the limit model which is a model of the limit of our knowledge. Such
an ordering of domains is very useful for Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science
but is problematic for the semantics of nominalisation. Note in passing that not all the
3-valued interpretations would allow us to have a full comprehension principle.
Intuitionistic logic: Intuitionists banish metaphysics from their (mathematical)
theories. Although for them all objects are abstract, they are constructive: existence is
equated with being creatable by constructive methods. However the demand for
constructive evidence is not a sign of limitation, for intuitionists have some secure
means to construct not only the finite objects but also the infinite. The domain of
objects or of the mathematical properties of these objects is not fixed in advance;
things in their universe are incomplete and will remain incompletable (Godel).22 So
existence is constructibility and the ways of constructions are not known a priori.
Objects and their properties are mental constructions. Language is not important; for
it is vague and ambiguous - even if it is a formal one.23 Note that Russell's theory of
types is itself constructive if we neglect the axioms of infinity and of reducibility.
According to the intuitionists there are two ways to build sets, either by constructing
their elements (species) or by characterising a property of their elements (spreads).
We can only admit x to be an element of S (spreads or species) if x has or might have
been constructed before S. In the case of a species S, an object is a member of S if it
has been or might have been defined before S, and which satisfies the condition S.
Intuitionists reject classical mathematics and the law of excluded middle. Their
22 This concept of incompleteness is best illustrated by a quotation from Poincar6 (in [POl]): "Quand
je parle de tous les nombres entiers, je veux dire tous les nombres entiers qu'on a inventfcs et tous ceux
que l'on pourra inventer un jour... et c'est ce "que l'on pourra" qui est l'infini". When I speak of whole
numbers, I mean all whole numbers already invented and all those that could be invented one day... and
it it the "could be" that is infinite.
23 Language remains important in practical terms, of course: otherwise these mental constructions
could not be communicated from mathematician to mathematician.
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argument is that classical mathematics is not safe and is subject to the paradoxes.
According to the classical mathematician, the meaning of any sentence consists of its
truth conditions, and as those truth conditions obtain independently of human
knowledge we have only two truth values (true and false). For the intuitionists,
truth is no longer bivalent: the truth of any sentence is a proof for it. The meaning of
a logical connective can no longer be given as the eifect it has on each sentence with
this connective as the main one: instead it is given in terms of proofs. As the
intuitionists reject the LEM, some strange results, or results which the classical
mathematician would not dream of asserting, obtain. For the classical mathematician,
there are continuous24 and non-continuous functions. For the intuitionists, all real-
valued functions which are defined over closed bounded intervals are even uniformly
continuous. Of course the process is not magical: when the classical mathematician
provides an intuitionist with a real valued function defined over a closed interval and
which is not continuous according to the classical conception, the intuitionist would
answer that this function is not defined (in intuitionistic terms). For the classical
mathematician, for each set S included in X, X = S U (X-S). For the intuitionist this is
only true in the case where S is detachable. That is when for each xGX, we have a
proof of either (x€S) or of ->(xSS). For the classical mathematician, interpretation is
based on set-theoretic and truth-theoretic models whereas for the intuitionist, we can
use: topological interpretation.25 Kripke model interpretation26 or Hevting algebra.27
These are not the only ways to avoid the paradoxes. For instance Hintikka (in
[HI2]) avoids them by altering the interpretation. So for CP we have
24 A function is continuous over a domain, if it is continuous at every point in that domain. A func¬
tion is continuous at a point y if whenever we take a point x which is very close to y, f(x) will be very
close to f(y).
25 Where for each P we assign [[P]] (an open set of a topology <X, 0>) to be the set all of whose p-
basic neighbourhoods subsets prove P. Then we use algebraic constructs to interpret the connectives, e.g.
[[P1&P2]] = [[PI]]
26 This is essentially like the ordered models of the many valued logics; at each stage, knowledge is
increased and ignorance reduced.
27 A Heyting algebra is a structure <A, fl, U, = >, T. I > such that A is a lattice with respect to Q
U _!_j. T and where =>is to be interpreted as implication.
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] y Vx [(x 6y) <- > [-> (x = y) -»<5(x)] ].
Also the tone of our discussion has been concerned only with the logical paradoxes;
solutions to the semantical paradoxes consist in the separation of the object language
and the metalanguage, but this issue is not our direct concern in this thesis.
Frege structures: Frege structures are not only solutions to the problem of model
existence, but are also systems of set theory in their own right: they single out that
part of Frege's theory which is consistent. Frege structures could be classified as a
restriction of logic, and they free Frege's notion of set from the paradox in the
following way: the logical constants can apply to any object, but the result will never
be a truth value unless the object itself was a proposition. The condition x€x is not
necessarily a proposition and so
CxGx) <->-> (x€x) is not contradictory.
The logic is weak in this way: the logical constants still apply to any object as with
Frege but the result is a truth-value only if the object itself is one. With Frege this
was not the case; he had the operator — (which stands for content) and which gives
the content of each object. So —A is always a truth value whether or not the object A
itself was a truth value. All the other logical constants in Frege's theory were applied
to the content of the object and so always resulted in a truth-value. So in particular
-l-A (not A) is always a truth value whether or not A was. Realising this about
Frege's theory, Aczel reduced the logic to a weaker one where the logical constants
only give truth values for truth values. In Aczel's Frege structures, the axiom (Vb) is
not rejected. In fact the whole of axiom (V) is proven as a theorem in Frege structures
and does not need to be asserted as an axiom as with Frege. Also, each concept has an
extension, and decidable sets (the extensions of decidable concepts) are objects to
which LEM applies.28 In a Frege structure you can prove that a set belongs to itself,
(take R = {x: (x = x)}) and so it seems quite convenient to think of Frege structures as
28 This is actually discussed in detail in chapter 3 under the heading "decidable properties".
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models for nominalisation, but I shall leave this matter for the next section. What we
have asserted in this section is that Frege structures solve the theoretical (ontological)
problem of set theory and so are candidates to be used for the semantics of
nominalisation.29 Before we move to the use of those theories for nominalisation, we
give a summary of the work that was carried by Feferman in the foundations of set
theory. This is because Feferman's work investigates all of these restrictions (i.e.
restricting the axioms, the logic or the language) and plays a crucial role in the area of
property theory.
B.1.1.4 Feferman and the foundational issues: Feferman, in many of his papers, has
worked on the question of the paradoxes and the possible solutions. He investigated
for instance in [FE9] the strategies of restricting the axioms, the logic or the language.
He also investigated in [FE2] a theory Tq which I believe is worth more attention than
it has received. Feferman's Tq was a formulation of Bishop's constructive
mathematics, as are the theories of Martin-Lofs and Myhill. Yet Martin-Lof's is the
theory which had been most used by Computer Scientists because it is more related to
notions such as computation, program specifications and constructive proofs. Maybe it
is the presence of canonical/noncanonical elements in Martin-Lof's theory and the
notion of types which are very attractive to computer scientists. Yet I believe that
Feferman's theory is simpler, has notions which are more related to property theories
(such as abstraction and application) and it studies classes, properties, comprehension
principles and various other notions of interest to a theory of nominalisation.
Of course in this thesis there is no room to discuss either Tq or any other of
Feferman's theories which avoid the paradoxes by various means. We must still
however introduce the comprehension principles that Feferman uses in two of his
theories.
29 Before closing this section, we mention that the paradox does not occur in free logic. That is if one
assumes that not every term denotes, one can have a consistent theory. [TE2] provides a good account of
how the paradox is avoided in free logic.
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In Tq, the comprehension principle is restricted to elementary formulas where a
formula is elementary if it is both stratified and has no bound class variables. Hence
the principle looks like:
ECA: GX)({x:<$(x,y,z)} = X & Vx(x£X <==> <l(x,y,z))),
where <£(x,y,z) can only be an elementary formula.
Tq was a constructive theory. Feferman, before Tq, had investigated the use of full
classical logic. Yet the paradox is avoided by having positive and negative formulas.
The membership relation is now split into two partial predicates 6 and €' with the
axiom:
Dis(€, 6') : -i(x€{u/$(u,y1,..yn)} & x€'{u/fl(u,y1,..y11)})
The comprehension principle is then divided into two comprehension principles: one




Now of course Russell's paradox is avoided here because if we take R = {x/—<x€x},
then
R6R <==>(-.R€R)+ = (R6R)~ = RG'R.
These are two of the ways that Feferman uses to avoid the paradoxes. However none
of them as we see has a full comprehension principle, whereas Frege structures
provide us with a full one.
B.1.2 Effects of set theory on Nominalisation: I have said above that nominalisation
inherits the same problem as set theory. Therefore, it should inherit the same
solution. I shall summarise here the influence that the various approaches to set
theory had on the semantics of nominalisation.
B.1.2.1 Language and nominalisation: The reform of set theory by following the route
of altering the language was based on the vicious circle principle, and resulted in
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Russell's theory of types. The language here becomes typed and the ladder of types
has to be climbed step by step. Russell's theory of types was made simpler by Church
and this is essentially the language used by Montague (in [TH2]) as an application to
natural languages. (Montague was the first to apply this approach of set theory to the
syntax and semantics of natural languages.) In Chapter 6, we shall find a detailed
description of this account and of its inappropriateness to nominalisation. It is worth
mentioning here that Montague did not himself deal with nominalisation and that his
account is very problematic from the nominalisation point of view. There have been
few attempts at dealing with nominalisation within the Montague tradition.
Examples are Carlson's work and Parson's floating types (in [CAl] and [PA5]). The
main problem with Montague semantics is the typing constraints and the existence of
the function f which has to associate once and for all the syntactic type of each
syntactic category. This could be dealt with by changing the function f, but the
approach is cumbersome and leads to difficulties.
B.1.2.2 Axioms and nominalisation: We said above that type theory is not adequate to
handle nominalisation. What about the solution based on restricting the axioms? Does
it help nominalisation? The way to know the answer is to try the various methods we
have met of restricting the axioms. If we start with ZF set theory, we will still get a
problem. This is because in ZF, we cannot have a set that contains itself. What about
systems like NF or ML? We know that they contain sets that belong to themselves,
and so they should be promising candidates for the semantics of nominalisation. In
fact they have already been applied to this by Cocchiarella who used Quine's approach
to both NF and ML and obtained two systems. We illustrate by going back to
Cocchiarella's system of non-standard second order logic shown in A.1.
1. Altering (CP*) Here, the paradox is avoided by restricting the formulae in (CP*) to
what is called stratified formulae. A stratified formula is one built up with respect to
the vicious circle principle as we explained in the previous section. That is, one cannot
- 46-
assume the undefined in trying to define it. So a stratified formula is one where the
arguments are of lower level than the level of the predicates. This means that in
(CP*), we do not take Fn to be simply free in O, but we impose in addition the
constraint that the whole bivalence be stratified. To return to our example, X(X) is
not a stratified formula and so the comprehension principle cannot assure us of the
existence of the predicate F. We therefore failed to prove the contradiction F(F) <->
->F(F).
2. Altering (A*) Instead of altering (CP*), we alter (A3*) to (A3**) where:
(A3**) Vx } y (x = y)
We then have to add (a = a) as an axiom and replace X-CONV* to:
(E/X-CONY*) [Xxj,..xn <1>] (aj,...an) <->] x1,...xn((a1 = x^)&. &(an = xn)&4>)
where no x. occurs free in any aj, for 1 ^i, j ^i.
Note here that because of the elimination of (A3*), we can no longer prove the
theorem
Vx<I> -»<J(a/x).
Therefore, we cannot substitute F for x in the special instance of (CP*) and so we
cannot derive the paradox.
The option of restricting either (A3*) or (CP*) was put forward by Cocchiarella, and
the two systems were proved to be equivalent to NF and ML respectively ([C02]),
even though Cocchiarella committed himself to a conceptualistic (naive) conception of
set and argued that both NF and ML lack motivation if they are regarded as set
theories in the mathematical sense. However, I have two criticisms of Cocchiarella's
two systems. The first is that the models are not at all easy to imagine: we have no
idea what they look like. The second is that restricting nominalisation to stratified
formulas means that not all the desired items can be nominalised. There are
expressions we can nominalise in natural languages that this approach does not
handle the nominalisation of; e.g. nice(nice). It must be noted of course that this
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criticism is basically of his first system, since the second system does allow
nice(nice). But even Cocchiarella himself rejects this system because in it the axiom:
(IND*) (VX)(VY)(X^Y <== >(VxXX(x) <==>Y(x))).
is refutable.
B.1.2.3 Logic and nominalisation: The last category is the use of non-standard logics.
Take for instance the use of a three-valued logic, rather than the classical two-valued
one. F(F) <- > -i F(F) would not be inconsistent any more, for we can give F(F) the
value u(undefined) and in the interpretation of -> and <->, we take: -iu<->u. This
solution has been applied to nominalisation by Ray Turner ([TU2, 3, 4, 5]). Turner
used three valued logics and this allowed him to have an untyped language which
could deal with nominalisation without falling into the paradox. This approach has
been successful as far as predication is concerned, for one can nominalise all formulae.
However it has a problem with quantification, since it is only to quantify over ideal
elements (i.e. the limits of the finite ones). (It has been claimed that this is so
mainly because Scott domains are only suitable for Computer Science applications and
not for linguistics. But as it is a question of models, I shall leave the details of the
problem of quantification to be briefly discussed in part B.2 and in Chapter 7.)
However, anybody who adopts a non-two-valued logic should be able to defend their
use of it. Many-valued logics have been criticised by philosophers as being unnatural,
and Turner did not offer any justification for using them.
In this section, we have talked about the set theoretical approaches that have
been offered. We looked at the theory of types and nominalisation and although we
did not claim it was impossible to work out a theory of nominalisation based on
Montague's semantics, we did say that it was difficult and cumbersome. We recall
here that Russell's theory of types was unsatisfactory and so other theories came into
being. The same applies to nominalisation, for Turner's and Cocchiarella's systems are
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less problematic than Montague's approach, because systems like NF and ML, or logics
which are non-standard, were better attempts to provide a system without paradox
than Russell's theory of types. Our criticism of Cocchiarella is that only stratified
formulae can be nominalised and that his models are difficult to imagine. In the light
of the theoretical problem, we do not find anything against Turner except his use of
three valued logics, which have a very controversial status in the literature. However,
when it comes to the question of models, we shall find that a problem occurs which
we shall describe in B.2. It seems therefore that all the theories of nominalisation
that have been worked out so far face some problems. There still are many solutions
for set theory that have not hitherto been applied to the semantics of nominalisation,
one of these being the notion of Frege structures. It seems at this stage that all the
disadvantages of the theories that have been worked out so far can be circumvented
by the use of Frege structures. The use of Frege structures will allow us to keep to
two-valued logic30 which is the first advantage over Turner's work; also, we can
quantify over all our nominalised items, which is another. Moreover, Frege
structures permit us to nominalise all our open well-formed formulae and they are
easy to work with, which gives us two clear advantages over Cocchiarella.
B.1.2.4 The place of logic in the above applications: Of course one here will wonder
why this section did not occur under B.l.2.3. The reason for this is that we are not
here trying to study only how the avoidance of the paradoxes by altering the logic
was applied to nominalisation, but to study what sort of logic one obtains in the
theories of B. 1.2.1, B. 1.2.2 and B.l.2.3. Although this section could have been
accommodated in the three above sections, we decided to single it out on its own to
make the comparison more illustrative.
The primary characteristic of most of the theories discussed in B.l.2.1, B.l.2.2 and
30 Here I do not mean that there are only two propositions. I am trying to say that once something is
a proposition, it is either true or false.
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B.l.2.3 is that they are extensional rather than intensional. Of course extensionality
simplifies the theory tremendously (as many terms and propositions will be
identified) yet it is not good enough for various reasons. The ideal solution of course
would be if we can have a theory where syntactic elements can reduce to each other as
much as possible yet the theory does accommodate intensionality. None of the theories
explained above does that, yet the one that we shall provide is an intensional theory
where the principle of extensionality applies to functions. It may be objected that
Turner's theory does not have the axiom of extensionality and hence may be
intensional. This is not true however. The loss of extensionality in Turner's thesis is
due to the use of partial predicates. Hence Turner's theory is disadvantageous from
the points of view we are discussing. It does not have the extensionality axiom and it
is not intensional.
Now if we consider the theories of B. 1.2.1, we must say about them that they are
unattractive. We really would like the syntax to be as expressive as possible, and
theories where the syntax is restricted are also restricted for the cases of
nominalisation they can consider. Our discussion hence should concentrate on the
logics obtained from either altering the axioms or the logic. This is the work of
Cocchiarella and Turner. Cocchiarella's two main theories discussed above could be
compared to Quine's NF and ML, which should be viewed as theories of classes in the
logical sense and not the iterative sense. In fact Cocchiarella argues that NF and ML
would lack motivation if they were considered as theories of classes in the iterative
sense. Knowing that Cocchiarella's theories try to accommodate Frege's sense of
classes, we must now mention that one is based on a system which is proposition free.
That is: the following is no longer provable:
Vx<£ - <Ka/x).
This is unattractive and yields undesirable consequences, such as loss of
indiscernability.
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The theory of Turner uses three valued logic with Kleene's connectives and this forces
the use of partial predicates. It must be noted however that none of the above
theories used an intuitionistic logic. This is not an argument that intuitionistic logic
should be preferred over a classical one. It is rather an argument that this logic should
be investigated.
B.2. Solution to model existence
There were many solutions to the problem shown in A.2. The problem discussed
there is not specific to nominalisation. It is the problem of finding models of the X-
calculus. Therefore I shall start by describing some of those models, and then I shall
discuss how they have been used for the semantics of nominalisation.
B.2.1 \-calculus and its models: We can forget about the formal axiomatisation of the
X-calculus with logic on the top of it and just remember that the X-calculus with logic
is a formal system which has 2 important operations: abstraction and application
together with X- conversion.31 Until recently, models of the X-calculus have been
problematic: do they really exist, and what are they like? One answer can be that the
model itself is a structure which has two operations (abstraction and application); but
this is an unsatisfactory answer. First, we could abstract the formula -> P(x) and then
apply the abstract to itself which would yield Russell's paradox. Second, not every
structure which has the two operations can be a model of the X-calculus. Take for
instance any combinatory algebra (which has K, S and We could prove in a
combinatory algebra that the axiom of abstraction
G F) (Vy1),..,(Vyn) [F(y1,..,yn) = A]
holds, but that does not mean that the combinatory algebra is a model of the X-
calculus. It will be if we consider the extensional X-calculus, but in the absence of
extensionality we will have many choices for the function F in the axiom of
31 There are other rules like {-rule, but we ignore them for the moment.
abstraction and so the structure cannot be a model. What we should really require
from the model is that if two wlfs are equivalent or convertible in the X-calculus then
their values in the model must be the same.
The other problem with defining models of the X-calculus is that some X- terms
denote functions and so they have to take the elements of the structure M itself as
argument. But again they themselves are terms and must take elements of M as
values. We could take what is known as a term model as a model of the X-calculus.
Term models are just a trivial formulation because all they do is translate the syntax
step by step. Two other formulations of models are environment models and
combinatory models. The environment models include in them two embedding
functions P and 3> which belong to D— >[D— >D] and [D— >D]— >D respectively.
[D— >D] is not the set of all functions and it usually is the case that certain
mathematical properties play a role in choosing [D— >D]. Usually, [D— >D] is the set
of all the continuous functions and is closed under the standard operations (such as
composition, abstraction, application,...). The combinatory model is exactly the
combinatory algebra we talked about above but with the very important element e
which obeys some axioms. What e does is to single out the functional part of every
element. In the presence of extensionality we do not need e and that is why in the
case of extensionality, combinatory algebras are models of the X-calculus. Both
environment models and combinatory models are equivalent to each other and for a
proof of this, the reader is referred to [MEl]. These are not the only kinds of models
provided for the X-calculus. The two kinds of models cited above together with the
term models are algebraic, there are others which have a built-in structure. (It is easy
to work with such models as one does not get involved with the cumbersome syntax).
The two main models that I shall talk about throughout the thesis are: Scott domains
and Frege structures. Only the first has been applied to the semantics of
nominalisation and in this thesis I discuss the semantics of nominalisation based on
y /
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Frege structures. Scott domains are introduced in the appendix, and Frege structures
are introduced in the second chapter. I shall however briefly mention some
characteristics of Frege structures before I continue as this will enable the reader to
understand what we are talking about without having to jump to the second chapter
yet.
B.2.1.1 Frege Structures: In Chapter 7 we shall meet the application of Scott domains
to nominalisation and explain its problem of predication. We shall also show that it is
not possible to find a solution to such a problem within semantic domains without
logic, therefore semantic domains are not adequate for the semantics of
nominalisation. Frege structures are more conclusive than a solution to domain
equations and they can be used as models for nominalisation. The remaining question
is, do we encounter the same problem as Turner? We show in Chapter 7 that the
answer is negative and that all the advantages that Turner obtained by using Scott
domains, we obtain within our Frege structures. Scott domains are one possible
solution to the problem mentioned in A.2. and have solved it by restricting the
functions to the continuous ones. By so restricting the functions, we do not lose any
power of interpretation in Computer Science or recursion theory, according to results
obtained by Church and Kleene (see [CH6]). However, when it comes to the semantics
of natural languages, we have a problem which may come either from continuity or
from the ordering on the domains. There does not seem to be any solution for it in
Scott domains. In any case, we need to look for another solution to A.2 which holds
more promise for nominalisation. No one would want to work with the cumbersome
structures of the term models, and we would like a model which we can master with
set theoretical or topological techniques as was the case with Scott domains. Pea
([SC3]) is such a model, but unfortunately, there is no extra advantage in using it. Pea
does not have more to offer than Scott domains, as there is an equivalence relation
between the two - and Turner's problem is not going to be solved with Pea. One other
solution to the problem of A.2. is Aczel's notion of Frege structures. Frege structures
are not only a collection of collections of functions (as in the case of E^, but they
also have a certain logic which works on them, and whose availability solves also the
problem of A.l. Therefore, Frege structures solve both problems of part A. The
solution to the technical problem has been discussed in B.l and, I shall not discuss
Frege structures further in this section as they are the subject of Chapter 2.
B.2.2 Using those models for nominalisation: In the previous section, we described two
solutions to the problem of model existence of the \-calculus having in mind that
those two solutions are to be assessed as models of nominalisation. In this section, we
shall comment briefly on how each solution has been or can be used for the semantics
of nominalisation.
B.2.2.1 Scott domains and nominalisation: We mentioned in B.l.2.1 that the theory of
types was not adequate to the semantics of nominalisation. The typing constraints
according to Church's type theory are too restrictive for nominalisation and we need
to have functions which can apply to themselves or to items of the same type.
Abandoning Church's type theory does not imply getting rid of all the typed theories.
We can still keep to typed languages but make the typing adequate to deal with
nominalisation. The area of Computer Science and its use of the X-calculus gives us
good examples of typed theories which still allow functions to be applied to
themselves. Natural languages seem to make more demands on a semantic theory than
computer languages, but the progress in Computer Science could nevertheless lead to
useful insights about natural languages. I am not of course claiming that results in
Computer Science can always be applied to natural languages; indeed Scott domains
are a counterexample. To date, the only result from Computer Science applied to the
semantics of nominalisation seems to have been Turner's work (referenced above).
However, no one has yet applied Frege structures to the semantics of nominalisation.
I intend to work out such an application and to assess its advantages over the use of
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Scott domains as models. I shall show in Chapter 7 that the ordering relation on Scott
domains makes predication trivial. For, a predicate P is true of all the objects in the
model iff it is true of the bottom element. Also the use of Scott's domains forced us
to use three valued logics. All these disadvantages do not occur in our application of
Frege structures to nominalisation. From the theoretical point of view, Frege
structures are going to have an equal advantage, and their explicit closure embodies in
it the abstraction principle (see Chapter 2).
CONCLUSION AND COMPARISON WITH COCCHIARELLA
In the first part of this chapter, we outlined two problems with the semantics of
nominalisation. One is a problem of set theory or predication, the second is a problem
of models. The fear of Russell's paradox, which obviously threatens a theory of
nominalisation, led to questions on the nature of universals and predication. These
questions are not new however, and have been the concern of ancient philosophers.
What philosophers nowadays take from them is a decision as to which objects are to
be subject to predication and which concepts have extensions. This is the theoretical
point of view. With respect to model existence, Cantor's diagonal theorem makes us
fear the non-existence of models. The division of the problem into two parts does not
imply a total independence of both problems. In a way, they are strongly related, for
we start from an ontology and build a model which contains that which conforms to
our ontology. Yet, separating those two problems makes us concentrate on each
independently and then later we consider both as a whole.
The second part of this chapter discussed some of the solutions of set theory to
the first problem (A.1) and of the model construction to the second problem (A.2)
and briefly described some of the applications of both set theory and model
construction to the semantics of nominalisation. Frege structures provide a solution
to both problems but have not been used for the semantics of nominalisation. We
have commented that they have all the advantages of the previous applications and
more, they do not have any of the previous disadvantages. In the next chapter, we
shall introduce in detail Frege structures and the theory that we shall be using
together with the semantics. In subsequent chapters, we shall discuss some further
advantages of Frege structures in relation to property theory, intensionality,
quantifiers and type theory; afterwards, we shall compare our work to others. Before
moving to the next chapters however, it would be nice to locate Cocchiarella's
proposal discussed in this chapter to the one proposed here and in chapter 6. The
location is going to be mainly in terms of the typing system, because whereas I use a
type free theory, Cocchiarella uses a second order one. There are however some
similarities and differences in these two ways of typing that I would like to illustrate.
According to axiom (9) under A. 1.2, we have MEnC MEq for all n>l, where
MEn are the meaningful expressions of any type n. For us, we have that MEn CMEq
for any n^l but the pictures of both approaches are quite different. According to our
approach these types are related to each other in a chain like way. That is MEn£
MEn_ j C „MEq. For Cocchiarella we have that each MEn C MEq for n>l, yet no
relation exists between MEn and MEm for n?hn,. Also for Cocchiarella, propositions
are not included in objects, even though they can be embedded in MEq by axiom (8)
under the same paragraph. Hence Cocchiarella's whole structure can be understood as
a collection of objects, which has a denumerably infinite number of subcollections
called functions but where propositions are outside the domain of objects and can be
mapped into it. This structure for Cocchiarella is not a structure of types in the sense
that we have in the typing structure in Chapter 6. In fact everything that
Cocchiarella has so far we have; as will be seen in the next chapter, a Frege structure
is FQ,...Fn.. where Fq is the collection of objects, F^ is the collection of k-ary
lr
functions and each of these F^ can be embedded in Fq by \ . What we shall have in
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addition is a typing system constructed inside Fq, which cannot be found in
Cocchiarella's theory. Also, our system is first order in that the quantification over
objects and functions is the same, whereas Cocchiarella's system is second order.
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CHAPTER 2. FREGE STRUCTURES AND NOMINALISATION
In this chapter we introduce the reader to Frege structures (see [AC3]) and set
out the theory that we shall be using throughout this work. Afterwards, we give the
semantics to be adopted and lay out the proof theory.
PART A. SUMMARY OF FREGE STRUCTURES
Before launching into this section, let us introduce some convenient notation and
informal definitions:
If f is a function of 2 arguments then we will sometimes write afb for f(a,b). For
example, we write a & b for & (a,b).
Until we give the exact definition of an F- functional, let us understand it to be a
function which takes functions as arguments and returns functions as values.
Fq11 stands for: FqxFqX...xFq, n times.
Metalanguage abstraction: For every expression e[x^,..,xn] of the metalanguage built
up in the usual way from variables ranging over Fq and constants ranging over Un
Fn> the expression <e[xj,..,xn]/xj,..,xn> denotes the n-place function f: FqX..xFq -->
Fq such that for each in Fq, 1 ^ i^sn, f( ,.., an ) is the value of e[ a^ ,.., aQ ], the
expression e in which x^ has been replaced by a^ for i = l,..,n. For each expression
etf^,^,..,^ ] of the metalanguage built in the usual way out of variables (ranging
over Fn for n^O) and constants (ranging over Fn for n^O and over F- functional),
the expression denotes *he n-place function obtained by
abstracting hi e. The next concept is one that we shall be referring to very
often; we therefore introduce it by a named definition, Def*.
Def: If F is a 1-place F- functional and <e[x]/x> is in the domain of F, we write
Fxe[x] for F( <h[x]/x >).
For example, V : Fj — > Fq and X : Fj — > Fq are F- functionals and we write V
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<T(x)/x> and X <f(x)/x>as V xf(x) and X xf(x) respectively.
We understand by a propositional function, a function of the Frege structure which
takes propositions as values, Le. f(x) is a proposition for every x.
A1. Informal introduction
Before we introduce Frege structures formally, we need to introduce the reader
to the geography of the field with which we are concerned here. The existing models
of the X-calculus did not deal with logic added on top of the X-calculus, since once
logic is added, consistency might be threatened. Also, if one constructs a theory which
will have logic, X-abstraction and predication, then one has to show the existence of
the models of this theory. This is the work we find with Feferman for instance, yet
his models are not tidy and clear. Hence one would like to have a clear idea of a
model of the X-calculus with logic on it, and Frege structure is such a model.
However, such a construction was not obvious for a long time. It was initiated by
Scott in [SC2] yet the work was incomplete and hence such a model was not achieved.
Then came the construction of Frege structures where simply the idea is to start from
any model of the X-calculus and build logic on top by inductively constructing two
collections (of the possible propositions and the possible truths) and taking the limit
of these two collections which actually draw the logic we now have on the top of the
initially considered model of the X-calculus.
As it sounds, the process is quite simple, yet it depends on having a clear idea of the
structure and on proving some theorems which will ensure the existence of the
various logical connectives in the model considered.
Now that logic has been constructed on the top of a model of the X-calculus, we can
consider the structure only in terms of its objects and functions. The objects include
propositions and truths and the functions obey the condition that propositional
functions can be projected in the domain of objects (i.e. as sets). Those sets can be
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applied to any object (hence we now have not only functional application such as
f(x), but also the application of one object to another as in app(a,b)), and set
application to an object results in a proposition.
This is the simple idea of a Frege structure. Next, the reader finds the various steps
used to construct a Frege structure.
A Frege structure consists of a denumerably infinite number of collections
(F-r.)^ > n such that:32n n^ u
1. Fq is a collection of objects which has three very important subcollections PROP,
TRUTH and SET where,
PROP is a subcollection of Fq which can be thought of as the collection of
propositions and
TRUTH is a subcollection of PROP which can be thought of as the collection
of true propositions.
SET is a subcollection of Fq which can be thought of as the collection of
objects which are nominals of propositional functions.
2. For each nX), Fn is a collection of n-ary functions which take all their arguments
inFQ.
3. There is a set of F- functionals that operate over (Fn)n^ q and which ensure
important closure properties on (Fn)n^ q. For example:
V : Fj — > Fq is a functional such that:
If f in Fj is a propositional function
then V f is in PROP and
V f is in TRUTH iff f(a) is in TRUTH for each a in Fq
X : F^ — > Fq and app : FqxFq ->Fq are two other functionals which possess the
very important property: app ( X f,a) = f(a) for every a in Fq and every f in Fj.
4. ( Fn)n^ q is super explicitly closed: Le. for each expression ef^,^.-.^] of the
32 There are variables and constants that range over Fn, for nS?0.
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metalanguage built in the usual way out of variables (ranging over Fn for n^O) and
constants (ranging over Fn for 0 and over F- functional), the n-place function
denoted by > is an F- functional. This means that Frege
structures are closed under composition, projection, etc.33
Now that we have some idea of the structures' form, let us try to give an intuitive
picture. A Frege structure is a collection of both objects and functions (which are
distinct) where we can map any function f into an object a and this object will
preserve some of the properties of the function. For instance if the function f is a
propositional function then the nominal of the function, Xf, is an object34 which
belongs to the category SET. Moreover SET contains only those objects which are
nominals of propositional functions. Thus, if a is in SET then there must be a k-ary
propositional function f such that a = Xq11!", where: Xq* is X and maps 1-ary
functions into objects (i.e. into Fq ); Xq^ maps 2-ary functions into objects;... Xq11
maps n-ary functions into objects. By induction, we can define Xmn which maps n-
ary functions into F .J m
It is natural to ask whether the intersection of SET and PROP is empty or not;
some elements of PROP are elements of elements of SET, yet the intersection between
SET and PROP is not certain to be empty.35 Independently of whether SET and
PROP are disjoint, there is an important relation between them which is the
following;36 they both have strong links with propositional functions. Let us
33 Properties 1-4 are only informally presented here and there are many concepts that were intro¬
duced above but were not quite explained (e.g. F- functionals). This will be done next however. The
above introduction is intended to be as simplified as possible to allow the reader to imagine the structure
of the model first before putting all the details in front of his eyes.
34 ( X f) is not an extensional object and even though we write sometimes ( X f) = {x: f(x)} this does
not imply extensionality.
35 Take for example an element a of PROP and consider b to be the set {x: (x=a)}. Obviously b is in
SET because <ix=a)/x > is a propositional function, so we have a is in b.
36 SET and PROP are not necessarily disjoint. Take for example, a in PROP and assume the following
principle:
Vx(app(t,x) = app(t',x)) —»t=t'.
Xlal = a can then be seen as follows:
Vx, app(Xlal,x) = lal(x) = app(a,x).
Therefore Vxapp(Xlal,x) = app(a,x) and hence a = Xlal.
Now, if lal is a propositional function, then SET fl PROP is not empty. The question here is whether lal is
a propositional function when a is a proposition. We do not need to answer this question here and we
leave it to Chapter 5.
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consider 1-ary functions to illustrate the argument and take a propositional function
f. For any object a, f(a) is a proposition (i.e. is in PROP ). X f is a set and app ( X f,a)
= f(a). We can always jump from propositional functions to sets (and from sets to
propositions). But we can also jump from sets to propositional functions. Take the
operation I lj defined as: For each object a of the Frege structure, lal^ = <app (a,x)/x>.
Obviously for each a, lal^ is in Fj and if, in particular, we take a to be in SET (say a is
X f) then we have that lal ^ = I X flj = f. Therefore we have an equivalence between sets
and propositional functions; each set corresponds to a propositional function and each
propositional function corresponds to a set. This is important and it is this strong link
that I am trying to emphasise between SET and propositional functions.37
So in a Frege structure, we can take any function into an object and we can
preserve some properties of the function and use them for establishing facts about the
function or its nominal. In short, we do not lose information by mapping the function
into an object. We can switch back from objects to functions using I I , the inverse
operator of Xq11 where we have the following theorem: I Xgnf I = f for any n-ary
propositional function f.
The ability to switch back and forth between objects and functions is not the only
important aspect of the program; the presence of PROP, TRUTH and of a logic in a
Frege structure is also crucial. The logic is built in a way that allows us to talk about
truths and propositions without falling into any contradictions. We have classified
Scott domains as inadequate because they do not have any logic in them - and when
one tries to build a logic on them, one faces problems with quantifiers. In a Frege
37 Note that for each n, this bivalent path holds between P F and SET, through Xq" and I ln where
again we have app ( X„n f,a) = f(a), for a in Fq11, and f in F^. The functionals Xq , appn and the
operation I I could oe defined recursively as follows:
Take lal = < app_ (a,£),£ > and X„n+ f(X) = X ( <f(X,x)/x >), and
assume^.nn+ f has been defined/Yhen take Xnn+m f = Xnn ( Xn+-^n+m f).
appn is also defined by recursion where:
appj = app and assume we have defined up to appn- Then
appn+1 (a,b,t>) = app ( app (a,b),t>).
One can prove that appn ( XQ f,a) = f(30 for each ninoi and I in Fq11.
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structure, we have combined both the elegance of a simple structure (objects and
functions) together with the presence of a consistent logic (and therefore the ability to
talk about semantics and truths in a philosophically sound way). Before we can move
further in this thesis, we need to describe the formal details of a Frege structure.
A.2. The models
Having in the previous section informally introduced Frege structures, I shall fill in
all the technical details in this section and show that Frege structures exist.
Consider Fq, Fj,.., Fn,.. a family F of collections where Fq is a collection of objects,
and
(V n>0) [ Fn is a collection of n-ary functions from Fq11 to Fq]
Defl: An explicitly closed family: We say that a family F as above is explicitly closed
iff: For every expression e[xp..,x ] of the metalanguage built up in the usual way
from variables ranging over Fq and constants ranging over Un Fn, the n-place
function denoted by <£[xj,..,x ]/Xj,..,xn> is in F .
More formally, F is explicitly closed iff 1, 2 and 3 below hold:
1. Closure under constant functions: For each a in Fq, the function f is in Fj,
where (Vx) [f0(x) = a],
a
2. Closure under composition: For each f in Fm, for each gp->gm in Fk'
f('§l'"'§m') is 111 Fk where (f(g1,..,gm))(x1,..,xk)
f(§^(Xj,..,Xk),..,g^(Xj,..,Xk)).
3. Closure under projection: For each n,i^ 1, lbn is in Fn where P.n(ap..,a^) =
a^ for each a^ in Fq and ,1 <i^h.
For example, if f and g are unary functions of F and h is a binary function of F, then
the following function o g(h(x^,X2))/x^,X2 >38 is a 2-ary function (Le. in F2 ).
In what follows, we assume such a closed family and call it F.
38 I.e. the function which takes any (a1;a2) into f(g(h(a1,a2))), that is fogoh.
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Deft. F- functional: A function D: F„ x...xF^ — > Fn is an F- functional with
nl nk 0
respect to the explicitly closed family F, iff:
(WO) (Vfj in Fm+ni )...CVfk in )
[<D(<f1(y,x1)/x1>,..,<fk(y,xk)/xk>)/y>is in Fm ].
where y is a list of m-variables and x- is a list of n- variables, for i = Note that
if fjp-.fj, are 1-place functions and D: FjX..xFj — >Fq then D(fj,..fk) is in Fq. What
is the intuitive meaning of F- functionals? We know that an F- functional is a
functional, so that it operates on functions. But once we include functionals in the
structure, we need to ensure that any expression which contains functionals should
actually be in the structure. Assume for the sake of argument that D: Fn x...xFn —
> Fn is an F- functional. Assume also that for some m ^ 0, f • is in F„ . _ for i =0 l m+n.
l,..,k. We know that according to the explicit closure, if y is a list of m-variables
ranging over Fq and for each i, x^ is a list of n- variables ranging over Fq, then
<^i(y,xi)/xi> is an element of Fn for each i. Therefore it makes sense to talk of the
expression DC <T^(y,x^)/xj >,.., <fk(y,xk)/xk>). This expression however is open in y
and if we abstract over y in this expression we are going to obtain an element of Fm?
Nothing so far in the structure ensures that this is the case, and we must therefore
impose the constraint that these functionals should have such a property. A
functional which has this property is called an F- functional and now if D is an F-
functional then
[ <D( <f1(y,x1)/x1 >,.., <fk(y,xk)/xk>)/y> is in Fm ].
Now we extend the definition of explicit closure to the following:
Deft. A super explicitly closed family: Taking a family as above, we say that this
family is super explicitly closed iff for every expression e[|^,..,^m] of the
metalanguage, built up in the usual way from variables ranging over Un Fn and
constants ranging over Un Fn and over F- functionals, the m-place function denoted
by <^[|1,..,lm]/|1,..|m>is an F- functional.39
39 This notion of explicit closure is going to provide us with the full comprehension principle we have
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Theorem: Any explicitly closed family which has variables for functions and objects,
constants for objects, functions and F- functionals, is a super explicitly closed
family.
The proof is by an easy induction. □
As an example of an explicitly closed family, consider Po> as described in Chapter 1.
Define Fq to be the set of all subsets of oj (i.e. Pw). Define, for each n ^ 0, Fn to be
the set of all continuous functions from Fq11 — > Fq. We have demonstrated that the
constant functions, the projection functions, etc are continuous. We have also shown
that continuity is closed under composition and that any combination e[x^,..,xn] of
variables for objects and constants for both functions and objects results in the
function denoted by <j[x^,..,xn]/xj,..,xn> being an element of Fn- Therefore the
family (Fn)n just obtained from Pea (call it FE), is an explicitly closed family.
Furthermore, FE is super explicitly closed as it can be proven not only that
-<&[x^,..,xn]/xj,..,xn> denotes a continuous function but also that for any expression
e[£j,..,£n] built in the usual way out of variables ranging over Un Fn and constants
ranging over both Un Fn and F- functionals, denotes a
continuous function.
So far, we have only explicit closure on our structure. But that is not enough to give a
logic on the structure - something we have been arguing is necessary. In what
follows, we see how to obtain such a logic.
Assume an explicitly closed family F and a list of logical constants which are the
following F- functionals:
"" : F0 "" > F0
V, : FQxF0 — > Fq
V,J:F1 ->F0
Def4. Logical system: A logical system on a super explicitly closed family F, relative
been promising.
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to a set of logical constants as above, is the set of two collections of objects < PROP,
TRUTH> such that TRUTH Q PROP. These two collections are closed under an
adopted logical schemata for each logical constant. The logical schemata corresponds
to the external logic and tells us, for each logical constant from the list, how to build
new propositions out of other ones using the logical constant. It also gives the
conditions of truth for the resulting proposition.
THE LOGICAL SCHEMATA:
NEGATION
If a is in PROP then ^ a is in PROP and -> a is in TRUTH iff a is not in
TRUTH.
CONJUNCTION
If a, b are in PROP then (a & b) is in PROP and (a & b) is in TRUTH iff a is
in TRUTH and b is in TRUTH.
DISJUNCTION
If a, b are in PROP then (a V b) is in PROP and (a V b) is in TRUTH iff a is
in TRUTH or b is in TRUTH.
IMPLICATION
If a is in PROP and the object b is in PROP provided that a is in TRUTH
then (a -»b) is in PROP
and (a -* b) is in TRUTH iff a is in TRUTH implies b is in TRUTH.
UNIVERSAL QUANTIFICATION
If f is a propositional function in F. then V f is in PROP
and V f is in TRUTH iff f(a) is in TRUTH for all objects a.
EXISTENTIAL QUANTIFICATION
If f is a propositional function in F. then j f is in PROP
and ^ f is in TRUTH iff f(a) is in TRUTH for some object a.
EQUALITY
If a, b are objects then (a = b) is in PROP
and (a = b) is in TRUTH iff a=b.
EXTENDED CONJUNCTION
If a is in PROP and the object b is in PROP provided that a is in TRUTH
then (a &-► b) is in PROP
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and (a &-» b) is in TRUTH iff a is in TRUTH and b is in TRUTH.
BI- IMPLICATION
If a, b are in PROP then (a =b) is in PROP
and (a = b) is in TRUTH iff (a is in TRUTH iff b is in TRUTH).
In short, a logical system builds a logic on our structure.40 But something is still
missing: predication and abstraction. We do not want to gain logic yet lose the
bijection between objects and functions. Therefore, our structure must have more in
it. The next definition will tell us what.
Def5, X-system: A X-system on an explicitly closed family F is a pair of functionals
< X, app > such that:
X : Fj ~ > Fq and app : FqxFq — > Fq satisfy:
app ( X xf(x),a) = f(a), for each f in F and a in Fq.
If41 we take the system FE42 given above, and
if we define X : Fj — > Fq as X f = {(n,m): m is in
where we take (n,m) to be l/2(n+m)(n+m+l)+m 43
and define app : FqxFq — > Fq as app (a,b) = {m : en Q b for some n, (n,m) is in a};
then ( X,app ) forms a X-system for FE.
Proof: app ( X f,a) = {m : en Ca for some n and (n,m) is in X f}
= {m : en £a for some n and m is in fCen)}
= {m in f(en) : en Ca}
= f(a) by continuity. □
Therefore ( X,app ) is a X-system for FE. Actually, FE contains X and app and so it is
a X-structure, but we leave this to the next definition.
40 From now on, we shall use a is true for a is in TRUTH, a is a proposition for a is in PROP and a is
a set for a is in SET.
41 Note that the X-system here is only X and app.
42 I have tried to choose the simplest example and the one I give here is the simplest (apart from the
trivial case where the set is one element only). It is a well known result that there are no finite (non
trivial) models of the X-calculus.
43 Recall that the topology on Pta was defined in Chapter 1; the reader may wish to refer back for
some notations.
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Dejft. X-structure: A A.-structure is an explicitly closed family F which has a A-
system.
Note that the A-structure contains X and app and that it is an explicitly closed
family. Now take the example of the A-system on FE given above. FE is also a A-
structure having ( A,app ) as A-system, because both A and app are in FE, as FE is
explicitly closed.
Def7. Frege structures: A Frege structure is a logical system relative to a list of logical
constants on an explicitly closed family F, together with a A-system.
As an example of a Frege structure, take the A-structure FE given above and which
has a A-system ( A,app). Aczel (in [AC3])44 showed that each A- structure can be
extended to a Frege structure. Therefore we now have an example of a Frege structure.
Let us sketch the proof of how our particular A- structure FE can be extended to a
Frege structure. This will make the reader understand the notion of Frege structure,
and get him used to working with it. Before proceeding, however, we must define two
missing notions: that of an independent family of F- functionals and of a primitive F-
functional. We say that a family of F- functionals is independent iff for any two F-
functionals in the family, the range of values of those F- functionals are disjoint. This
implies that if F and G belong to an independent family of F- functionals, then for
any i and g such that F(£) = G(g), we should definitely have F = G. From
independence only we cannot conclude that f = g. For this we need primitivity and
this is the next notion we define.
We say that an F- functional F: Fn x..xFn — > Fq is primitive iff there exists a
projection P- in Fn.+1 for each l^i^k such that P-(F(£),a) = f^(a) where f = f^,..,fj^ is
in Fn x..xFn and a is in Fq1. The aim of primitive F- functionals is similar to
injectivity; if we have F(f) = F(g) then we should be able to deduce f = g. It can be
easily checked from the definition of F-primitivity that this is the case.
44 Dana Scott has found similar results in his Combinators and Classes paper (see [SC2]). However he
used 3-valued logic and did not fully complete his account.
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The proof that we can extend any X-structure into a Frege structure is based on two
theorems. The first is one which asserts the existence of an independent family of
primitive F- functionals on the X-structure, which include the logical constants, &, V
etc. It simply states that if for each natural number m we let (v ,..,v ) be a finiterJ
m^ m^
sequence of natural numbers, then there is an independent family of primitive F-
functionals: <£>m: Fv x..xFv — > FQ, for m = 0,1,2,... The second is the well
ml mk
known fixed point theorem which applies to monotonic operators and helps us to find
the logical schema of these logical constants. This theorem simply states the
following: if A is a partially ordered collection of objects such that every chain in A
has a least upper bound45 then any monotonic46 operator Y from A to A has a fixed
point. That is (j a 6A) [Y(a) = a]. Let us apply those two theorems to our FE and
obtain out of it a Frege structure. Up to here, we know that the X-structure FE exists
and the first theorem enables us to find all the logical constants needed. What
remains to turn it into a Frege structure is to find a logical system for the logical
constants. This is the task of the second theorem. The idea is to associate with each
logical constant two predicates which will ultimately (after we get to the fixed point)
give all the propositions obtained from the logical constant and all the truths
respectively. The construction is well known mathematically and is similar to the
one followed by Kripke in [KRl].47 Now consider our X-structure FE. We can be sure
from theorem 1 that we have a list of F- functionals which includes:
"1 : F0 > F0'
&, V, = = : FqxFQ - > F0
Vj:F1->F0.
But we still need to make sure that they satisfy the closure properties we want to
impose on them.
45 See appendix for these notions.
46 Y is monotonic <==>(Vx,y in A) [x% ==>Y(x)<Y(y)] where <is the partial order.
41 Please remember the independence property of the F- functionals. This is a very important proper¬
ty and without it we cannot prove the existence of Frege structures.
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I shall here try to make the construction a little easier than that described by Aczel
(in [AC3]). To construct a logical schema for each constant, i.e. to define the whole
logical system, we follow Aczel's intended construction but will carry an example
with us at all times. The logical system is defined inductively. As the basis of the
induction, we start with a pair Xq = (*Op'*bP suc^ tliat ^Ot^Op' Intuitively» X()p 4S
the set of propositions at stage 0 and is set of truths at stage 0.
Example 1
Let Xq = (Xop'XoP = N°te that b°th and ^ are ^
Before proceeding to the induction step, we must define a couple of auxiliary
predicates which ensure that the logical constants map their arguments into
appropriate values. That is, for each logical constant F, there is one predicate <I>p
which tests whether a particular tuple of arguments has the correct status of
propositionhood, and a second predicate Ikp which states the conditions under which
the tuple will be mapped into TRUTH by F. To see why we need this, recall the
logical schema for negation that we presented under NEGATION above:
(1)
If a is in PROP then -> a is in PROP, and -> a is in TRUTH iff a is not in
TRUTH.
This is an instance of a general logical schema for those functionals F in a Frege
structure which correspond to truth-functional connectives:
(2)
If £ is in Fn-|X...xFn)c and C'(F,£), then F(f) is in PROP; and F(f) is in TRUTH
iff C(F,f), where C expresses F's truth conditions and C expresses F's
propositionhood.48
Now it is Op which tests that the arguments J are in PROP, while Tp does the work
of C in (2).
48 Actually this principle is divided into two parts in (3) below.
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Example 2
and take arguments in C U xpx Fq and
(X0>x) is:xis inx0p
(Xq'x^ is: JLis not iaXof
Thus, ^(Xq.x) is true of the set Xqp = (0,1}, and ^(Xq.x) is true of all elements in
F0-X0t. i-e- everything except the element 1.
In order to carry out the induction step of the construction, we introduce a
principle which determines how the propositions and truths at stage i+1 are built
from the propositions and truths at stage i. The principle has two parts:
(3)
(i) Xi+ip is the collection of those F(£) where F is a logical constant and
%(*!>£)•
Cii)X|+^t is the collection of those objects F(f) where F is a logical constant
and both and
In other words, given the pair (Xjp>X^)> we construct (Xj_|_ip»Xi+iP in the following
way: first, X|+ip has to contain all and only those elements F(£) such that £ belongs
to the propositions at stage i, i.e. it is in Xjp according to <I>p(Xp£); and second,
must contain all and only those elements F(£) such that £ belongs to both the
propositions and the truths at stage i, Le. it is in Xjp and according to OpCxpf) and
%(Xi»£)- Notice that the principle guarantees that X(^+^)tQi(^+^)p-
Example 3
We wish to build x1 = (Xip'XitP from ^Op'^Op =C(0,1},{1}). By (3i), xlp is the set
of objects -ix such that ^(XqjxX i-e* it is the set {->0,-> l}. By (3ii), is the set of
objects -> x such that <!>__ (Xq,x) and (Xq,x), i.e. such that x belongs to Xqp but does




<3>£. and take arguments in ( L^.)x( Fq x Fq ) and
%(%(x'y)) is: are in x0p
%(%(x'y)) 181 ^and xare in x0t-
Thus, we can supplement the Xjp °f the previous example with the set of objects
&(x,y) such that (x,y) Q<qpxXqp> he. the set { 0 & 0, 0 & 1, 1 & 0,...}. Similarly, we
add to the set of objects & (x,y) such that (x,y)Qfotx^Ot' *'e' t^ie set (l & !)•
Note that according to our example, the collection of objects in TRUTH at stage 1 is
{1 & 1, - 0}.
Note also that -> 0, 1 & 1, 1 V 0 are distinct objects, even though they are all in
TRUTH and all have the same truth value in Frege's terms. If we wish, we could
reconstruct Frege's notion of the True and the False by forming the relevant
equivalence classes, but Frege structures give us an intensional ontology. This is
justified on the grounds that objects with the same truth value, e.g. -» 0 and 1 & 1 are
equivalent in truth value but distinct. We will return to questions of intensionality in
Chapter 5.
We see that the pair is being enlarged at each step starting from the first step where
we take Xgp = {0,1} and Xqj- = {1}, with the property that for each i we have: Xjt £=
Note that we are not imposing the condition that Xjt £ X(i+i)t or Xjp — X(i+i)p:
in fact our construction is monotonic in another sense which we shall see below. The
aim is now to keep going up to a certain level a where x = (x r.»X t) is a logical(X CX.p CX\t
system, because it is obvious that Xj at the levels we met so far are not logical
systems. Take for example Xq in our example above based on FE. Then Xq is not a
logical system, as can be seen by taking the logical schema for -> :
If a is a proposition then -> a is a proposition such that -> a is true iff a is not
true.
Xq is not a logical system because 1 is in Xgp (supposed to represent propositions) but
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-i 1 is not in Xgp* Nor is Xj a logical system because -> 1 is in Xjp but -> -> 1 is not in
X^p and so on. To solve this problem, let us consider the fixed point (if it exists) of
this construction. It may be that the fixed point is a logical system and if so, we have
succeeded. Before we prove that the fixed point is a logical system, let us remind
ourselves again of the construction. The construction is built through an operator Y
which takes us from level i to level i+1 in such a way that Y(xp = X|+^» where Xj =
(Xip,XitX Xi+1 = (Xi+1p>W> xit £*ip . xi+lt £*i+lp. Moreover xi+lp and xi+lt
are obtained as follows:
For any F- functional F, X^+jp Is the collection of those F(F) where F is a
logical constant and <I»p(XpF) and X|+jt Is the collection of those objects F(F)
where F is a logical constant and both Op(XpF) and Tp(XpF).
Now we prove that any x such that x = Y(x) is a logical system. To show that, we
have to prove that for each logical constant F, the logical schemata of F holds in X-
Let F be a logical constant whose logical schema is as follows:
If F is in F x....xF and <Xy,(x,F), then F(F) is in x„I and F(F) is in x+ iff
IIJ " P t
%(x,f).
Let us prove that this schema holds in x where x is a fixed point, x = (Xr,>Yt) and Y(x)P ^
= (x'p»X't)- Let F be in Fn x—xFn where <l>p(x,F). As <I>p(x,F) then F(F) is in x^ by
definition, but x"p = Xp (because x = Y(x)). therefore F(F) is in Xp- Now let us prove
that F(F) is in xt iff ^(X.F)-
(==>) If F(F) is in xt then F(F) is in x't- As F(F) is in x't then there exists an
F- functional G and a sequence g in F x....xF such that F(F) = G(g) and
nl k
^(X.g) and ^G(x,g) by definition. But the logical constants are independent.
Therefore F = G and as the family is primitive, F = g. Therefore we have from
that ¥p(x,g).
(<==) Suppose Tp(x,F), since also Op(x,F) then F(F) is in x'p but x't = Xt>
therefore F(F) is in xt-
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This implies that the logical schema of F holds in x• Now we know that if there
exists a fixed point x then this X is a logical system. Let us find a fixed point.
We define an ordering ^ on (xpj as follows:
(i) *ip c*i+lp-and
Cii) if x is in Xjp> then x is in Xjt iff x is in
With this ordering we can show that Y is monotonic.49 Note that the levels can be
any ordinal even a transfinite one, for if we are at a finite ordinal i we define Y
(y.);=y-+^ as above. If we are at a limit ordinal j, we define Y (Xj) = U X^ f°r i<j-
Applying the fixed point theorem we get a fixed point of Y. The reason for this is of
course the monotonicity of the operator Y, as we know that the ordering relation ^ is
a partial ordering on all those pairs.
49 This is due to the fact that for each i > 0, we follow the logical schemata for each F- functional to
go from level i to level i+1, and monotonicity is hidden in those schemata together with the fact that we
have an independent family of F- functional.
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A3. Frege structures as models and comparison with Scott domains
X-structures are models of the X-calculus in an obvious way. For just take the
interpretation of terms as follows over a defined Frege structure F, where g is an
assignment function which takes variables into objects of Fq :
[[x]]& F = g(x)
[[MN]]g, F = app ([[M]] F , [[N]] F )
[[XxM]]g>F =X<[[M]]g[a/xLF/a>50
Now it is easy to show that this interpretation has the property that:
\ I- M=N ==>[[M]]& F - [[N]] F .51
Therefore, Frege structures are models of the X-calculus and in turn we know that
they solve the second problem. For the remainder of this section, we shall concentrate
on the comparison between both Scott domains and Frege structures as models, and
hence help justify our claim that Frege structures are better candidates for the
semantics of natural languages than Scott domains.
On Scott domains, one has a topology (Scott topology based on a partial ordering
relation) and two special elements Top and Bottom. (Bottom is less than all the other
elements and Top is greater than all of them.) We shall see in Chapter 7 that this
ordering relation, together with the existence of Bottom and the requirement that the
functions be continuous, make Scott domains problematic for the semantics of
natural languages. On Frege structures, however, we have no ordering and no
requirement on the continuity of functions. What we have in a Frege structure is a
collection of objects Fq together with, for each n, a collection Fq of n-ary functions
which take elements of Fq as arguments and return elements of F0 as values. But
although we do not consider all possible functions to be elements of the Frege
structure, we still consider only structures which are explicitly closed. This explicit
50 Note that the second X above is the X-structure one whereas the first one is the formal language one.
51 X I- M=N means that M=N is derivable in the X-theory.
closure imposes the existence of some necessary functions such as projections,
constants, etc, and requires the closure of our structure under some important
functional operations such as composition. We have both constants for functions and
variables for functions, but the functionality on a Frege structure does not stop at
those first order functions; we also have functionals. However, whereas for functions
our language contains both variables and constants, for functionals it only contains
constants.
One should bear in mind that none of the collections PROP, TRUTH or SET is
internally definable. Intuitively, we say that a collection x °f objects is internally
definable if we can talk about it through the object language and just not the
metalanguage. An example of a collection which is not internally definable is the
collection of truths in a theory which contains names for its wffs. If this collection
was internally definable, then there must be a predicate T such that for any object a,
T(a) is true iff a is true.52 But according to Tarski, a theory cannot contain its own
truth predicate (in the object language) without falling into inconsistency and
therefore T is a predicate of the metalanguage. Now if we want to talk about truth in
this metalanguage then again we have to have a truth predicate T' in the meta-
metalanguage and this process iterates. Just as T is not an element of the object
language in Tarski's approach, so inside a Frege structure the collection of truths is
not internally definable. Aczel gives a more formal definition of internal definability
and considers a collection x °f objects in F0 to be internally definable in the Frege
structure iff there exists a propositional function C in Fj such that the following
holds:
(**) For any object a in Fq, C(a) is in TRUTH iff a is in y.
It might be clearer if we set FALSE = PROP - TRUTH, and then replace (**) be the
following:
52 Note that we do not restrict this condition to every wff but range it over all objects.
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(***) For any object a in Fq, C(a) is in TRUTH iff a is in x and C(a) is in
FALSE otherwise.
Some might find it easier to draw a contrast with the following schematic definition,
where C is not a propositional function:
(**#*) por any 0pject a pi Fq, C(a) is in TRUTH iff a is in x anc* C(a) is in Fq
otherwise.
(*#*) makes x decidable, while (#*#*) only makes semi-decidable.
It may seem unfortunate that the collection of truths is not internally definable,
but it is essentially this that provides Frege structures with consistency. Notice that
since elements of SET are the nominalisations of propositional functions, we have no
way of talking about the nominalised items internally and SET is not internally
definable. Moreover it may also seem that we will encounter a problem in defining
second order quantifiers. I hope that it will become clear throughout the work that
the inability to internally define quantifiers does not have any serious effects. On the
contrary, we keep to simplicity while being able to formalise many concepts within
the theory.
The undefinability of PROP and of SET is due to the undefinability of TRUTH.
The collection of propositions is not internally definable, for if it were (through a
predicate P) we would find that TRUTH is also internally definable (through the
propositional function <P(x) &—> x/x>, which stands for a function in Fj). That
PROP is not internally definable implies that SET is not either. This is because if S
were a propositional function in Fj internally defining SET then <S({y/x})/x> is a
propositional function in Fj internally defining the collection of propositions. Note
also that, for each n, P FR (the collection of n-ary propositional functions) is not
internally definable. For if it were, we get that the collection of propositions is also.
The proof here needs an extension of the definition of internal definability so that
instead of having a function we have a functional.
Let us return to the comparison of Frege structures with Scott domains. Frege
structures do not have any ordering or continuity problems and their restricted
logic53 would allow us to solve the problems of Scott domains (and of Cocchiarella).
But of course the solving part is not going to be easy. We have to do something about
the non-internal definability of SET. There are a few ways to go here: we have to
either see how the function domains (as with Scott) could be built inside Frege
structures, or else show that we do not need second level quantifiers and therefore the
problem does not arise. Now the word inside brings an uncomfortable feeling -
especially after we pointed out that all the interesting collections are not internally
definable. I assure the reader however that this difficulty is only temporary and that
we can always find solutions to the problem.54 It is important for the reader to know
that a Frege structure can be built on the top of a model where continuity and
ordering play a very important role (such as Ej. However the way quantifiers are
constructed on a Frege structure using the fixed point, is not based on the ordering
relation, and so the problem that faced Turner in his work based on (where
quantifiers depended on the ordering relation - see Chapter 7) is not faced by the
quantifier treatment on a Frege structure.
The fact that functions, but not functionals, can be mapped into F0 in a Frege
structure is not a disadvantage, indeed it may even be seen as a virtue, since there
appears to be no justification in NL semantics for nominalizing expressions - for
example determiners - which would require a formalisation as functionals. Also, in
Frege structures we have more possible elements than we do in Scott domains. We
have propositions, truths and sets which are all legitimate elements of the Frege
structure. We could not talk about them internally but that is how it should be.
Tarski's undefinability of Truth and G&del's famous result55 make it impossible for
53 i.e. -i, &, etc do not necessarily have to apply to propositions only but can be applied to any objects
and the result will be a proposition only in case the objects themselves are.
54 Such details are again examined in Chapter 4.
55 According to Godel's theorem, we can only give a proof relative to some other system. The two
theorems of Godel are:
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us to be able to internally define any of these collections. So, our inability to
internally define any of these collections is not a weakness in comparison with Scott
domains; Scott domains could not talk about them at all, and therefore can not be
adequate for NL semantics. If we try to extend Scott domains in a way that will
allow us to talk about truths and propositions, we obtain Frege structures.
(1) For any formal system consistent and strong, sufficient for arithmetic, there exists a sentence <I> for-
malisable in that system which is true but not provable.
(2) No consistent formal system which is strong enough for arithmetic is capable of proving its own con¬
sistency.
(2) ==>(!), for <t> is taken to be "O is true but not provable".
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PART B. A THEORY OF PROPERTIES, ITS SEMANTICS AND PROOF THEORY
In this part, I introduce the theory to be used throughout the rest of the thesis.
This theory is first order, intensional and type free. There have been many arguments
for both type freeness (e.g. Feferman's work [FEl], [FE2] and [FE9]) and
intensionality: further justifications for adopting these features will not be given
here. But why use a first order theory? The reason for using a first order theory is
due to the very nature of Frege structures; this does not, however, imply that one
cannot interpret higher order languages with Frege structures; that would be incorrect.
For instance, the highly typed language of Martin-Lof could be interpreted with Frege
structures. Nonetheless, first order languages are easy to work with, and it is well
known that higher order languages can be reduced to first order languages having
extra predicates to simulate the types.56 People turned to higher order languages for
many reasons, two of them being the issue of expressive power and the paradoxes. On
the question of expressive power, we can talk about second and higher order
quantifiers because they can be reduced to first order ones (we defined in Part B,
clause (14'), [[VXV]]g = V <[[V]]g|- |a|/x]^a>^57 t^ie question of the paradoxes, we
see that people are returning to first order theories (e.g. Feferman, Turner).
I assume full extensionality of functions, in the sense that the following
principle holds:
(EE) Vx [f(x) = g(x)] -» f=g, or
"if two propositional functions are true of the same arguments, then they are
identical"
It is important to distinguish (EE) from a principle of extensionality of properties
which might be formulated as:
(EP) Vx [f(x) is true iff g(x)is true] -» f= g, or
56 Neither am I implying that types and higher order are the same thing.
57 Barwise and Cooper ([BA3]) argued that first order languages cannot be used to define some
quantifiers like Most: but we are concerned with expressivity here and not definability.
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"if two propositional functions are true of the same arguments, then they are
identical"58
(EP) is rejected in the current framework. Put briefly, equivalence does not imply
equality; in fact, if it did, a version of Russell's paradox could be constructed. If we
had taken f and g to be propositional functions which denoted truth values, then (EE)
and (EP) would of course collapse. The point to be emphasised is that in a Frege
structure, it can be the case that f(x) and g(x) are both in TRUTH, yet f(x) ^ g(x),
since they are distinct propositions.
Now let us put forward the theory and its semantics. This is a theory of
properties and propositions and for any term t, O t is to be understood as 't is a
proposition'.59
B.l. The theory Tq
Syntactic categories and items
Let us consider the following categories and items:
x, y, z, Xp yp... range over the category of individual variables which is
denumerably infinite.
c, c', Cq, Cp... range over the category of individual constants which is
denumerably infinite,
t, t\ t", tp X2range over terms.
We have the following operators and logical constants: =, D, V, &, j, V, X, app.
Syntactic clauses for T^
t := x I c I app(tp X^) 11j - tj I ' ti^t2 '
tj-»t2 I Htj I Xx.tj I Vxt^ ! j xtp
We define J =c^60 and define three more logical constants '= and '&-*
58 Of course (EE) and (EP) collapse if we take the semantic value of f(x) (and g(x)) to be a truth
value.
59 In Chapter 3 we define properties in terms of propositions.
60 Where Cq and c^ are two distinct constants.
- 81 -
out of the previous ones as follows:
-t-df t-J_
ti=t2 =df Ctj—♦ t2)&(t2-» tj)
tf&-» t2 =df tj&Ctj -* t2).
Bound/free variables and substitution are defined as usual; in t^[t2/x] the bound
variables of t^ are changed to avoid collision.
As can be seen from the above, we only have terms (which are defined recursively
using the logical constants V, &, V, = and the three important operators Q, X and
app). It is the tradition to define inductively both terms and wffs; by contrast
everything here is a term and the logical constants operate not only on the
propositions but on all terms.
Axioms and Rules:
(oO Xx.t = Xy.t[y/x] where y is not free in t
C/3) app((Xx.t),t') = t[t'/x]
. > tl~t2 l'l ~ f2
appCtj.t'j) = app(t2,t'2)




(e) where x is not free in t, t' or any open assumptions
t = t'
From the axioms so far, we can deduce the following theorems:
Theorem :
(i) = is reflexive: Le. (r) t = t for any term t.
t = t'
(ii) = is symmetric: Le. (s)
t" = t
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t = t' t' =t"
(iii) = is transitive: i.e. (t)
t = t"
Proof:
app(Xx.t,x) = t app(Xx.t,x) = t By (j8)
For (i), By (8)
t = t
Cii) is now easy to deduce from both (8) and reflexivity as follows:
t = t'
t = t' t = t (reflexivity)
t' = t By (8)
Also (iii) is easy to deduce as:
t = t' t" = t"
(symmetry)














and therefore (£) is a theorem. □
Theorem : We can also deduce from above that (t)) is a theorem, where (t)) is:
(t)) (Xy.app(u,y)) =u for y not free in u.
Proof: app(u,y)[x/y] = app(u,x) as y is not free in u





Note, however, that from (e) above we have been able to deduce both (£) and (t)),
but from (£) alone we cannot deduce (e) as we will also need (rj) in the derivation.









are not valid; this means that the converse of (y) does not hold. Take for example, t^
and t2 to be \x.x=c' and Xx.c=x respectively, where c, c' are two distinct constants;
take also t'^ and t'2 to be c' and c respectively, then we have that app(tpt'^) =
app(t2,t'2), but we do not have tj =t2 or t'j =t'2-61
(a:)-(e) are just axioms and rules of the lambda calculus with extensionality; we











61 This will force us to introduce in the third chapter a relation called pred which makes the two
derivations above valid, 'pred' is highly intensional in that if predCt^^) = predCt'pt^) then we have t^





































Note that this axiom is redundant, as other axioms may be.




(3 E) provided x is not free in t, s
s or any open assumption
ft(t[x] )
( ft}) x not free in t or any open assumption
ou t)
t[x] x not free in t or
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B.2. The metatheory ofT^
We write I- t if t is a theorem of and T I- t if t is deducible from
Axioms(T^)Ur.




t = t' t
t'
ti =t'i for i=0,..,n t()[t1/x1,..,trL/xn]
t'o[t'l/xl'"'t'n/xn]
t = t' fit
fit'
Proof:
(Tl) is deducible from (Tsu^)
(T2) is deducible by induction on the way terms are constructed.
(T3) is deducible from (
Now before completing the metatheory of we stop mention with other theories
that were offered as theories of Frege structures. In [AC4] Aczel offered a language of
Frege structures but he made negation primitive (not defined). Here, I use I instead.
Flagg and Myhill (in [FLl] and [FL2]) offered a theory based on the A-calculus. This
implied that where we had to choose between substitution and application in our
axioms and rules, they could use application only. In [SMI], Smith offers a theory of
Frege structures with the aim of interpreting Martin-Lof type theory. I must also
mention Monnich in [MUl] who used Frege structures, but the theory was derived
from [AC4]. Also Beeson in [BE4] offered an axiomatic theory of Frege structures.
Now we proceed with the metatheory of Tfl
(T4) If I- t&t' then I- t'&t
(T5) If I- tVt' then I- t'Vt
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(T6) If I- t then I- -> -> t65
(T7) {at} I- t=t
(T8) If I- t=t' and I- t'= t" then {at, at'} 1- tsst"
(T9) If I- t=t' then I- t'=t
(T10) If I- Vt then I- - ] (-> t)
(Til) {a(t[x] )} I- Vt -♦ -i ] (-> t) x not free in t
or any open assumption66
(T12) If I- t then I- Vt
(T13) If T I- t then T I- Vxt for x not free in T.
(T14) If T I- Vt then T I- t
(T15) I- ] x.x
(T16) I- 3 x.-" x
(T17) If tGT then T I- t
(T18) From T I- t and T I- t-» t' we deduce T I- t'
(T19) If TU {t} I- t' then TU {at} I- t->t'67
(T20) {at} i-1—»C-1 -»t')
(T2i) {at} i- t^--t68
(T22) {at} I- -i t= -i -i -i t
(T23) {at, at'} i- -Ctvt')=-t&-nt'69
(T24) If {at, at'} I- t=t' then {at, at'} I—■ t= ->t'
(T25) If r I- J then T I- t
(T26) If T I- t then T I- ] t
(T27) If r I- t then TU A I- t
(T28) If T I- ] xt[x] and AU {t[y]} I- t' then TU Al- t' for y not free in A
65 The other direction does not necessarily hold.
66 The other side does not necessarily hold.
61 This is known as the deduction theorem; please note the insertion of {fit}. This is important as
without it we would get Curry's paradox as is explained in Chapter 3.
6S The other direction does not necessarily hold.
69 But not necessarily {fit, fit'} I—'(t&t')= -■ tV-11'
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(T29) If T I- t and A I- t' then TU A I- t&t'
(T30) If T I- tVt', AU {t} I- tj and *U {t'} I- tj then TUAU* I- tj
(T3l) If fia then ->(a&-'a) Le. {fla} I—i(a&->a)
(T32) {fit, fit'} I- t-*(t'-»t)
(T33) {fit, fit'} I- (t-»t')-»((t-»-.?)-»--t)
(T34) {fit, fit'} I- t-»tVt'
(T35) {fit, fit'} I- t-U'Vt
(T36) {fit, fit'} I- t-»(t'-»t&t')
(T37) {fit, fit', fit", t=t'} I- t"[t]= t"[t']
(T38) If I- t and I- t-t' then I- t'70
Proof:
(T4) holds because from t&t' you can deduce t' and from t&t' you can deduce t; but
from t' and t we deduce t'&t.
(T5) holds because if I- tVt' then fi(tVt') and so fit and fit'. Hence, if we assume t
we get t'Vt as fit' and if we assume t' we get t'Vt as fit; this implies that t'Vt due to
(VE).
To prove (T6) it is enough to say that from t we deduce fit and from the assumption
-> t we get I since t is true; hence by (->1) we get -> t-> I . i.e. -> -> t.





From t-» t and t-» t we get t=t.
For (T8), the proof is as follows:
If I- t=t' and t'= t", then I- t —»t' and I- t'-»t"; hence {fit} I- t-»t".
In the same way we can show that {fit"} I- t" -»t.
Therefore {fit,fit"} I- t= t" and so (T8) is a theorem.
The proof of (T9) goes as follows:
70 We refer to this as Modus Ponens.
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If I- t=t\ then I- (t->t')&(t'-»t);
hence I- (t'-»t)&(t-+t') and so I- t'= t.
For (T10) we have to show that I- -> ] (-> t), he. that I- ] (-> t)-» I :
But ftVt), hence CI (t[x] ) and so CI (T[x] ) for x not free in t or any open
assumption.
0(->t[x] ) implies CI ( } (it)) by as x is not free in t or any open
assumption.
If we assume that ] (-it) then from -<t[x] where x not free in Le. tfxl —» I
we get 1 as I- Vt. Hence from the assumption J (it) we get I .
Now applying (O) we have fl( ] (it)) and from assumption j it we get I ,
then } (i t) —» I and so I- i] (i t).
For (Til), the proof goes as follows:
{a(t[x] )} I- fl(Vt) by (flV).
But by (T10), if I- Vt, then I- 13 (i t),
hence {fl(t[x] )} I- Vt—► i] (it).
In (T13), the condition that x not free in T is there to enable us to apply VI which
imposes that x be not free in t or any open assumptions.
(T14) is a consequence of (VE).
We know that = is reflexive, hence c=c and so x[c=c] is true; this implies by ( } I) that
] x.x, hence (T15).
We know that CI I and that from J_we deduce hence I -» I and so i_L If we
take t to be i x, then t[J_J is i I and is true. By (] I) we get 3 x.i x and so (T16) is a
theorem.
(T17) is true due to our definition of T I- t.
(T18) is a consequence of (-»E).
The proof of (T19) is very straightforward due to the addition of CI t; without that,
we could not have proved it.
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-> t~* t' By 3, 4 and ( -»I)
Hence {fit} I-










t—» —> —< t
Hence {fit} I- t-» -> -> t.
The proof of (T22) goes as follows:
From (T21), we have that {fit} I—< t-» t,
if we assume ->->-« t, then if we assume t, we get -> -> t by (T2l);
but -i -> t is -> -> t—» I and as we have -> -> t, hence I .
Hence -> t and so from the assumption t we get -»t.
As fl(-i -> -i t), then {fit} I— —> —> —> t-> -> t..
Combining both results we get {fit} I—< -< -> t= -> t.
The proof of (T23) goes as follows:
A. fit, fit' then fl(tVt') and so fl(-> CtVt')).
If we assume -> (tVt') then if we assume t then tVt' and so I .
hence -»t; Le. i CtVt') -»-> t. Also -> CtVt')-» -> t\
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Hence -> (tVt') -»(-> t &-> t').
B. XI t, fit' then Xl(-it) and Xl(->t'); hence Xl(->t &-it').
If we assume -> t&-> t' then -> t and -> t';
and if we assume tVt', we get from the assumption t, I by -> t and (-C).
Also from the assumption t' we get J by -> t' and (-»E);
and from the assumption tVt' we get J if we already assume -> t&--t\
Hence the assumption -> t&-> t' implies ->(tVt').
A and B imply {fit, XIt'} I- -i(tVt')= (-it&->t').
The proof of (T24) goes as follows:
{X2t, XIt'} I- (t-»t')&(t'-*0.
Now Xlt, XIt' then Xl(-<t) and Xl^t').
If we assume -> t then as XIt' and t'-»t we get t' —» I : i.e. -> t\
Hence {Xlt, fit'} I- -it-»->t\
The same method enables us to get {XI t, XI t'} I—> t'-* -> t.
Hence {->t, ->t'} I- ->t=-it\
(T25) results from C I ).
(T26) results from (] I).
For (T27) it is enough to say that if t is a theorem of Axioms(T^) U T then t is a
theorem of Axioms(T^)UTUA
The proof of (T28) follows the usual procedure.
(T29) holds because TU A I- t and TUAI- t', and so TUAI- t&t'.
(T30) is due to (VE).
For (T31) it is enough to say that if XI a then XI (-> a), hence XI (a&-> a). Assume
a&->a, then a and -> a; by (->E) we get I and by (_[_} we get anything and in
particular -> (a&-n a).
For (T32) the proof goes as follows:
Xlt' and from the assumption t and t' we get t,
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hence t'-»t from assumption t, but fit and so
(fit, fit'} I- t-»(t'-*t).
The proof of (T33) goes as follows:
We have flCt-^t') as fit and fit'.
We also have fl(t-»-'t') as fit and fl(->t').
If we assume t, we get -> t' and t', hence I and so -> t.
Therefore (t-+ -> t')-» -«t from assumption t-»t' and so
(t—► t')—► CCt—► -• t'D —* -• t) from assumption fit, fit' and so (T33).
The proof of (T34) goes as follows:
If fit, fit' then fl(tVt').
If we assume t then tVt' by (VI) and so t—» (tVt') from assumption fit, fit'.
This means (T34) is a theorem.
The same proof can be followed for (T35).
(T36) and (T38) are obvious and (T37) is done by induction on the way expressions
are constructed. □
Our theory is intuitionistic; if we add either of tV-<t or -> -> t-> t, then we obtain a





leads to a classical theory and this is why we ruled it out.
B.3. The semantics ofT^
We define a model to be a pair M= < F, C> where F is a Frege structure and
C: CON—>U Fn, such that for each constant c-, C(c.) 6Fq.
The semantics with respect to an assignment function g:VAR—>Fq is as follows:
(1) [[x]]g = g(x)
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(2) [[c]]g = C(c)
(3) [[Xx.t]]g = X a.[[t]]gja/xj
C4) [[t=t']]g = ([[t]]g = [[t']]g)
(5) [[tVt']]g.([[t]]gV[[f]]g)
(6) [[t&t']]g = C[[t]]g & [[t']]g)
(7) [[t-t']]g = ([[t]]g-[[t']]g)
(8) [[ 3 t|3g - 3 a.[[tnrfa/x]
(9) [[V.]]g - V a.[[t]]g[l/x]
Cio) l[£it]]g - n[[t]]g
(11) [[app(t,t')]]g = app C[[t]]g, [[t'Mg)
Theorem : We can prove from the above that if we assume C to be the constant
function which maps each constant into itself, then for each expression A built in the
usual way and open in x, y.p..,yn,
[[Xx.A[x,ylf..,yn] ]]g = X a. A (a,g(y1),..,g(yn)),
where A is built exactly like A except that functionals inside are replaced by the
corresponding F- functionals of the Frege structure.
E.g. [[Xx.(x=y)]l = X a.(a = b) where g(y) =b;
o
also, [[Xx.app(y&z,x)]] = X a. app (b & c,a) where g(y) =b and g(z) =c.
o
Theorem : If we take a model < F, C > as above, then it is a model of the theory T^
Proof: Let g be an assignment of the variables into Fq, then:
(*) For each term t, [[t]]j^g is in F0'
The proof of (*) is by induction on t:
It is trivial for variables or constants.
If t is Xx.t' then [[t]]j^g = X a[[t]]j^ g[a/x]- ^ut an easY induction on terms one can
prove that < [[t]]Hg[a/x]/a> is in Fj, therefore, X ^ ^^^M.gta/x]
is in Fq.
For the case where we have to apply semantic clauses (4)-(7) to t, the proof is trivial
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as the logical constants are elements of the Frege structure F and the proof is done by
induction.
(8)-(9) are proved as for the case where t is Xx.t\
(10) is trivial as CI is that F- functional of the Frege structure which has the
following logical schemata:
If a is an object then CI a is an object such that CI (a) is true iff a is a
proposition.71
(11) is trivial as app is an F- functional of the Frege structure and the proof by
induction on t.
What about the axioms and rules? It is tedious to check each of them one by one, but
they all hold in the model. The proof is illustrated with the following:
(&I):
If [[t]]M g is in TRUTH and [[t']]^g is in TRUTH, then [[t&t'jj^g - which by
definition is [[t]]jy^g & - is in TRUTH, due to the logical schema of &
in a Frege structure.
(fl&):
If [[f>t]]M is in TRUTH and [[Ot'flj^ is in TRUTH
then ([[tjjjy^g is a proposition) and ([[t']]jyj is a proposition).
So ([[t&t'Hjyj g is a proposition) from the logical schema of &.
Therefore [[fi(t&t)]]^j g is true. □
B.4. Soundness and completeness
After having made the reader follow the above proof, we now tell her that this
was unnecessary as it is obvious that the theory we put forward is a theory of the
Frege structure; consistency of this theory is assured from the model construction we
gave in part A of this chapter. We shall not repeat the construction but the reader
71 Note that £2 does not internally define propositions; since it is not itself a propositional function.
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should always remember that we construct our Q, V, &, etc, so that they are
independent and primitive. This means that we can never have a & b = a V c and if a
& b = a' & b' then a = a' and b = b\
The reader may still not be persuaded that we have proved the consistency of the
language T^ The route usually followed to prove consistency is the construction of
a model of the theory and we shall show how this can be done. We understand by a
consistent set of T^a set F of closed expressions of T^such that no contradiction
can be deduced from the assumption ft e for e in T; otherwise T is inconsistent. A
maximal consistent set T of closed expressions is such that if M is any closed
expression not in T then {F, M} is inconsistent. We say that F is satisfiable with
respect to a model M iff there is an assignment function g such that is true
for every $ in T. An expression t is valid iff for every model F which is a Frege
structure, for every assignment function g, [[t]]F is in TRUTH.
Now to prove consistency, we have to show that for any consistent set T of
closed expressions from T^ there exists a model (which is a Frege structure) for T ^
♦
which satisfies the set of closed expressions T, where T ^ is the extension of T^
obtained from T^by adding a countable number of constants.
It must be noted here that the proofs found in the next few pages are only
outline of how things should be followed. For instance the construction of the model
below is not followed to the end. The main idea there should be to assume the
existence of a \-model and to construct the various expressions (which contain the
logical connectives) inductively in a way that the process remains monotonic and then
to take the fixed point. However, as mentioned before we provide only the outline
and how the construction of the model should be initiated.
Theorem 1: If A is any consistent set of closed expressions of T^ then there exists a
model (which is a Frege structure) with respect to which A is satisfiable.
Proof: This theorem should be proved in three parts;
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*
Part 1: The construction of the extension T ^of T^and then the construction
*
of a maximal consistent set T of which contains A
Part 2: the construction of a model M of T,
Part 3: the proof that M is a Frege structure.
In this theorem, we shall only outline the proof; mainly because parts 1 and 2 are
standard proofs that can be found in any relevant book (e.g. [BE6]); also Monnich
has shown (in [MOl]) a theory not very distinct from the one oifered here to be
complete. Also, part 3 is long and tedious, hence it will not be worked out in full
detail. I shall also make one simplification, that is reduce the work to objects and
unary functions rather than work with n-ary functions for n^ 1.
*
Part 1: T ^is constructed by adding denumerably many primitive constants. A is a
set of closed expressions from T^ we can therefore extend A to a maximal set T of
*
closed expressions in r can be constructed so that it possesses the following
properties:
(i) r is a maximal consistent set.
(ii) T contains A
(iii) We cannot have both $ and -< $> being deducible from T.72
(iv) T contains Vxt[x] iff T contains t[c] for every new constant c;
(v) T contains ] xt[x] iff T contains t[c] for some new constant c;
(vi) T contains \x.t[x] iff there is a new constant c such that T contains c=
Xx.t[x].
(vii) For any expression t containing an occurrence of a new constant c, ] c'
such that t[c] = app(c',c). D73
Part 2: Now we have to search for a model which satisfies T; this model will
obviously satisfy A and we want it to be a Frege structure. In this part we construct
such a model and in the next part we show it to be a Frege structure.
72 Because, if we did, then we would have J deducible from T and so T inconsistent.
73 Again the reader is referred to [BE6] and [MOl].
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The model F is built out of T as follows:
*
We define an equivalence relation — on as follows:
t—t' iff t=t' is deducible from T;
— is obviously an equivalence relation. We take Fq to be the set of equivalence
♦
classes of all the closed expressions of with respect to the relation — above.
What about propositions and truths? For any t of Tn*> [t] (the equivalence class
of t according to the equivalence relation above) is not a proposition if there exists a t'
such that we have both t— t' and t— ->t\ For example,
appCAx.-i app(x,x),\x.-> app(x,x)) is not a proposition. To see this take t and t' to be
-> app(Xx.-> app(x,x),Xx.-> app(x,x)), then we can deduce both t=t' and t= ->t' from T;
therefore we have t—t' and t— ->t'. Truths are all the equivalence classes of all the
closed expressions t which are in F and for which ft t is deducible. E.g. t=t is true
where t is a closed expression.
Now we construct &, V,... as follows:
[a] & [b] = [a&b],
[a] V [b] = [aVb],
[a] —»[b] = [ a-» b],
V x[a] = [Vxa]
]x[a] = Mxa]
X. [a] = [X.a]
app ([a],[b] ) = [app(a,b)].
We take F^ to be the collection of all the expressions t open in one variable, chosen in
the enumeration such that there is no expression t' which precedes t in the
enumeration and where t'[c] = t[c] can be deduced in T for any new constant c.
Having led the reader up to here, she can now practise trying to build an function g in
the usual way. She can also define the semantic function [[ ]] relative to the
assignment function g in the usual way.74 Now it is easily provable that this model
74 For help she can refer to [BE6].
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*
under the assignment function g is a model of which satisfies T. □
Part 3: Here, one has to show that the model constructed above is a Frege structure.
I.e. one has to show that the structure is explicitly closed, that (X,app) form a X-
system and that the structure above is a logical system relative to the set of logical
constants. As I said above, the proof is long and tedious and hence it will not be done
here. □
Consequently any consistent set of closed expressions of T^is satisfiable by a model
(which is a Frege structure).
Of course from consistency, one obtains soundness as seen below;
Soundness theorem : If an expression t of T^is deducible, then t is valid.
Proof:
This is done by checking that each axiom of is valid and that each rule
preserves validity which is easy to do. Now, as t is deducible, this means that
there is a finite proof tree with bottom element t, where at each stage the
formula is either an axiom (which is valid) or obtained from previous
formulae by application of the rules (which preserve validity). □
Now we come to complement our proof of soundness above by a proof of
completeness. Some people might sacrifice completeness for other results as in the case
of substitutional/referential interpretation. The substitutional interpretation of first
order languages is not strongly complete but it is claimed that it provides some
philosophical and ontological advantages over the referential interpretation [DUl].75
All our interpretations are referential and so we have no reason yet to ignore
completeness; moreover, it is argued that completeness is to be aimed at in our
theories [CH3].
Theorem 2: T I- t iff TU {-> t} is inconsistent.76
Proof:
75 See Chapter 1 for the meaning of Substitutional/Referential interpretation.
76 This theorem together with the consistency theorem gives completeness.
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r I- t then ru {—• t} I- t from (T27). TU {-> t} I—> t from (T17). Hence TU {—• t}
I- t&it from (T30). therefore TU {->t} I- I which means that TU {->t} is
inconsistent. □
The completeness theorem : If an expression t of T^is valid, then t is deducible.
Proof: Any first order theory interpreted using standard semantics is complete.
Higher order languages are incomplete under standard semantics but there is a
procedure to make them complete; this procedure consists in using Henkin's
techniques which we shall describe below. A second order language interpreted under
standard semantics is incomplete but could be made complete & la Henkin; also the
theory of types is incomplete under standard semantics, but could be made complete 4
la Henkin.77 is complete with respect to the interpretation we gave; this is seen
from both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
If t is valid then {-«t} is inconsistent, for if it was consistent then there would exist a
model M in which -> t was satisfiable. As -> t is satisfiable in M then [[-> t]]^ is true
with respect to an assignment function g. But [[t]]^^ is true as t is valid. Hence
contradiction and so -< t is inconsistent. From Theorem 2, we get that I- t. Hence
completeness. □
77 Henkin in [HE2] proposes to make the simple type theory as formalised by Church [CH5], com¬
plete.
The crucial clause in the standard semantics to Church's type theory, is the following:
(l) For each type a, b, Da b is the set of all functions from to D& and it is to provide denotations for
wffs of type ab. In (l) we considered the set of all functions and this is the key to the problem. Look¬
ing back at Church's paper, he proved that his logic satisfies Peano's arithmetic. But according to the
theorem which says that any two sets that satisfy Peano's arithmetic in their higher order must be iso¬
morphic, Church's TRA must be isomorphic to <N,0,+,x,s >. If so, they must then be enumerable. But
Church could not enumerate his TRA and therefore his system is incomplete. The problem comes from
the standard interpretation given above, together with letting the valuations of the functions of order n
be the set of all functions of n-ordered tuples of individuals. The solution consists in reinterpreting sets,
functions and the definition of validity. The values of functions should not be elements of the set of all
the functions as above but only a certain class of functions. So validity of a sentence Q is obtained iff
[[Q]]m v ^ true f°r aH M,V where the domain of values of functions is reinterpreted as above. The ques¬
tion is'of course whether such models exist. For, if one takes an arbitrary class above, IMlj^ y may not
be in any of the domains. Henkin imposes the condition that this arbitrary choice of class' must have
denotations for all the functions. Under this interpretation, he proves that the theory is complete. I.e.
"Ao is valid iff I- Ao in the general sense". Note that the formulation of the simple theory of types is
essentially the language used by Montague. However, Montague semanticists tend to interpret it using
standard techniques, so it is not surprising that the semantics becomes incomplete. It could be made com¬
plete using Henkin's procedure which I just described, and for such a proof the reader is referred to
[GA1].
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Before closing this chapter it is interesting to see what happens to the compactness
theorem; this is because our deduction theorem (T19) has a different form, that is: If
tl t2 t^ien
The compactness theorem : A set S of sentences of is satisfiable iff every finite
subset of S is satisfiable.
To prove this theorem, one needs prove one direction only. That is:
If every finite subset of S is satisfiable, then S is satisfiable.
If we do the standard proof here, then we get to a stage from which we cannot
proceed, as is shown below.
If S is not satisfiable then S is inconsistent. Next we must prove that if S is
inconsistent then there is a finite subset of S which is not satisfiable. As S is
inconsistent, then anything is deducible from S; and in particular _]_. Therefore there
must be a finite proof of J from t^,...tn in S. Hence, by our version of the deduction
theorem, {fltj,..fltn) I- t^->C....CtJ1-» I )....).
From here, we cannot deduce that tj-» (....(tn~+ is valid and hence that
{tj,..,tn} is not satisfiable. This means that we cannot use the standard method to
prove the compactness theorem. Another way of proving the theorem consists in
applying the Tychonoff's theorem on product spaces. This is done topologically where
the compactness property is used and where a space (X,T) is compact iff
(VfOjJjgj of T-open sets such that UOj =X) [( ] J finite subset of I): X= Uj^j
The two versions of the Tychonoff theorem are:
Tychonoff product theorem : If (X-, 0-).gj is a non-empty family of non-empty
compact spaces, then the product space II(X-, 0-) is also compact.
Tychonoff theorem : IIX- is the product space of a countable family of non-empty
spaces Then IIX^ is compact iff each (X-,0-) is compact.
It is interesting to prove compactness using this theorem, especially given that Frege
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structures themselves can be built over a topological space; we shall leave this
however to another occasion. □
- 102-
CHAFTER 3. A THEORY OF PROPERTIES AND THEORIES OF TRUTH
In this chapter, we study some basic characteristics of the theory offered in
Chapter 2. We will be concerned here with the logical operations on properties and the
various theories of truths that could be obtained.
PART A. A THEORY OF PROPERTIES
First we start with some definitions. We introduce in our language the
operator A, understanding AP to mean that P is a property. A is defined as follows:
AP =df Vxft(app(P,x)).
That is, something is a property iff whenever it applies to an object, the result is a
proposition; e.g. Xx.->(x=x).
Note that any element of SET is a property, because if P is in SET then app (P,x) is a
proposition for any x and therefore CI ( app (P,x)) is true. Hence A P is true. Note that
we introduce a A in the model for A in the formal language (in the same way as we
did for flD.78
A.l. Closure conditions on properties
Having defined properties in T^ let us now look at their closure conditions to
see whether they "behave properly". We can construct properties in the following
way:
1. P U P' = Xx.(app(P,x) V app(P',x))
2. PDP' = Xx.(app(P,x) & app(P',x))
3. Pc = Xx.-> app(P,x)
4. P— >P' = Xx.[Vy(app(P,y) -> app(P',app(x,y)))]
78 A does not internally define properties; this is because if P is not a property then Vx fXp(P,x))
is not a proposition.
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5. 0 = Xx.(x=x)
6. V= Xx.-> (x=x)
(l) - (3) give us boolean combinations of properties, using join, meet and
complement. (4) gives us function space, and (5), (6) give us the universal and the
empty property, respectively. Now we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1: A0, AVand if AP and AP' then A(PUP'), A(PDP'), APC, A(P->P').
Proof:
We shall only prove that A(P— >P'), as the others are similar.
We have to show that VxH(Vz(app(P,z) -»app(P',app(x,z)))).
If AP' then Vxfl(app(P',x)),
hence fl(app(P',app(x,z))); but X2(app(P,z)) as AP.
Therefore ft(app(P,z) -* app(P',app(x,z))).
Hence fl(Vz(app(P,z) —»app(P',app(x,z)))) and so
Vxfl(Vz(app(P,z) -* app(P',app(x,z))));
hence A(P— >P'). □
0 stands for the universal property, Vstands for the empty property, and, of
course, if P, P' are properties, then so are their disjunction and conjunction. Also, the
complement of any property is a property. This theorem implies that our domain of
properties satisfies some important closure conditions; note especially that if P and P'
are properties then P—>P' is also a property. It is well known that this would not
hold if the notion of property was more comprehensive. For instance, for Turner in
[TU9] (and Feferman in [FE2]), if P, P' are properties (classes) then P— >P' is not
necessarily a property (resp. class) because according to their approach, there were
more properties (or classes) and propositions than there is according to the approach
put forward here.
We understood AP to be P is a property, however some people understand by
this P is a class. Both interpretations work in parallel and to illustrate this point we
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introduce 6 by the following definition:
aGP =fjj. app(P,a), and we understand by it: a belongs to the class P.





H(app(t,x))(iii) where no assumption depends on x.
A(\x.app(t,x))
Theorem 2:
(i) a€ PHP'= CCaGP) & Ca6P'))
(ii) a£ PUP' = ((aSP) V(a£P'))
Proof:
We only prove (ii) here and leave (i) to the reader.
a£PUP'= app(PUP',a) = app(\x.(app(P,x) V app(P',x)),a)
= app(P,a) V app(P',a)
= (a€P) V(a6P') □
The above theorem shows that properties are closed under union and intersection.
That is, if John is either a lawyer or a doctor then either John is a lawyer or John is a
doctor; also if John is a clever man, then he is both a man and clever. Our latter
example creates a few problems, since it only works for a restricted set of adjectives.
For instance, from Mary is &_ beautiful dancer, one should not deduce that Mary is
beautiful. How can one accommodate this in the above framework? The solution here
would be in not identifying beautiful dancer with beautiful fl dancer: yet still
identifying clever man with clever D man.
Operators such as 14 fl and c are just ways of building new properties (or classes)
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out of old ones. We have not yet defined any relations between properties (those
relations may not be properties). Here we take the first step and define the following
between properties:
PCP' = (Vx)(app(P,x) -►appCP'jX))
We understand P£P' to be P is a subproperty of P\
We also define the following operation on properties, which we have not included
with the previous ones because of its distinctive status - a status which will become
clear below.
IIP = Xx.(Vy(app(P,y) -»app(y,x)))
IIP is the collection of subproperties of P. It is obvious that we should not deduce
from AP' and P£P' that AP; but if AP, do we then have A(IIP)? Well, we need to add
another condition, namely, Vy(app(P,y) —»Ay). With this new condition, things fit;
Theorem 3: If AP and Vy(app(P,y) -»Ay) then A(IIP).
Proof:
app(lIP,x) = Vy(app(P,y) -» app(y,x)); and we can show by (i>-») of Chapter
2, ft(app(P,y) ->app(y,x)) if we can show both that
(i) 0(app(P,y)) is deducible, and that
Cii) 0(app(y,x)) is deducible from assumption that app(P,y).
(i) follows from AP and Cii) follows from app(P,y) and Vy(app(P,y) -» Ay).
Hence A(nP). □
Now we start by listing some characteristics of our domain of properties. We have
already seen two of these characteristics in Theorem 2, but we shall be working with
app instead of 6 from now on. With the following theorem we reveal more of our
domain of properties,
Theorem 4:
(i) app(Xx.4>,t) & appCXx.MXt) = app(Xx.(<E>& ^),t)
Cii) app(Xx.-> 3>,t) = -> app(Xx.4>,t)
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(iii) app(Xx.3>,t) V app(Xx.MXt) = app(Xx.(<h V UO.t)
(iv) app(Pc,t) = -> app(P,t)
Cv) app(P fl P',t) = app(P,t) & app(P',t)
Cvi) app(P U P',t) = app(P,t) V app(P',t)
(vii) app((Pc)c,t) = 1-1 app(P,t)
Cviii) {AP,AP'} I- app((P U P')C,t) = app(Pc,t) & app(P'c,t)79
Cix) {AP,AP'} I- app(PcUP'c,t) = app(Pc,t) V app(P'c,t)
(x) {AP,AP'} I- app(PcnP'c,t) = app((PUP')C,t)80
(xi) {app(P,t)} I- app((Pc)c,t)81
(xii) If fit then Vy app(Xx.t, t') -» app(Xx.Vyt, t')
(xiii) If fit then 3 y app(Xx.t, t') -»app(Xx.] yt, t')
Proof: We only prove (x) as (i)-(vii) are similar cases of /3-conversion, (viii) comes
from (x) and (v), (ix) is a particular case of (vi) and (xi) comes from (vii) and the
fact that from a we deduce 11 a. Also, (xii) and (xiii) are easy to prove.
app(PcD P'c,t) = app(Xx.(app(Pc,x) & app(P'c,x)),t)
= app(Pc,t) & app(P'c,t)
= i app(P,t) & i app(P',t)
= i (app(P,t) V app(P',t))82
and app((PU P')C,t) = app(Xx.i app(P U P',x),t)
= i app(P U P',t)
= i (app(P,t) V app(P',t))
Hence app(PcnP'c,t) = app((PUP')C,t). □
Now we come to the predication relation; if we allow app to define the predication
relation then we will face some problems related to intensionality. The problem will
79 But not necessarily {£P,AP'} I- app((Pfl P')C,t) =app(Pc,t) V app(P'c,t)
80 But not necessarily: app(PcU P'c,t) = app((PflP')C,t)
81 Not necessarily app((Pc)c,t) I- app(P,t).
82 Due to (T23) of Chapter 2 and the fact that P and P' are properties.
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be illustrated in Chapter 5. But here I shall try to accommodate Aczel's solution to
the intensionality problem within our framework: we know that app is really
functional application as we have app(Xf,a) = f(a). So we need a distinct predication
relation which I introduce as follows: pred : Fq x Fq — > Fq, such that pred satisfies
the following axioms:
pred(a,b) app(a,b) A(app(a,b)) A(pred(a,b))
(PI)
app(a,b) pred(a,b) A(pred(a,b)) A(app(a,b))
(P2) Vx(pred(P,x) = pred(Q,x)) -+ P = Q
(P3) pred(P,a) = pred(Q,b) -»(P = Q & a = b).
Now of course we have to make sure that pred belongs to the Frege structure; how
can pred be built such that this holds? pred is built like any primitive independent
F- functional and ^pred are defined as follows:
$pred (X0'x'y) fa:: app (x'y) " ^ *0p
^pred (*0'x'y) ™: app (x'y) is m Xip
The logical schema of pred is:
If a, b are objects where app (a,b) is a proposition then pred (a,b) is in PROP
and pred (a,b) is in TRUTH iff app (a,b) is in TRUTH.
Now it is obvious that pred as defined here enables (Pi), (P2) and (P3) to hold. (Pi)
and (P2) hold because of the characteristics of app; (P3) holds because pred is built
like any other logical constant and it is primitive independent.
After introducing pred. we have to extend our terms to embody the additional
condition: If t, t' are terms then pred(t.t') is a term. Now T^ is extended to T^
where the terms are those of T^ together with the terms obtained from the new
condition; axioms are those of T^ together with (Pl)-(P3). For the remainder of this
chapter, we assume that we are working inside T^.
In any theory of predication we would like to have that (PRED) below is valid:
(PRED) (} z)(Vx)(Vy)({ A(app(x,y))} I- app2(z,x,y) =app(x,y)).83
- 108 -
Theorem 5: (PRED) is valid.
Proof:
This is seen by taking [[z]] to be Xq ( pred ), which is an object of the Frege
structure. d84
The following shows that the application of a property to an object is equivalent in
truth value to the predication of that property of the object. This does not however
say anything about equality.
Theorem 6: If AP then Vx(app(P,x) = pred(P,x)).
Proof:
We have to show that
Vx(app(P,x) -»pred(P,x)) and Vx(pred(P,x) ->app(P,x)).
AP = > app(P,x);
by (Pi), if we assume app(P,x) then we get pred(P,x);
hence app(P,x) -»pred(P,x).
If fl(app(P,x)) then Xl(pred(P,x)) by (Pi);
again by (Pi), pred(P,x) -»app(P,x).
Hence app(P,x) = pred(P,x).
This is for all x and so Vx(app(P,x) = pred(P,x)). □
Now it is interesting to see what would happen to the closure of our properties if we
understand the predication relation to be given in terms of pred and not app.
We start from our definition of A above. We see that it does not make any difference
if we replace app by pred. I.e. A P Vxfl (pred(P,x)) does not give anything new;
this is because pred and app are equivalent when they result in propositions.
% $
Suppose, however, that we introduce a relation 6 such that a€ P pred(P,a).
*
What would happen to theorems 1-4 if we replace app by pred and G by G ? For
83
app, is to be understood as binary application. It applies the first argument to the pair consisting of
the second and third arguments. In particular, app2(kf,a,b) = f(a,b).
84 It is also obvious that as the axiom (PRED) does not have any reference to pred then the validity of
the axiom can be proven without the functional pred.
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theorems 1 and 3, nothing new results, since if AP then pred(P,x) = app(P,x) for any
x.
*
In Theorems 2 and 4, let us replace any occurrences of € by € , = by = and app by
pred. We combine the theorems that work for pred in one theorem, Theorem 7, and
we add the condition that AP and AP':
Theorem 7: If AP, AP' then the following holds,
(i) pred(P, t) & pred(P', t) = pred(P fl P', t)
(ii) pred(Pc U P'c, t) =pred(Pc, t) V pred(P'c, t)
(iii) pred(Pcn P'c, t) =pred((PUP')c, t)85
Civ) pred(P, t) -» pred((Pc)c, t)86
(v) pred(Pc,t) = -i pred(P,t)
Proof:
Ci)
If AP, AP' then A(P fl P').
Therefore il(pred(P flP', t)), fl(pred(P, t)) and 12(pred(P', t)).
But pred(PDP', t) = pred(\x.(app(P,x) & app(P',x)), t)
= app(P, t) & app(P', t), as A(P fl P').
Since pred(P, t) =app(P, t) and pred(P', t) =app(P', t) then
pred(P, t) & pred(P', t) =app(P, t) & app(P', t). Hence (i) is a theorem.
(ii)
AP ==> APC ==> pred(Pc,t) = app(Pc,t).
AP' ==> AP'C ==>pred(P'c,t) = app(P'c,t).
APC and AP'C == > APC U P'c == >
pred(Pc U P'c,t) =app(PcUP'c,t).
85 Not necessarily pred(PcUP'c, t) s pred((PD P')C, t), as we have: {O. t, £21'} I- ->(t V t') = -> t &
t' but not: {CI t, £21'} I- -• (t & t') = -• t V -■ t\
86 But not necessarily: pred((Pc)c, t) —»pred(P, t) ; this will only be the case if DP where DP will be
defined below.
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But by Theorem 4 (vi), app(Pc U P'c,t) = app(Pc,t) V app(P'c,t),
hence pred(Pc U P'c,t) = app(Pc,t) V app(P'c,t)




APC and AP'C == > A(PC D P'c) == >
pred(Pcn P'c,t) = app(PcnP'c,t).
AP and AP' == > A(P U P') == > A((P U P')c) == >
pred((PUP')c,t) = app((P U P')c,t).
But by Theorem 4, (V), app(Pc fl P'c,t) = app(Pc,t) & app(P'c,t)
and by Theorem 4, (Viii), app((P U P')c,t) =app(Pc,t) & app(P'c,t).
Hence app(Pcfl P'c,t) =app((PUP')c,t)
and so pred(PcnP'c,t) = pred((P U P')c,t).
(iv)
AP ==> H(pred(P,t))
AP == > APC ==> A(PC)C.








pred(Pc,t) =app(Pc,t) when AP.
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app(Pc,t) = ->app(P,t);
hence pred(Pc,t) = -> app(P,t).
But app(P,t) = pred(P,t); hence by (T24), -> app(P,t) = -> pred(P,t).
Therefore, pred(Pc,t) = -> pred(P,t). □
If AP and AP' are not assumed then the version of Theorem 7 is as follows:
Theorem 8: The following holds in T^,
(i) {pred(PflP', t)} I- pred(P, t) & pred(P', t)
(ii) {pred(P, t) & pred(P', t)} I- pred(PDP', t)
(iii) {pred(Pc, t)} I—'pred(P, t)
(iV) {->pred(P, t)} I- pred(Pc, t).
Proof:
CO
If we assume pred(PflP',t) then ft(pred(P fl P',t)),
hence Xl(app(P flP',t)) and so fl(app(P,t)) and fl(app(P',t)).
This means that fl(pred(P,t)) and fl(pred(P\t)).
But app(P,t) = pred(P,t), app(P',t) = pred(P',t),
app(PflP',t) =pred(PflP',t) and app(PflP',t) = (app(P,t) & app(P',t)).
Hence pred(PflP',t) =(pred(P,t) & pred(P',t)).
Therefore the assumption pred(PflP',t) implies pred(P,t) & pred(P',t);
i.e. pred(P fl P',t) I- pred(P,t) & pred(P',t).
Now (h), (iii) and (iV) are easy. □
A. 2. Decidable properties
Now, even if AP, we still do not have that pred(P,c) V -> pred(P,c); we therefore
define a property to be decidable as follows:
DP =cj^. Vx(pred(P,x) V -> pred(P,x))
E.g. D0; this is because Vx(pred(0,x) V -^pred(0,x)) is true as it is equivalent (in
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terms of to Vx((x=x) V ->(x=x)). We know that x=x is always true, therefore
(x=x) V -> Cx=x) is always true and so Vx((x=x) V -> (x=x)) is true.
For V we know that pred(yx) = -■ (x=x) and so for any x, -> pred(yx) = (x=x)
which is true; therefore, Vx(pred(yx) V ->pred(yx)) is true and so Dy
As an example of an undecidable property, take: P& = \x.(x=a); Pa is undecidable for
take pred(Pa,x) = (x=a) and ->pred(Pa,x) = ->(x=a). Therefore, pred(Pa,x) V
-< pred(Pa,x) = (x=a) V -> (x=a) which we do not have a proof for and so we do not
have that P is decidable.87
a
Theorem 9: Let P be a property such that DP. Then for any t,
pred(P, t) = -i -> pred(P, t).
Proof:
(==>) We always have pred(P, t) -»-> -ipred(P, t) for any property P.
(<==)
(1) 0(-> ->pred(P, t)) because fl(pred(P, t)).
(2) pred(P, t) V -> pred(P, t) because DP.
{-• ->pred(P, t)}
{pred(P, t)} {-i pred(P, t)}
I
Xl(-> ->pred(P, t)) pred(P, t) V ->pred(P, t) pred(P, t) pred(P, t)
(3)
-■-■predCP, t) ->pred(P, t)
Therefore the theorem. □
The above theorem shows that the domain of decidable properties obeys classical logic;
the following theorem shows that this domain is closed under U fl and c.
Theorem 10: If DP and DP' then D(P U P'), DPC, D(P PI P').




For D(PUP'), it is enough to say that:
pred(P U P',x) V - pred(P U P',x)
= pred(P,x) V pred(P'x) V ->(pred(P,x) V pred(P',x))
= pred(P,x) V pred(P'x) V (->pred(P,x) & -> pred(P',x))
= (pred(P,x) V pred(P'x) V (-> pred(P,x)) & (pred(P,x) V pred(P'x) V -i pred(P',x))
For Pc, we use the above theorem.
The case of P D P' is done by saying that
a V a, bVib
□
(a & b) V -> (a & b)
The following theorem pushes negation inside pred in the definition of DP and shows
that for any object we cannot predicate both a property and its complement to that
object.
Theorem 11:
(i) For any P such that AP, DP = Vx(pred(P,x) V pred(Pc,x))
(ii) Vx, if Ax then [Vy[-> [pred(x,y) & pred(xc,y)] ] ]
Proof:
(i) If AP then pred(Pc,x) =app(Pc,x) and pred(P,x) = app(P,x);
but app(Pc,x) = ->app(P,x) and app(P,x) =pred(P,x),
hence pred(Pc,x) = -> pred(P,x).
Therefore VxCpred(P,x) V -> pred(P,x)) = Vx(pred(P,x) V pred(Pc,x));
and so DP = Vx(pred(P,x) V pred(Pc,x)).
(ii) If Ax then pred(xc,y) = pred(x,y), from above.
But -> (pred(x,y) & pred(xc,y)) = -> (pred(x,y) & -> pred(x,y)) and
we always have ->(pred(x,y) & -> pred(x,y)). □
Now before we move to our next step, we need to lay out some theorems of the
theory, the first of which is concerned with the conjunction of complements of
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properties.
Theorem 12: For any properties P and P\ if DP and DP' then we can derive the
following in T
Ci) app(Pc U P'c, t) = app((P fl P')c, t)
Cii) pred(Pc U P'c, t) = pred((P PI P')C, t)
Ciii) app((Pc)c, t) -* app(P, t)
(iV) pred((Pc)c, t) -» pred(P, t)
Proof:
(i) (== >) We have to show that
(app(P,t) V -i app(P,t)) (app(P\t) Y ->app(P',t)) (->app(P,t) V ->app(P\t))
-i(app(P,t) & app(P',t))
In other words, we need to prove that
CaV-a) (bV-ib) (iaV--b)
-»(a & b)
This is done as follows:
(a V -ia) (bV-ib) a V ->b)
{a & b} Cl)
a b {-ia} {-i b}
I I
C V E) and - a V -■ b
I
By discharging (l)
-• (a & b)
( <==) is similar.
(ii) Now it is enough to say that
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pred(PcUP'c,t) = app(PcUP'c,t) and
pred((P fl P')C,t) =app((PnP')C,t).
Ciii) We proved in Theorem 9 that if P is a property such that DP then
pred(P,t) = -» ->pred(P,t). We also proved in Theorem 7 that if P is a property
then pred(Pc,t) = ->pred(P,t). Hence as Pc is a property, pred((Pc)c,t) =
-> pred(Pc,t) = -> -i pred(P,t). Therefore pred((Pc)c,t) =-•-• pred(P,t).
As app((Pc)c,t) = pred((Pc)c,t) and
app(P,t) = pred(P,t) then
app((Pc)c,t) = -i -> app(P,t) and so
app((Pc)c,t) -»app(P,t).
(iV) is a consequence from the proof of Ciii) above. □
Now we define pred(P,x) pred(Pc,x).
Theorem 13:
(i) If DP then we have pred(P,x) V pred(P,x) for any x.
(ii) If DA then predCXx.A, t) = -> pred(Xx.A, t)
Ciii) For P a property, Vx-i Cpred(P,x) & pred(P,x)).88
Proof:
Ci) DP =cj£ Vxpred(P,x) V -> pred(P,x).
But pred(Pc,x) = -> pred(P,x) for any property P,
hence if DP then pred(P,x) V pred(Pc,x) for any x.
(ii) pred(Xx.A,t) = pred((Xx.A)c,t).
If DA then AXx.A) and so
pred((Xx.A)c,t) = -> pred(Xx.A,t).
Hence pred((Xx.A),t) = -> pred(Xx.A,t).
Ciii) If AP then pred(Pc,x) = -> pred(P,x);
as we have Vx-^ (pred(P,x) & -> pred(P,x)),
88 We introduced pred for those who are interested in comparing the theory that is presented here
with those theories presented elsewhere such as Feferman's and Turner's.
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then Vx->(pred(P,x) & pred(P,x)). □
One of the basic characteristics of the theory of property ofFered here is the full
(even though weak) comprehension principle. This principle says that:
(CP) For f a propositional function, we have:
app(\x.f(x), t) is true iff f(t) is true.
As mentioned in our discussion in Chapter 1, this full comprehension principle would
lead to inconsistency if the notion of property was strengthened. This is why the
work of Turner, Feferman and others focussed on restricting the principle. The
fullness of the principle is very useful to have because, as we see, it relates the
internal logic to the external one. E.g. because from <£[t] —> T[t] and <t(t] we can derive
T[t] (if we are inside PROP ) and because of (CP), we have that from pred(Ax.<l>, t)
and pred(Ax.<F —► % t) we can derive pred(Ax.T, t). Having (CP), one can make do
with just the axioms of first order logic. As we have seen, things are not so easy for
Turner; he had to provide another set of axioms for the internal logic after he got rid
of (CP). According to our theory, if we are inside PROP then we could have the
following;
pred(Ax.<I>, t) & pred(Ax.'5r, t) = pred(Ax.€> & t) and:
pred(Ax.-> <1>, t) = -> <$(t).
Now if we want a more general version of the comprehension principle, we can
introduce the following:
For any W a propositional wff open in x, (j P)(Vt)(pred(P, t) = ^t/x] );
the above principle is valid. Also we of course have extensionality:
(Vx)(Vy)((Vz)(app(x,z) = app(y,z)) -»x=y)
Now we come to our next step, that is, the truth theory of T^. Before
presenting this however we summarise what we have done so far: we built a
predication relation which is equivalent to app (inside SET ). But outside SET, the
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behaviour of pred is not known. That is we can not say what pred(P, t) is when P is
not a property. Take P to be Xx.-> app(x,x) for example, we find that app(P,P) =
app(P,P) by simple j3-conversion, but there is no way for us to say what pred(P,P)
is. This is because we did not allow /3-conversion to take place inside pred as it did
inside app. This is acceptable if we follow the view that properties are elements of
SET and that predication is restricted to those elements. One might question here
why it is that we introduce pred where we had app. It was not only because pred
solved the problem of Rajneeshee and Fondalee, but also because pred is a primitive
independent F- functional. Thus pred provides properties with the characteristics of
high intensionality; that is, if pred(P,a) = pred(Q,b) then P = Q and a = b. We then
introduced the notion of a decidable property; that is, a property which at any
moment you can decide whether it holds of some object or not.
PART B. THEORIES OF TRUTH
Now we come to build a truth operator T on our structure. The first question
that will be asked here is: why introduce T when if you can deduce A then you know
that A is true? But as Kripke (in [KR2]) and other authors on theories of truth have
stressed, self-reference occurs frequently in natural language and often this self-
reference involves the attribution of truth.
Within the present context of Frege structures the natural question to initiate our
discussion is:
What is the logical schema governing the truth predicate?
We obviously cannot take:
(l) If A is an object then T (A) is a proposition such that T (A) is true iff A is
true
as our logical schema for T. This is because the above internally defines TRUTH.
Also, if we take
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(2) If A is an object then T (A) is an object such that T (A) is true iff A is
true,
This will not help as it will give the identity function. What about if we take the
following?
(3) If A is a proposition then T (A) is a proposition such that T (A) is true iff
A is true.
Will this help? The two operators <J>-p and Trj, should then be defined as:
<Iw, (X,x) is x is in XT p
fkrp (X,x) is x is in Xt
All this gives the impression that the way to obtain a truth theory here is to
introduce a new operator T and build T in the model. Assuming this to be the case,
we then extend the formal language T^ to T^t by adding a new constant T such
that if t is a term then T(t) is a term. What axioms should T have? The obvious one
is T(t) = t; this however would tie us to the condition that we are already in. That is,
the introduction of T is unnecessary and it is enough to deduce t. However even
though according to our account the liar sentence is not a proposition and therefore
cannot be a truth, the liar sentence disjoined with its negation is true in any classical
theory and therefore we feel the loss of something which is independent of whether
the theory is classical or intuitionistic. Therefore, what one needs is something more
than the set TRUTH that we have. Before we discuss how truth could be
implemented in a Frege structure, we must stress that the present account is very
elementary and is meant only to lay the foundation for the development of theories
of truth within the context of Frege structures. I do not claim to have provided the
final analysis. Second, I am trying to fit already existing theories of truth on the top
of Frege structures and do not wish to defend the axiom system that I present
below.89 I only use it to highlight the problems that a theory of truth faces: namely,
89 This axiom system is lifted from Turner's paper [TU9].
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no theory can support the full Tarski biconditional schema:
T(t) <->t
We would like the predicate T to be such that from the assumption T(t) we
deduce t; but assuming t should not imply T(t). This observation is captured in (TRl)
below. Also we want to have only two levels, t and T(t) and to obtain that from the
assumption T(t) we can deduce T(T(t)); this results in (TR2) below. Again, if T(t)
and T(t —»t') then T(t'), which results in (TR3). (TR3) is the first instance where the
behaviour of T is dictated by the behaviour of the logical constants (here -»). (TR4) is
the case for V and ] and (TR5) is the case for &. If we let T(->t) = -iT(t) hold then
we will get the paradox, yet (TR6) can capture negation without falling into
inconsistency. Finally (TR7) could be understood as stating that if you have good
grounds for asserting t (that is t is a theorem of T^) then T(t) must be a theorem of













T(t & t') T(t & t')
(TR5)
T(t) T(t')
(TR6) T(-> T(t)) = T(T(-> t))
(TR7) If I- t then T^t I- T(t)
- 120 -
B.l. Various truth theories
If we are inside PROP, no gain is obtained as we get not only (TRl)-(TR7) -
and in particular (TRl) - but also the converse of (TRl): i.e. from t we deduce T(t).
This of course will imply that the whole introduction of T inside is a trivial
matter, for not even a better expressivity is gained - this is because we obtain that
I- a is the same thing as I- T(a) and vice versa. But the matter will not be as trivial if
we are interested in discussing the truth of many sentences, even though we know
that they are compounded out of sentences which we deny to be propositions in our
theory. Let us see how various theories of truth could be built on the top of a Frege
structure.
I. Frege structures with Tarski's notion of Truth: This is essentially the notion of
Truth that we have so far in our Frege structure. According to this notion you can
only talk about the truth of a sentence in the metalanguage. Also, if you want to talk
about the truth of sentences in the metalanguage, then you have to go into a higher
metalanguage and so on... This of course leads to a hierarchy of metalanguages each of
which talks about the truth of its predecessor. Here if we want to talk externally
about truth in our structure then we introduce T, an external operator such that
T(#a) is90 true iff a is in TRUTH.
This notion of truth is the weakest notion because we need self-reference and
sentences that talk about their own truth or falsity. The first account to allow for
this was Kripke's in [KRl]; we shall see whether this account can be used to extend
Frege structures to where they can have a theory of truth equivalent to that of
Kripke's - but first, let us provide a completely predicative theory of truth which is
between Tarski's and Kripke's.
II. A predicative theory ofTruth:
90 #a is the code number of a if we assume a certain numbering.
- 121 -
We start with Tq = TRUTH
PQ = PROP
We take T^ = Tq U { T (x) : x is in Tq}
Pj = PqU { T (x) : x is in Pq}
T2 = ti U { T Cx) : x is in Tj}
P2 = P1U{ T(x) :xis inPj}
Tn = Tn-lU{ T(x):xis inT^j}
Pn = Pn-1 U { T Cx) : x is in P^}
For transfinite level co, we take T, = U„, T and P, = U , P • then for oi+l,(o nt(t) n oj n t n
(o+2,.. we repeat the above process. For ordinal a we have two cases:
either a is a successor ordinal, Le. a = (3+1 and so
T^TgUl T (x) : x is in T^}
Pa = P^ U { T (x) : x is in P^}
or a is a limit ordinal then
T = LL . T„a p <a p
P = U, . P„a p <a p
Theorem: If a <B then T CT^andP £P,j.^ a p a p
Proof: Trivial. □
Now to use the fixed point theorem we define a monotonic operator J as follows:
J:{(Ti,Pi)}i->((Ti,Pi)}i
such that
J((T^,Pp) = if i is a successor ordinal
= ( ^T-, U ^Pp if i is a limit ordinal.
We define an ordering relation ^ on {(T^P-)}- as follows:
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(T.,P.) <(Tj,Pj) iff T.CTj and P.CPj
Lemma: J is monotonic; i.e. if (T-,P-) ^(Tj,Pj) then J((T-,P|)) ^ J((Tj,Pj)).
Proof: Easy. □
Applying the fixed point theorem to the operator J above we obtain a pair (T00,?00) =
JCT^P00).
The theory of Truth that we obtain is stronger than Tarski's and weaker than
Kripke's. It is stronger than Tarski's in that we can talk about the truth of a sentence
in the language itself so we can say: snow is white is true, it is true that snow is
white is true. It is weaker than Kripke's in that we remain totally predicative and use
only propositions as arguments of meaningful assertions of truths. For instance the
liar sentence: This sentence is not true (which was taken by Kripke to be
ungrounded), does not lead to any problem for us only because we refuse to assign it
a truth value as we exclude it from PROP. By doing so, we will be subject to
criticism: why should we rule out those sentences as propositions and lose the ability
to discuss their truth value? This is not the right place to defend either taking those
sentences to be propositions or refusing to do so. If one denies the status of these
sentences as propositions then the above predicative theory of truth covers them; for
even though it can continue ad infinitum discussing the truth or falsity of sentences
that are already known to be true or false (e.g. The snow is white), it cannot however
discuss the truth or falsity of sentences which are not propositions such as: This
sentence is not true. For those who prefer to go beyond predicativity to self-
referential sentences involving the concept of truth in a more embedded way rather
than the above predicative simple way, we show them briefly the problem below. If
we make the paradoxical sentences legitimate subjects of the truth predicate, we will
face the possibility of becoming inconsistent. Of course T is a predicate which applies
to any expression and so is defined for any expression, but the information it gives is
only significant when this expression is itself a proposition. However, our notion of
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proposition is rather restricted and defined by induction on expressions involving
identity and the logical constants. To be able to build a theory of truth which gives
insight into these paradoxical sentences, and which could be compared with other
existing truth theories, we have to force the truth operator to tell us something about
some sentences (especially the paradoxical ones) which are not propositions. To do so
we start as follows:
We start first from a language Lq which has abstraction and application but no logic.
We then construct logic on top in the same way that we did for a Frege structure,
obtaining = Lq(X^,Tq), where Qq and Tq are those of the Frege structure. 91
We now take fl^a = X^a v X^(X^a) and T^a = TQayTgCTQa)). Hence for any a so far,
if we can prove TQa then a is true, if we can prove X^a and -> TQa then a is false.
We may assume we can continue in this way the construction of the various Ln, Xln,
T , and take the fixed point. However, take the Russell sentence a, then
X^a = u and TQa =u. However, aGPROP^ and aGTRUTH^, Xl^a=l and T^a=l.
So it seems that we are getting the Russell sentence to be true in every stage after
stage 1. This is something we wouldn't want to have and the above construction is
not acceptable. It seems hence that the Kripke construction is not straightforward.
There is however another account which uses the Gupta/Herzberger construction
of a theory of truth (in [GUI] and [HE4]), where the limit is obtained at a
stabilisation ordinal rather than at a fixed point. We shall follow this account next
and construct on the top of a Frege structure a theory of truth which is equivalent to
the Gupta/Herzberger theory of truth.
III. The Gupta/Herzberger notion ofTruth: By constructing a truth operator as above,
we obtain expressivity; the sets PROP and TRUTH are extended to a stage where they
contain statements about the truth of already existing statements. Our use above of
monotonicity to build the truth theory was paralleled by the way all the logical
91 Note that here we use propositions and truths whereas Kripke uses the extensions and antiexten-
sions. These two approaches however are equivalent.
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constants were built inside Frege structures. Let us provide another theory of truth
where the process depends on revision rather than monotonicity; that is where the
concept of truth is being revised at each step.
Above, when building a weaker theory of truth than that of Kripke, we kept things
predicative so that at each stage a such that a = (8+1, we have
Ta = T^U { T (x) : x is in T^}. Hence T^CT^. □
Next, when we tried to construct a Kripke truth theory, we counted on monotonicity.
Here, we shall lose both predicativity and monotonicity in favour of the following
revision process. The crucial point is that we do not follow the Kripke construction,
and hence our external logic does not depend on Kleene's connectives but on the fully
classical ones.
We start as above with a Frege structure F which has TRUTH and PROP. We let
TRUTHq = TRUTH
PROPq = PROP
TRUTH j = J(TRUTH0)92
PROPj = J(PROP0)
Where:
T (a) is in J(TRUTHq) iff a is in TRUTHq
a & b is in J(TRUTHq) iff a is in J(TRUTHq) and b is in J(TRUTHq)
a V b is in J(TRUTHq) iff a is in J(TRUTHq) or b is in J(TRUTHq)
and so on ... T (a) is in J(PROPq) iff a is in PROPq...
Note93 here that we shall differ from the above (Kripke's truth) in that if a is in
TRUTHq then this does not imply that a is in J(TRUTHq). This means that J is not
monotonic and so we cannot apply the fixed point theorem to find the limit. There is
92 J is built below in a way that J(S) contains T(a) if a certain condition holds, contains a&b if
another condition holds and so on.
93 We can prove here that truth is closed under the logical connectives. E.g. T (a & b) is in iff T
(a) is in and T (b) is in T . We shall leave this until the construction is given more formally.
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however another theorem we can use to find the limit of such a construction; it is the
following theorem of Herzberger (in [HE4]):
Theorem: For any model M there is an ordinal cr in the revision process based on M,
such that Mg.is a stabilisation ordinal.
We still have to explain what a stabilisation ordinal is. A stabilisation ordinal cris an
ordinal such that any element is positively stable iff that element is in TRUTH^
where an element t is positively stable iff (] a)(V/3 ^ o0(t is in TRUTH^).
The above is what should be done if the only way to obtain a theory of truth in
is by extending it to T^t. This however is not the case as we can introduce T in
T^ as follows: T(t) =^£. pred(Xx.t, x). This satisfies (TRl)-(TR7) if we are inside
PROP, as the following theorem shows:
Theorem: If fit and fit' then (TRl)-(TR7) are theorems.
Proof: Easy.94 □
94 The only thing worth mentioning here is that Vxpred(\y.t, t') —»pred(\y.Vxt, t').
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CHAPTER 4. DETERMINERS AND QUANTIFIERS IN A FREGE STRUCTURE
We have in the previous chapter offered a few theorems about closures of
properties and classes and discussed the possible truth theories that could be
constructed within our framework. Here, we shall concentrate on both determiners
and quantifiers and prove some relevant theorems about them.
One of Montague's main achievement in PTQ (see [TH2]) was to show how a
logically adequate treatment of quantifier phrases could be systematically
incorporated into a fragment of English. A further round of investigation into the
characteristics of quantifiers and determiners was inaugurated by Barwise and
Cooper's paper [BA3], which explored the way in which mathematical results in the
area of generalised quantifiers could be applied to natural language. Since then, there
has been a copious discussion of this topic - van Benthem provides a good summary of
the main results (in [BEl] and [BE7]). In this chapter, we inquire how natural
language quantifiers might be incorporated into the framework of Frege structures.
Although we will have to leave a number of problems unsolved, we are nevertheless
able to prove some relevant theorems.
In a Montague treatment, a sentence like Every boy runs receives a translation of the
following form:
(1) (every'(boy')Xrun').
Within the framework of [BA3], we say that everv'(bov') is a quantifier - interpreted
as a set of sets (or, intensionally, as a second order property of properties), and that
every' is a determiner - interpreted as a function from sets to quantifiers. An
alternative analysis, adopted by van Benthem, treats determiners as relations between




As we will see later, (3) provides a convenient notation for expressing interesting
characteristics of determiners.
Introducing D in (3) above prepares us for the important concept of a determiner
relation, also known as the characteristic property of the determiner. A characteristic
property of a determiner is that particular set theoretical relation which characterises
this determiner set theoretically; e.g. for every', it is Q and for al it is fl^. We shall
see below what Cand are.
PART A. TWO EXAMPLES OF DETERMINERS
We start first by defining the two determiners every' and al in our framework. Let
every' =df Xx.Xy.Vz (app(x,z) -»app(y,z))
a' =df z (app(x,z) & app(y,z))
The meanings of every', al are not classes but we can prove some important theorems
about them. We need however to introduce the characteristic properties of these
determiners. We have also to show that these characteristic properties Cor for that
matter the determiners themselves) behave properly; that is when we combine things
together in the right way we get a proposition. This is shown to be the case in the
following few definitions, lemmas and theorems. The characteristic property of
every', namely Q, has already been defined as follows:
If Pp are properties,
=df Vx (aPP(pi> x) ->app(P2, x))
Lemma 1: C is a transitive, reflexive relation on properties.
Proof: Obvious. □
Now what about symmetry or antisymmetry? The relation Q cannot be
antisymmetric (we do not want it to be). As far as symmetry is concerned, all we get
is:
If PjCp^ and P2£Pj then Vx (app(Pj, x) =app(P2, x))
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We call this equisymmetry.
Lemma 2: £ is equisymmetric on properties.
Proof: Easy. □
Theorem 1: If and P2 are properties then
(i) app2(every',Pj,P2) = PjCP2 and
(ii) ft(app2(every',P1,P2)).
Proof:
(i) app2(every\Pj,P2) = Vz (appCP^z) -»app(P2,z)) = Pj£P2.
(ii) If Pj and P2 are properties then n(app(P^,x)) and ft(app(P2,x)),
hence fl(app(Ppx) ->app(P2,x)) and so 0(Vx (app(Pj,x) ->app(P2,x))).
Therefore fl(app2(every',P^,P2)). □
We define P^ H*P2 } z (app(P^,z) & app(P2,z)).
It is obvious that P^ n*P2 is a proposition when both P^ and P2 are properties.
Another concept that we introduce here is that of an empty property. We say that a
property P is empty and write 0P iff Vz (-> app(P,z)). E.g. Vis an empty property, as






Theorem 2: If P, P^ and P2 are properties then the following holds:
(i) If - 0P then 0(P U P)
(ii) If -- 0(Pj U P2) then - 0(P2 U Pj)
Proof:
(i) is trivial to prove since when P is a property, app(P U P,z) = app(P,z)
and so -> 0P = -10(P U P).
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Cii) is also trivial as when P^, P2 are properties,
then app(P^ U P2»z) = app(?2 U P j,z). □
Theorem 3: If P^ and P2 are properties then
app2(a',PpP2) = P^ H Pj and
iKappj^P-^Pj))
Proof:
app2(a',P1,P2) = ] z (app(Pj,z) & app(P2,z)). By (j3)
-Pjrfpy
If AP^ and AP2 then fl(app(P^,x)) and fl(app(P2,x)).
Hence H(app(Pj,x) & app(P2,x)) and so il(app2(a',PpP2)). □
PART B. NON INTERNAL DEFINABILITY
Outside95 SET we cannot draw useful conclusions about every' because we
cannot decide the propositionhood of an arbitrary formula in which -» is the main
connective.96 This is not a disadvantage as we only want every' to have meaning
when we are inside SET. What we cannot do, however, is to define the type of every'
or of determiners inside Frege structures. Suppose we have the following definitions:
Quant(t) =£j£ Vx (Ax -+ fl(app(t, x)))
Det(t) =^£. Vx (Ax -+ Quant(app(t, x)))97
Quant <[Vx (Ax -» iXapp(t, x)))] /t>
Det <[Vx (Ax -» Quant(app(t, x)))] /t>
Det and Quant do not internally define determiners and quantifiers because
95 Here and thereafter, we shall consider Frege structures where PROP fl SET is empty. In Chapter 5,
we shall see how such Frege structures could be constructed.
96 The reader is reminded again that a—b is a proposition in the case where a is a proposition and b is
a proposition assuming a is true.
97 Note that we could have defined it as: Det(t) = Vxy ((Ax & Ay) —» fl(app2(t,x,y))) which is closer
to van Benthem's approach in [BEl] and [BE7].
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Vx (Ax -* Quant(app(t, x))) and
Vx (Ax -» fi(app(t, x)))
are not propositions for any t. In fact even if t is a property, we still do not have a
guarantee that Det(t) and Quant(t) are propositions.98 We can explain the problem
differently; assume we define new domains out of old ones in a Frege structure as
follows:
Fq, Prop and SET are three basic domains. For any two of these domains A
and B we let
A— >B = {a in A: for every x in A, app(a,x) is in B}
The type of quantifiers should be QUANT = SET—>PROP, and that of determiners is
DET = SET— >(SET—>PROP) = SET—>QUANT. QUANT is a non-empty subset of
SET, yet DET is empty. This is because if a is in DET then a is in SET and for every
b in SET, app(a,b) is in QUANT. Since a is in SET then app(a,b) is in PROP. But as
app(a,b) is in QUANT then app(a,b) is in SET. Hence app(a,b) is in PROP fl SET,
which is empty. Absurd.
This creates the first complication. DET should be constructed on the top of Fq even
though terms, verbs, etc.. could be inside F<r The second complication comes from the
fact since SET is not internally definable, QUANT is also not internally definable,
because QUANT CSET."
All the above is not serious as there is no particular reason for wanting
determiners and quantifiers to be internally definable.100 As everything fits together
properly, and we can prove many desirable features of our determiners, why insist on
98 This is because Ax is not a proposition.
99 Actually as it is here QUANT = SET can be easily proven. One might question the acceptability of
this, yet I have nothing to say about it.
100 Sets are not closed under function space: for take A and B to be sets, then if we define to be {f:
fE AxB & (Vx 1 !y)( <x,y >Ef)}, we then cannot show that B is a set. This can be seen as follows:
If we spell out the definition of the function space we get: {f: fC AxB & (VxfiA)G y 6B)( <x,y >6f&(V
y'6B)(-Ct,y'>ef—>y=y'))}. Now if A and B are sets then to have B a set we must restrict f in AxB to be
a set. This is related to the problem that if we have that AP and pQ" in the sense that (V
x)(app(P',x)-<app(P,x)), then we do not necessarily have that AP' as it was shown in Chapter 3.
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internal definability? The following lemma proves inside the theory that combining a
determiner and a property results in a quantifier.




Vx (Ax -»Quant(app(Q, x))) From DetQ
By (VE)
AP -»Quant(app(Q,P))
AP AP -* Quant(app(Q,P))
By ( -»E)
Quant(app(Q,P)).
Hence the lemma. □
PART C. THEDETERMINER "the"
The reader may now wonder why it is we only discussed every and a. This
should not give the impression that the remaining determiners are definable in terms
of the above two. In fact, we now come to the. This determiner might sound
problematic at first, as it deals with definite descriptions and we have a problem
talking about definite descriptions inside Frege structures. Not only should the be a
functional which operates on101 Fq (even though most categories take denotations
inside Fq); but also the has the problem that definite descriptions have in any Frege
structure, every, a had denotations in DET = SET— >(SET— >PROP); the however
should have a denotation in SSET— >(SET—>PROP) Q DET where SSET is the
collection of all singleton sets. Hence it appears that with the we will face more
problems than with other determiners. This is because, not only is SET neither
decidable nor internally definable, but also SSET is neither decidable nor internally
definable.
Let us take the usual translation of the:
the' = XuXv[ ] y [Vx (app(u, x) =(x=y)) & app(v,y)] ]
Let us define for any property P, SN(P) ] y [Vx (app(P, x) =(x=y))]. SN is not a
propositional function outside SET and so SN does not internally define singleton
properties. Some properties are obviously singleton properties, e.g. Xx.(x=a). For some
others however we can only tell they are single if there is some information to the
effect. We leave open the question of how this problem should be dealt with.
As mentioned before each determiner is associated with its characteristic
property. For each determiner we introduce, we have to show that if we apply this
determiner to two properties we get a proposition. As the following theorem shows,
the' has this characteristic.
101 Every determiner has this characteristic.
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(1) app2(the\P1,P2) = } y [Vx (app(P1,x) = (x=y)) & app(P2,y)].
If AP^ and AP2 then ft(app2(the',Pj,P2)X
(2) app(the", Pr p2) = SN(P1)&P1Qj2-
As AP^ and AP2 then ft(SN(Pj)) and fXP-^S^ aiK* ^eELCe ft(app2(the",Pj,P2)). d102
PART D. HOW TO SHOW SOMETHING IS A DETERMINER
We shall need to define all remaining determiners that haven't yet been defined
(e.g. few), as none is definable in terms of the others; but now the whole method for
doing so should be obvious and the lack of internal definability no longer worrying.
Having determiners such as every', al and the' is one thing; being able to deduce
that every'. §1 and the' are determiners is something else. I.e. we introduced every', a'.
etc.. by equations but can we prove that Det(every'), Det(a'), etc..? Take the formula
for every':
Xx.Xy.Vz [app(x,z) -+app(y,z)];
To show that Det(every') we have to show that
Vx (Ax -» Vy (Ay -+ ft(app2(every',x,y)))).
But to be able to show the implication we need to have ft (Ax), and ft (Ay), which we
cannot assume. For this we need an extension for implication as follows:
We always have that if {a} I- b then {ft a} I- a -» b (our version of the deduction
theorem). We need that if {ft a} I- b then I- ft a -* b. Can we assert this rule? That is:
(*) If {ft a} I- b then I- ft a -»b.
102 However things are not as smooth as may seem. When we come to measure theory, some things
may not be provable inside the theory and some extra devices may be needed. The following for in¬
stance, is not provable in our theory:
If Pj and P2 are properties, PjCPj and SN(P2) and -'0P1 then SNlP^).
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It may be claimed here that this rule leads to an inconsistency similar to Curry's
paradox because if a is Xx(fhpp(x,x)->J_J, then a is a well-formed expression.
However it is not the case that we will get Curry's paradox, for take the following
chain of deductions:
app(a,a) = fhpp(a,a) -> J by ^-conversion
app(a,a) I- fhpp(a,a) —»J from above
app(a,a) I- fhpp(a,a) obvious
app(a,a) I- J_ by MP
fhpp(a,a) I- app(a,a) —» J by DT
But now applying (*) we get: I- fhpp(a,a)->(app(a,a) -+ I )
which is not contradictory.
Note that we should not always deduce from {a} I- b that I- a-b; because if we did
then we get Curry's paradox as explained in the previous chapter. However, I am not
sure whether the deduction from {fh} I- b to I- fh—b is harmless and hence the
following theorem that every', al and the' are determiners can only hold if we
conjecture that (*) holds.
Theorem 5: Det(every'), Det(a'), Det(the'), if (*) is consistent.
Proof:
For every': We have to prove that Vx (Ax -»Vy (Ay -» fl(app2(every',x,y)))).
{Ax,Ay} I- fl(app2(every',x,y)) according to Theorem 1, (ii) above.
{Ax} I- fl(app(y,z)) -» fl(app2(every',x,y)) according to (*).
From this we have: {Ax} I- Vz [ft(app(y,z)) -» 0(app2(every',x,y))]
{Ax} I- [VzO(app(y,z))] -» fl(app2(every',x,y))
{Ax} I- Ay -> 0(app2(every\x,y))
{Ax} I- Vy (Ay -> fl(app2(every',x,y))).
Repeating the same process, we get:
I- Ax ->Vy (Ay -> fl(app2(every',x,y)))
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I- Vx (Ax -»Vy (Ay -» fl(app2(every\x,y)))).
The proof of al and the' is similar to that of every'. □
From here we see that the theory can be strengthened in many ways: our framework
is powerful yet flexible.
PART R CHARACTERISTICS OF DETERMINERS AND QUANTIFIERS
Here we are concerned with some characteristics of determiners that could be
proven in our theory. We start with the first theorem that asserts that the result of
applying a quantifier to a property results in a proposition.
Theorem 6: {Quant(Q), AP} I- H(app(Q,P))
Proof:
We have to prove that: H (app(Q,P) from assumptions: Vx (Ax —> H
(app(Q,x))) and AP.
But {Vx (Ax -* fl(app(Q,x))), AP} I- AP, AP -» H(app(Q,P))
and {AP, AP -» fl(app(Q,P))} I- fl(app(Q,x))
Hence the theorem. □
We still cannot prove: {Quant(Q), AP, AP'} I- (app(Q,P) & PCp') -♦ app(Q,P'), but
this is not worrying as it should not always hold. The following theorem is to show
that the domain of quantifiers is closed under U, fl and c.
Theorem 7:
(i) {Quant(a), Quant(b)} I- Quant(aHb)103
(ii) {Quant(a), Quant(b)} I- Quant(aUb)104
(iii) {Quant(a)} I- Quant(ac)105




E.g. Every man and some women.
E.g. Every man or some women.
E.g. Not every man.
- 136 -
Vx (Ax -» fl(app(a,x))) Vx (Ax -+ fl(app(b,x)))
Vx (Ax -» ft(app(a,x)) & fl(app(b,x)))
Hence Vx (Ax -» H(app(a,x) & app(b,x))). □
Also the following theorem is concerned with the closure on the domain of
determiners. Now closure is in term of fl^, U^, c^.106
Theorem 8:
(i) {Det(a), Det(b)} I- Det(afljb)107
(ii) (Det(a), Det(b)} I- Det(aU^b)108
(hi) {Det(a)} I- Det(ac1)109
Where
afl^b = Xx.(app(a,x) fl app(b,x))
all^b = Xx.(app(a,x) U app(b,x))
ac* = Xx.(app(a,x))c
Proof: We illustrate only (hi).
Det(a) = Vx (Ax -* Quant(app(a,x))
= Vx (Ax -» Quant(app(a,x)c) By Theorem 7, (hi).
Hence Det(ac*). □
We would be interested in proving something in general about these determiner
relations. Let us consider monotonicity. We have two kinds of monotonicity: upwards
monotonicity and downwards monotonicity (see [BEl], [BE7] and [BA3]). These are
defined as follows, where C is a property of sets:
(upwards) If A CA' and C(A) then C(A')
(downwards) If A' CA and C(A) then C(A')
10<s We introduce the subscript '1' to make the distinction between the intersections considered.
107 E.g. many and many
108 E.g. Some or few.
109 E.g. not all, not every.
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As an example of an upwards monotone determiner, we take a\ al is monotone in both
arguments. E.g. a. boy who sings walks entails a. boy walks. Also _a_ boy sings and
dances entails a boy sings.
Hence to show that al is upwards monotone in both arguments we need to show that
(i) app2(a',P1,P2) & -♦app2(a,,P'1,P2) and
Cii) app2(a',P^,P2) & P2S3'2 app2(a',PltP'2).
Both (i) and Cii) can be shown as follows:
For (i) :
app2(a\P1, P2) & P^CP'j =
]z(app(P1,z)&app(P2,z)) &
-♦ ^z(appCP'1,z)&app(P2,z)).
The proof of Cii) is similar.
every3 can also be shown monotone in the right argument but not in the left.110
We now consider another property of determiner relations; that is conservativity. We
say that a property of sets C is conservative if
(CONS) D(Pj, P2) = D(Pj, P2OPj), where D is the determiner relation of
C.
As an example, al and every' are conservative. E.g. a boy walks entails a boy is both a
boy and he walks. Also every man runs entails every man is both a man and he runs.
Now to show that al and every' are conservative, we have to show that for any P^
and P2 properties,
(a'coNS) p^p.^ =P1n1(P2np1).
(every'CONS) Pj 0>2 ssPjQ^nPj).
This is shown by the following two theorems:
Theorem 9: If P^ and P2 are properties then P^ fl*P2=P^ n*(P2 0 Pj).
Proof: The only thing worth mentioning here is that app(P2fl P^,z) = app(P2,z) &
110 For a clear discussion of such characteristics of determiners, the reader is referred to [BE7].
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app(P-pz). □
Theorem 10: P^Cp^ =Pj£(P2HPj)
Proof: Trivial. □
Of course we would like the conservativity condition to hold of any determiner we
define and we would be happy if we could prove conservativity for determiner
relations as a special type of their own. It is not obvious how to do so and we must be
satisfied with proving properties about each determiner relation individually.
Now we can take the definition of properties of concepts which is given in [BE7; page
459] to be:
"determiners only dependent upon the intersection of their arguments; that is
if
CnD=AnB then D(C,D)=£>(A,B)".
Now we can prove that al has such a property. This is because the determiner
relation for al is fl* and we can prove that if CD D=Afl B then Cn*D=Afl*B.
Before closing this section, we give the following theorem which shows that every'
is a transitive relation:
Theorem 11: (app2(every',Pj,P2), app2(every',P2,P3)} I- app3(every',P^ fl P^)
Proof:
app2(every\P1,P2) & app2(every\P2,P3)=
Vz (app(Pj,z) -»app(P2,z)) & Vz (app(P2,z) -+ app(P3,z)).
Hence Vz (app(Pp) ->app(P3,z)). □
Transitivity does not hold for a'.
PART F. NO LOSS OF QUANTIFICATIONWITH FIRST ORDER THEORIES
We have said that we do not need more than two levels of quantification,
namely quantification over objects and quantification over predicates. An obvious
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question, however, is whether we need these two levels of quantification. In this
section we shall discuss this issue and show that the semantics that we have been
following does not result in any loss of quantification. The crucial point here is the
following:
if we had two levels of quantification, one over individual variables and the other
over predicate variables then the universal quantifier clause is defined as:
(1) [[VX<KX)]]g = V<tf<&X)]]g[ |a,/X]/a>
However, if we were able in a Frege structure to have higher order quantifiers, then
we would replace (l) by (2):
(2) [[VX<KX)]]g = v<[<Kx)]]g[f/x]/f>
However, our inability to do so is not problematic, since A is isomorphic to Fj, where
A is the collection of lal such that a is in Fq.
Proof:
Take the identity function from A to Fj.
This function is injective, obviously.
It is surjective because for all f in Fj, IXfl is in A and IXfl = f. □
Hence we are fine up to here. As we have shown, quantification over objects coincides
with quantification over functions. What about if we considered
(3) [[VX<KX)]]g = V<[<KX)]]g[a/x]/a>
Do we get any loss of quantification? And if we do not, is this equivalent to (4)
below?
(4) V<tWX)]]g[|a|/x]/a>
Regarding loss of quantification, we are fine as Fq is isomorphic to A.
Take I I : Fq — > A
I I is injective for if lal = Ibl then a=b by (e).
I I is surjective, obvious.
About equivalence, if app(a,x) = lal (x) then we do have equivalence. However,
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always app(a,x) = lal (x) and therefore the two definitions are equivalent.
In summary what this chapter shows is that our theory works well for both
quantifiers and determiners; it is also simple, tidy and flexible. We have
demonstrated that even though determiners and quantifiers are not internally
definable, we can prove very useful things about them - things such as monotonicity,
symmetry, and equisymmetry that are the main concerns of workers in this area.
What we have not investigated is the cardinality characteristics of determiners and
quantifiers. We will pursue such questions in future work.
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CHATTER 5. INTENSIONALTTY AND EXTENSI0NAL1TY USING A FREGESTRUCTURE
PART A AN INTENSIONAL SOLUTION TO PROPOSHIONAL ATTITUDES
Problems of intensionality have been central to much research in natural
language semantic, at least since the time of Frege. Kripke's possible world semantics
for modal logic has been extremely influential, and plays a major role in Montague's
extensive treatment of intensional constructions in his Universal Grammar and Proper
Treatment of Quantification - see [TH2]. Although Montague made enormous progress
in this area, the analysis of propositional attitudes has remained intractable, for
reasons that we shall briefly review.
On a Possible worlds approach, intensions are functions from worlds to extensions.
For example, the intension of a sentence is a function from worlds to truth values.
Consequently, two intensions are identical if they yield the same value for each
possible world. We call this weak intensionality. One notorious consequence of weak
intensionality is that any two logically necessary propositions have the same
intension, namely the function that yields True at each world. While this may be
acceptable if we only restrict our semantics to alethic modalities, it leads to the
well-known problem of logical omniscience (cf [HI3]) when one considers verbs of
propositional attitude. That is, we have the result that if John believes that 2+2 = 4,
then this entails that John believes that p, where p is any truth of arithmetic. This
consequence seems inevitable if we adopt weak intensionality together with the
principles of compositionality and substitutivity of co-extensive expressions. Rather
than abandoning either of the latter, we would prefer to solve the problem by using a
stronger notion of intensionality. Before showing how Frege structures can help us, let
us explain compositionality and substitutivity, and say why they create difficulties in
weakly intensional frameworks.
Compositionality is the principle that says that the meaning of any complex expression
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is a function of the meaning of its parts; for example, the meaning of John runs is a
function of the meaning of John and of the meaning of runs and this function is
specified in advance.
Substitutivity is the process that allows us to replace a by b in <I> where a=b; so that if
the Morning star = the evening star and John dreams of the morning star then John
dreams of the evening star.111
To illustrate a problem that having both substitutivity and compositionality creates
in extensional/weak intensional logics, consider the following example:
Let <t> be John is aware that the least integer greater than x. is greater than
5000.
Let $[x/tj] be the result of replacing x in <1> by t^ = the sum of the first 100
positive integers.
(i.e. <£{x/t^] is John is aware that the least integer greater than the sum of the first
100 positive integers is greater than 5000).
Let TCxA^] be the result of replacing x in <X> by t2 = 5050.
Clearly t^ and t2 have the same extension, and therefore according to one version of
substitutivity, they should be interchangeable salva veritate. However, since x occurs
in an opaque context, we might adopt a stronger version of substitutivity according to
which two terms are only interchangeable if they have the same intension. However,
this will not help us here, since tj and t2 have the same extension in every possible
world, and thus have the same (weak) intension. Consequently, if we assume that
tix/tj] is a compositional function of the intensions of <I> and tj we are still forced to
the conclusion that <l(x/tj] has the same semantic value as <l(x/t2].
To illustrate with an easier example, take
(la) All oculist are doctors
(lb) All eye-doctors are doctors.
111 In this example, I used definite descriptions, which need a different treatment from proper names.
In this chapter I rarely touch on proper names.
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According to both extensional and weakly intensional frameworks, both (la) and (lb)
are true and hence John believes (la) iff John believes (lb). This is again unacceptable.
Extensional approaches cannot deal with belief sentences because equality of functions
there coincides with co-extensionality. Montague's IL cannot deal with belief
sentences because equality of functions in that approach coincides with co-
extensionality in all possible worlds. Montague followed Frege in assigning to each
sentence both an intension and an extension (Frege's terms were sense and reference).
Before moving on to provide a better treatment for propositional attitudes, allow me
to discuss Frege's sense and reference as we will be using these terms quite often.
According to Frege (see [FR3]), every expression has both a reference and a sense;
the expression is said to designate its reference and to express its sense. The reference
of a sentence is its truth value, while its sense is the thought which it expresses. Frege
argued, however, that when expressions occur in certain contexts - for example, in
indirect quotation - this view has to be modified: expressions do not have their
customary reference, but have an indirect reference, which coincides with their sense.
In particular, the reference of a subordinate clause, such as that John is nice, is not a
truth value, but its customary sense, namely the thought that John is nice.112 The
question that is asked is: how are we to know when to use the sense or the reference
of an expression?
The key to this problem comes from realizing that the reference of a sentence is not
always a function of the reference of its parts. E.g. The morning star has the same
reference as The evening star, but (□ The morning star = The evening star) is false
because there is a possible state of affairs in which the evening star is not the same as
112 The area of sense/reference, intension/extension is a rich one. We have only mentioned Frege (the
father of the subject) and Montague. Other scholars provided interesting theories which deal with the
subject. Church, for instance developed a whole axiomatic system (in CH7) in which \ was used to give
the intension of a function; for both Montague and Church, intensions play the role of Frege's sense and
extensions play the role of reference. The extension of a property like nice is a set of individuals (or a
function from individuals to truth-values). The intension of nice, on the other hand, is a function from
indices to extensions. For Montague, the indices range over WxT (the cartesian product of the set of pos¬
sible worlds and possible times). One must not also forget Carnap's work in the area - see [CA2].
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the morning star. Frege did not abandon functionality for reference but held the view
that the reference of r) depends on the syntactic context in which it occurs. If context
is ordinary then the reference of 7) is ref(r)), if oblique then it is sen(-q). For instance
if we go back to our example of oculist and eye-doctor, Frege's solution consists in
applying believe to the sense of (la) and (lb) rather than to their reference. Even
though ref(la) = ref(lb), sen(la) is not the same as sen(lb). Hence Bel(j,sen(la)) does
not necessarily imply Bel(j,sen(lb)).
Montague attempted to solve the problem along the lines of Frege, yet he built a
weak notion of intensionality which implicated that two expressions have the same
sense if they have the same reference in every possible world, and this led to
difficulties mentioned above. Another problem that should be mentioned concerning
intensionality in weakly intensional frameworks is the following which was given by
Bealer and discussed by Aczel in [AC6]:
Rajneeshee = Xx.follows(x,Rajneesh)
Fondalee = Xx.follows(Jane Fonda, x)
app(Rajneeshee, Jane Fonda) = follows(Jane Fonda, Rajneesh)
app(Fondalee,Rajneesh) = follows(Jane Fonda, Rajneesh)
Therefore app(Rajneeshee, Jane Fonda) = app(Fondalee,Rajneesh)
This conclusion might be questioned since someone could believe that Raineeshee
holds of Fonda, without believing that Fondalee holds of Rajneesh. What is the
solution? Aczel's approach consists in taking properties to be propositional functions
while not making the predication relation be functional application except when the
property is basic (e.g. green). This really amounts to adopting Leibnitz's law in belief
contexts while rejecting the following:
B<I> & (4>=^) -»BT^ where B is a belief operator.
Now the problem of intensionality mentioned above is solved if we replace app by
pred where pred is the relation defined in Chapter 3. This is because:
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pred(Rajneeshee, Jane Fonda) = follows(Jane Fonda, Rajneesh) and
pred(Fondalee, Rajneesh) = follows(Jane Fonda, Rajneesh).
Hence all we obtain is that pred(Rajneesh, Jane Fonda) = pred(Fondalee,
Rajneesh) and believing one will not imply believing the other.
Before we introduce the problem of building intensionality out of extensionality,
let us give an informal account of how problems like the first two examples above
could be solved according to our approach. The point to our solution of propositional
attitudes is that the meaning of each sentence is a strongly intensional proposition and
that we look for the truth value only when we are interested in it. Two propositions
might have the same truth value in every possible situation but still not be equal as
objects and hence not be interchangeable in any belief context. We illustrate with our
doctor example:
Under our interpretation, we take: Vx(0(x)-»D(x)) and Vx(ED(x) —>D(x)) to be the
respective representations of the sentences (la) and (lb). Note that those two
representations are already propositions and that when we adjoin that to both
sentences it will not add anything new.
Now the truth values of Vx(0(x)-©(x)) and Vx(ED(x)-D(x)) are the same in any
possible situation, but as objects they are distinct. Therefore, to believe one
proposition is not necessarily to believe the other.
Because of the strong intensionality in a Frege structure, we face a slight problem
which, however, we can mend easily. We know that as a proposition is
equivalent to but not equal to it. Therefore, if someone knows 'F&T, it will not
follow that he knows T&O. This could be mended by postulating some axioms about
the functions know and believe, for example: K(<h&T) = K(T&4>).
Since on our approach the meaning of any sentence O is a strongly intensional
proposition, if we want to find the truth value of $>, then we have to unpack the truth
content of the proposition that it denotes. This chapter is intended to work out in
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detail the intensionality/extensionality problem and to discuss if one can build from
the strongly intensional structure that we have so far an extensional one which helps
in finding the truth value of any sentence.
As we have now achieved a stronger notion of intensionality, we may ask what
has happened to the possible worlds of Montague's approach? They can be
reconstructed in many ways:
(a) As maximal sets of propositions.
(b) As a set of models
(c) By defining Necessary, and Possible in terms of the equality relation that
already exists in the Frege structure, and studying the modal logic one obtains.
In Part D, we shall very briefly discuss how each of these approaches might be
accommodated in our framework.
In Chapter 3, we defined the operator T and said that if we can deduce T(t) then we




With these equivalences one would wonder if it is possible to construct an extensional
structure out of the intensional one and to see the connection between the intensional
truth operator and the extensional one. However the answer is no and this chapter is
intended to explain this puzzle of intensionality; that is can one accommodate inside a
highly intensional structure an extensional one? Before we start, let me briefly
summarise the points that will be tackled:
We try to build an extensional structure out of an intensional one. This is done by
defining an equivalence relation — on the Frege structure together with both the sense
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and the reference of any expression. This equivalence relation is the weakest that one
requires to identify two extensionally equivalent propositions. It will be shown
however that not even this weak notion of extensionality can be added to a Frege
structure as the resulting extensional structure of propositions will either collapse in a
trivial one element or is itself inconsistent. Before we explain this puzzle, we define
the —relation so that the reference of any expression (object, function or proposition)
is the —equivalence class of that expression. The sense of any equivalence class is a
particular way of computing a representative of that class. The relation —allows us to
place the denotations of groundhog and woodchuck in the same equivalence class and
so the reference of groundhog is equal to the reference of woodchuck. even though the
senses are not the same. Application and abstraction are defined on the extensional
structure, and it is shown that113 PROP/[] - the collection of all the equivalence
classes of elements of PROP - is a boolean algebra. It will also be shown that
PROP/[] collapses into a trivial one element set. Of course the reference of any
proposition is True if either that proposition or any one —equivalent to it is in
TRUTH. However we shall show that this cannot be done without resulting in an
inconsistency.
Let me emphasize that we are assuming the principle of extensionality on
functions (we build the Frege structure by starting from a model which allows for
this extensionality, e.g. as opposed to P^); in fact in the theory T^ we assumed




Assuming this extensionality would allow us to concentrate on Fq (the collection of
objects) and to ignore the remaining Fj, F2,... This is due to the following lemma:
Lemma 1: In a Frege structure, if (e) is assumed then we always have a = Xlal.
113 Of course this is provided extensionalisation can be patched up. Le. provided we do not face the
problem will be explained below.
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Proof: Vx, app(\lal,x) = <&pp(a,x)/x>(x) = app(a,x). Using (e), we get that Xlal = a. □
PART B. AN EXTENSIONAL STRUCTURE
It may be questioned here why we are going to construct an extensional
structure when the main aim is to show that building extensionality on the top will
result in inconsistency. This extensional structure however, is built just to illustrate
the problem. It could be viewed hence as an example of the inconsistency of adding
extensionality to a Frege structure.
We need to construct a Frege structure F = Fq, Fl,.„Fn,.... built on the top of
E^ and having certain properties; namely that PROP fl SET = 0. In E^
extensionality holds on functions, and to give the reader a clear idea of how our Frege
structure can be constructed following the techniques explained in Chapter 2, basing
things on top of E^ which is constructed in the appendix, we include the following
summary.
(1) Build E^ following the steps of the appendix.
(2) Define app and X on the top of E^ in the usual way.
Now steps (l)- (2) above still do not guarantee that PROP fl SET = 0 because we
still have not decided what PROP and SET should be built on using the logical
constants. To guarantee that we have PROP DSET = 0, we proceed as follows:
We take Bp = {1,0} C fq = E^ and Bs= { XQn f: f is in E^11- and for all x, f(x)
is in B_}.114
P
Obviously, from this construction, B HB = 0. We then take our construction of the
p s
logical constants so that PROP is the smallest set containing Bp and closed under
1. The logical constants.
2. For all n-ary functions f such that for all o in Fq11, f(o) is in PROP, the
114 1 and 0 are the elements of as in the appendix and are distinct from 1 and 0 of PROP/[]
below.
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following are in PROP: Vf, ] f.
We then take SET = {XQnf: f is any n-ary propositional function}.
Because HBs= 0, then PROP H SET = 0. Hence the following lemma.
Lemma 2: In a Frege structure built as above, PROP fl SET = 0.
The above lemma guarantees that no element is both the result of predication (of a
propositional function to an object) and of X-abstraction (of a propositional function).
Let us define an equivalence relation on F which associates with each object which is
intensional another object (which is extensional), and which to each function also
associates the extensional part of that function. We will need this equivalence
relation to talk about the intension and extension of an expression. For instance, one
feature of this equivalence relation should be:
ua = u/3 iff a =/3, where 'ua' stands for the extension of a.
Now, we start by defining an equivalence relation on Fq:
Let a b be defined as follows:
a b =df
(i) (a=b) or
(ii) ( fh & fib & a=b) or
(iii) (Aa & Ab & (Vx(app(a,x)3ipp(b,x))) or
(iV) On & flb & [ ] a',a\b',bV
a=app(a',a") & b=app(b',b") & (Vx(app(a',x)3ipp(b',x))) & (a" =^b" Yb" =^a
Note that a b does not imply a =b. In fact a and b might be sets.
Lemma 3: is both reflexive and symmetric.
Proof:
^ is reflexive because a=a for any a, hence a=^a for any a.
is symmetric because if a=^b then
if (i) then b^a,
if (ii) then Lb & fh & (b^), hence b=^a,
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if (iii) then Ab & Aa & Vx(app(b,x) =app(a,x))) and hence b=^a
if (iV) then flb & fh & [ ] b',b",a',a"/
b=app(b',b") & a=app(a',a") & (Vx(app(a\x)sipp(b',x))) & Cb"^a"Va" ^b")],
hence b=^a. □
It is more difficult to establish transitivity, and so we define the following by
induction:
= U{ <3a,b>: G c)[a==QC & c^^b]}
—n+1= —nU{ <a,b>: G c)[a—nc & c=nb]}
~= U==n"
That — is reflexive and symmetric is obvious, as — is the transitive closure of ==q.
The following lemma establishes transitivity.
Lemma 4: —is transitive.
Proof:
If a=b and b=c then ] n,m a— b and b— c. If n<m then a—„b and b— c,
n m m m
therefore, a~m+jc and so a==c. □
Note that CiV) is the cause of non-transitivity of and this is what causes us to
build the transitive closure of To see this clearly, take a^b and b=^c where (iV)
holds for both. Then when we get to b=app(b',b")=app(b'j,b"G, no relation at all
can be deduced between b' and b'^ or b" and b" j.
It is extremely interesting, however, to discover what sort of extensionality one gets
from this equivalence relation; below we show the extensional behaviour of =; The
following theorem for instance, states that if f is a propositional function and if a=b
then f(a)=f(b). For example
the morning star —the evening star, hence
the morning star is the star that rises at 4.00 am —
the evening star is the star that rises at 4.00 am.
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Theorem 1: If a—b then f(a)—f(b), for any prepositional function f.
Proof: f(a) = app(\f,a), f(b) = app(\f,b) and
[Vx(app(\f,x) ^ipp(Xf,x)) and a—b].
We conclude that app(Xf,a)=app(\f,b) by (iv) since f—f and a—b.
Hence, f(a)—f(b). □
The careful reader might produce an example which fells our aspirations concerning
intensionality. The following is such an example:
If we take a. to be groundhogCt) and b. to be woodchuck(t) where _t_ denotes a
particular individual; and if we have that Vx flCgroundhog(x)).
Vx IXwoodchuckCx)) and Vx(groundhog(x)^woodchuck(x)) then we get that
groundhog(t) =woodchuck(t). Now take f to be <Bel(j,x)/x> and assume that
f is a propositional function. Then according to the above theorem we get the
undesirable consequence that Bel(j,groundhog(t))—BelCj,woodchuckC t)).
However we assumed above that f is a propositional function and this assumption
was crucial in obtaining the undesirable consequence. One way to avoid this is to
prevent <Bel(j,x)/x > from being a propositional function. Note however that even
though we then reject VxfXBelCj.x)), we would still hope to have:
(PB) Vx(fk - flCBel(j,x)).
One way of achieving this would be by taking <Bel(j,x)/x> to be a function which
takes objects and returns objects with the special restriction that when one argument
object is a proposition, the value object is a proposition too. This is a common
construction for functions in a Frege structure and hence (PB) should be postulated as
an axiom in the formal theory.
It is now time to define equivalence inside F , nX). We define f=^g as follows:
f=^g =df Cvx(fCx) = g(x)))v (vx(n(f(x)) & fi(g(x)) & CfCx)=gCx))))
It is seen from this definition that nothing has been mentioned about CiV) or CiV') and
hence our above definition of is suitable for a framework in which either
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equivalence relation is assumed. Also the following two theorems show that
equivalence in Fj is isomorphic to equivalence in Fq (for both senses of equivalence).
Theorem 2: f^g iff Xf—Xg; for any f, g propositional functions.
Proof:
(==>)
Assume f^g. If Vx(f(x) = g(x))
then Vx(app(Xf,x) = app(Xg,x))
then Xf = Xg and so Xf—Xg
If Vx(0(f(x)) & 0(g(x)) & (f(x)= g(x)))
then A(Xf) & A(Xg) & Vx(app(Xf,x)sipp(Xg,x))
Therefore Xf—Xg.
(<==)
If Xf = Xg then f^g.
We cannot have 0(Xf) or 0(Xg) as PROP and SET are disjoint.
If (iii) then Vx(0(f(x)) & 0(g(x)) & (f(x)= g(x)) and so f=^g
CiV) is impossible because Xf is a set and so we cannot have 0(Xf). □
Theorem 3: f— g iff Xf—QXg; for any f, g propositional functions.
The proof is the same as above. □
Now we restrict our attention to Fq and having built an equivalence relation on F0 we
see what extensional structure one can obtain on Fq, according to this equivalence
relation.
Let 1 = (a: 0a & a—T} and 0 = {a: 0a & a— J_j where T= Vx.x=x and I =
(cq=Cj);115 then we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4: PROP/[] = { 0,1} where [] is the equivalence class according to =^116
Proof:
lls Where Cq and are distinct.
116 Having an equivalence relation —on PROP, say, one writes PROP/[] the quotient. PROP/[] = { [a]
: a G PROP }, where [a] = { a' : a' 6 PROP and a' ==a} is the equivalence class of a.
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0 = [J_l and is in PROP/[] as J_is in PROP. For the same reason 1 is in
PROP/[l hence {0,1 } C PROP/[l
Take a in PROP/[]; a = [b] where b is in PROP. Now if b is in TRUTH then
b=T and so [b] = [T] = 1, i.e a = 1. If b is not in TRUTH then as Ob, b= I
and so [b] = [J_l = 0, i.e a = 0. Therefore PROP/[] = { 0 , 1 }. D117
Note here that we are working inside the model (Frege structure) and not inside the
formal theory. This is why our non intuitionistic argument is allowed - we are
working in the model set theoretically. If we define the boolean operators #,v, I}...118
in PROP/[] as usual then we have the following theorem,
Theorem 5: For any a, b in PROP, the following holds;
(1) [a & b] = [aMb],
(2) [a V b] = [a]v[b],
(3) [a] V 1 = 1,
(4) [a = b] = ([a] = [b])
and so on.
Proof:
If a & b in PROP then [a & b] = 1 or 0. If [a & b] = 1 then a & b is in
TRUTH, then a is in TRUTH and b is in TRUTH, therefore [a] = [b] = 1 and
so C[a]#(b]) = 1. For the remaining cases, the proof is similar. □
Now we know that F/[]119 has a logic on it where PROP/[] has a boolean
structure, what about application? If we characterize application in the quotient
structure as:
(**) [f]([a]) = [fCa)],
then is this well-defined? I.e. if [f] = [g] and [a] = [b] then is [f]([a]) = [g]([b])?
Before we attempt to show that application is well-defined in the above sense, we
117 Note that this theorem is not proved constructively. We used the law of excluded middle in argu¬
ing whether b is in TRUTH or not.
118 Conjunction, disjunction and implication respectively.
119 Again F/[] is the collection of all the equivalence classes according to =i
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need a reminder that our construction of a Frege structure made use of a fixed point,
and that for each logical operator F we had both 4>p and MTp. Since we need to use '=
which is defined in terms of in the following sense: a= b is (a-*b)&(b-*a), the
relevant logical constant is Recall that
a->b is true iff a is in PROP, and b is in TRUTH if a is in TRUTH,
is:
"
x is in Xq and y is in Xq provided that x is in X^"
where Xq is the collection of propositions and X^ is the collection of true propositions
with Xj QCq.
This observation enables us to deduce that if a= b and fh then Ob. It can be seen as
follows:
If aSb then (a->b)&(b-»a); hence from <!>_,,( (PROP, TRUTH), a,b) and
<!>_,( (PROP,TRUTH), b,a) we get that fh and Ob. In fact we did not need the
condition that fh.
The following lemmas are needed to show that application is defined.
Lemma 5: If Oa, Ob, aa', b^b' and a—b then a'—b'.
Proof:
fh and aa' hence Oa' and so a—a'. In the same way we get that b=b\ But a=
b, hence a'—b' by transitivity and symmetry of =•□
Lemma 6: If Aa, Ab, a=b, Vx(app(a,x)^pp(a',x)), Vx(app(b,x) 3app(b',x)) then a'—
b'.
Proof:
If Aa, then VxO (app(a,x)), hence as app(a',x)3app(a,x), we get VxO
(app(a',x)), hence Aa'. From Aa, Aa' and Vx(app(a,x)sapp(a',x)) we get that
a—a'. We follow the same procedure to prove that b—b'. From a—a', b—b',
a—b we get that a'—b'.D
Theorem 6: If Aa, Ab, a—b, c=d then app(a,c)=^app(b,d).
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Proof:
As Aa, Ab, a—b, then Vx(app(a,x)= app(b,x)).
Also c—d hence by (iV) app(a,c)—app(b,d). □
Theorem 7: If f,g are propositional functions, and if f=^g and a—b then f(a)—g(b).
Proof:
Since f=^g, we get by Theorem 2 that Xf— Xg. Hence by Theorem 6,
app(Xf,a)=app(Xg,b), hence f(a)—g(b). □
This theorem shows that application is well-defined with respect to =5 on
propositional functions. One wonders whether application is well-defined everywhere
and not solely on propositional functions. It is not obvious how to show this due to
clause (iV). But we do not care about application outside propositional functions and
can be satisfied with this position.
Theorem 8: If Aa, Ab and a==b then pred(a,x)=pred(b,x).
Proof:
By Theorem 6, app(a,x)=app(b,x).
Also by Lemma 5, pred(a,x)==pred(b,x), this is because:
fXapp(a,x)), fXapp(b,x)), app(a,x) = pred(a,x), app(b,x) = pred(b,x)
and app(a,x)=app(b,x). □
Theorem 9: For any a, b, c sets such that a=b, we have:






Note also that if we mix our structures in the following way:
(*) [f](a) = tfCa)],
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then this is well-defined. I.e. the following holds;
Lemma 7: If [f] = [g] then for any a, [f](a) = [g](a).
Proof:
Assume [f] = [g], then for any a, either
(i) f(a) = g(a) or
Cii) fl(fCa)) & fl(g(a)) & f(a)==g(a).
If f(a) = g(a) then [f(a)] = [g(a)],
if Cii) then f(a)=g(a), Le. [f(a)] = [g(a)]. □
Note here that we mixed the types of f and a. This needs attention and anyone who
would like to use this method has to ensure that the typing fits well.
In the extensional structure, we defined functional application as [f]([a]) = [f(a)].
What about abstraction? We define Xe[f] = [\f].
Theorem 10: Xe is well-defined on propositional functions. I.e. if [f] = [g] then Xe[f] =
Xe[g] for f and g propositional functions.
Proof: If [f] = [g], Le. f^g then Xf—Xg by Theorem 2, and so [Xf] = [Xg]. Hence Xe[f]
= Xe[g]. □
We should also build application of an object to another. We define appe([a],[b]) =
[app(a,b)].
Theorem 11: appe is well-defined on classes of properties. That is, if a, b are properties
and if [a] =[b] and [c]=[d] then appe([a],[c]) = appe([b],[d]).
Proof: This is due to Theorem 6. □
In building the boolean connectives of the extensional structure above we did not
mention anything about universal quantification; it can be shown however that once it
has been defined, we can obtain the following theorem,




So far it is clear that the extensional structure is explicitly closed. However what we
have not shown yet is that the addition of the extensionality axioms to the system
(by =q) results in either of the following two conclusions:
1. The whole PROP/[] collapses into one trivial element.
2. This can be seen as an inconsistency in the theory.120
Now this means that one cannot build extensionality on the top of the intensional
structure. In fact this has its background in the literature: Gordeev has shown (see
[BE4], page 235) that one cannot add extensionality without making the system
inconsistent. In fact the inconsistency can be shown in our structure above by taking
the following example:
Take R= Xx(x€x = I ).
and a = app(\x(x= I ). I ).
and b = app(\x(x= I ). R€R).
Then a = (J_= Jj 6 TRUTH,
and b = (R6R) = _L_6 PROP -TRUTH.
But (R€R) because RGR = I .
Hence a=b
This implies that the whole PROP/[] collapses into a trivial one element algebra,
because 1 = [a] =[b] = 0.
120 Thanks to Uwe Monnich who drew my attention to this point.
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PART C. THOMASON'S APPROACH
Another issue of interest concerns the relationship between the present theory
and that of Thomason in [TH4]. Thomason takes propositions to be intensional and
has an extensional truth-finding operator u: PROP — > {0,1}, which unpacks
intensionality and satisfies the usual boolean connectives.121 u is like u in MG but
Thomason does not introduce ~, though it could be constructed when possible worlds
are introduced.
With our approach, the extensional structure is built out of the intensional one and it
satisfies some nice closure properties. Even though, ~ ,Dand other connectives had to
be introduced as new constants by Thomason, and meaning postulates had to be
provided to ensure an homomorphism between propositions and truths, Thomason did
not provide a way to build a model which satisfies these meaning postulates.
Similarly, the relation between intensional quantifiers and extensional ones is
introduced by meaning postulates with Thomason, whereas for us, we have shown
that these axioms can be satisfied in a model where extensionality is built on the top
of intensionality (see theorems 5 and 12). However, because there is no model in
which extensionality and intensionality occur together in this strong sense, the
extensional and intensional models have to be separate and joined by homomorphic
functions. That is, the following two meaning postulates of Thomason
u(Vx<£) = Vxu0
U(a^a2) = (Vua2)
have to be imposed.
Not only does Thomason introduce two constants for each logical constant and
quantifier (for the intensional and extensional structures) - which is something I also
do here - but he also introduces for each verb or common noun two different names,
121 Thomason uses a 2-valued classical logic, where everything is constructed out of and type
freeness is not insisted upon although all the work can be done using constructive and type free theories.
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one standing for the intensional interpretation and another standing for the
extensional one. For instance, walk+ below is intensional and walk# is extensional.
The connection between these two verbs is again stipulated by means of a meaning
postulate:
Vxe [ uwalk+(x) = walk#(x)].
According to the approach adopted here, if we take walk+ to be of type <e,p >, then
we have the result that [walk+] can be considered to be of type Fq/[] U Fq —>
PROP/[X which enables us to apply (*) and obtain the following:
Vxe [ [walk+(x)] = [walk+](x)].
As well as introducing walk+ of type <e,p> and walk# of type <fe,t>, Thomason also
postulates a third constant walk' of type <«e,p >,p >,p >. Having the following
constants, walk'. walk+. walk#. John'. John+. (where John' is of type «£,p>,p> and
John+ is of type e) creates a number of possibilities for the translation of John walks





(3) is of type t and so is ruled out. The remaining three should have the same truth
value and Thomason ensures this by meaning postulates; something like:
(5) Vy^'P^John'Cy) = uyOohn+)]
(6) Vy<<i'P>'P>[uwalk'(y) = uy(walk+)]
(7) Vxe [uwalk+(x) = walk#(x)]
These enable him to derive uwalk'(John') = uwalk+(John+). What about walk'(John')
and John'(walk+)? To move freely between the 4 formulae, Thomason still needs
two postulates:
(8) Vy "^'P^John'Cy) = y(John+)]
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(9) Vy<<fe' p>'p>[walk'(y) = y(walk+)]
Using the above, Thomason can prove: uwalk'(John') =
uJohn'(Xv^ewalk'(Xz ^zCv^))). So they have the same truth value. Note that
even though formula (7) (or its equivalent) is not added as a meaning postulate but is
a consequence of (*) in our approach, it is still to be seen how formulae (5)-(6) could
be obtained here. (5)-(6) are needed because they lift (or lower) the types of walk+
and John+ (or walk' and John'). If we could write John' as XP.P(John+) and walk' as
XP.P(walk+) then (5) and (6) would no longer be needed due to X-conversion. It is a
common feature of both the approach here and Thomason's approach that John',
walk', etc. cannot be written as straightforward X-expressions in terms of their
corresponding elements of a lower level. This is because this actually reduces the
intensionality behaviour of the various constituents. We do not want for instance that
John'( v) = v(John+) but want their truth-values to be the same for every y. With
the approach that I put forward, we can find elements in the model that could be
written using X-expressions without affecting the internal definability of any type.
This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
PART D. POSSIBLEWORLDS
Now we come to the issue of possible worlds and modality. There are many
ways we could deal with this issue, but let us see how to accommodate some of them
within our framework. The three we want to consider are:
A. Take possible worlds to be maximal sets of propositions and define □ in
terms of these possible worlds.
B. Take a collection of Frege structures and define □ in terms of this collection;
that is, each element stands for a possible world.
C. Define □ in terms of the equality relation using one Frege structure only.
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Now, (A) seems to be quite hard to do while staying inside the Frege structure.
The reason for this is that maximal sets of propositions are not internally definable.
Again (C) is problematic for the following reasons:
If we take □<* a=(a=a), we can not prove things like: □( white is white). This is
because even though (white is white) = (white is white), there is nothing which
guarantees the equality between (white is white) and (white is white = white is
white). They are equivalent as propositions but not necessarily equal. We could of
course solve this problem by positing some axioms to this elfect; but this is ad hoc.
Solution (B) appears the most convenient within our framework. We just take a
collection of Frege structures, each of them standing for a possible world and then
interpret □ according to the usual techniques. By dealing with modality and possible
worlds in this way, we can dispense with our earlier definitions of ~ and u and
redefine them in terms of possible worlds. This is again straightforward and very
common in the literature.
We will not say more on possible worlds in this thesis but we finish by
summarizing what this chapter was concerned with. We started by defining two
equivalence relations which helped us illustrate that one cannot add extensionality
axioms on the top of a Frege structure. We then compared our work with Thomason
and discussed possible worlds.
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CHATTER 6. TYPE THEORY AND THEMONTAGUE FRAGMENT IN A FREGE STRUCTURE
PARTA MONTAGUES IL
The originality of Montague's approach lies in the axiomatisation of a procedure
which maps English terms and expressions into the logical language IL. In doing
ordinary symbolic logic we intuitively translate from English to the formal language.
With Montague, we have two formalised steps: the syntactic step which translates
English into IL, (the language of typed intensional logic that Montague used), and the
semantic step which gives a semantic interpretation of IL. The interpretation thus
obtained is also an interpretation of the English fragment that was translated into IL.
The translation procedure is axiomatised in the following way: first translate the
English basic categories into IL, then with each syntactic rule of the English fragment
(English is axiomatised) associate a translation rule which translates the output of the
syntactic rule into IL. This procedure is set up so that if an expression is assigned by
a syntactic rule to a certain syntactic category, then it is mapped by the translation
rule into a logical expression of the corresponding logical type. Each syntactic category
corresponds to one and only one logical type, though we can have two different
categories associated with the same type. IL employs Russell's type theory, and thus
can be classified under the approach of restricting the language to avoid the
paradoxes. Since Montague offered his approach, most of the subsequent approaches to
natural language semantics seem to have been Montagovian. This is unfortunate -
though not because we think that Montague's approach is not worthy of attention: on
the contrary, it has made tremendous impact on the study of the semantics of
natural languages. However, in so far as it utilises type theory the approach is
problematic. We have already seen that the Montagovian approach consists of two
main components : type theory and the translation procedure. Since PTQ (see [TH2])
was developed, semanticists and linguists have been facing different kinds of problems
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with it, which is not surprising. Some of them would perhaps claim that the defects
lie in the translation procedure - which is something I disagree with. The most
problematic issues lie in the theory of types, and that is where semanticists should
start. The translation procedure is elegant and novel and we cannot think of any
other procedure which would work better. Thus the issue first should be to elaborate
a logical theory which works better than type theory, and then to ameliorate any
difficulties with the translation procedure. Fine - but what are the other alternatives
to type theory? We have seen most of them in Chapter 1 when we studied the
theoretical problem of nominalisation. Russell's type theory was merely the first and
the weakest solution offered: as we saw there are many others. It is true that we
were talking in abstract terms in Chapter 1 and that we did not give many linguistic
examples as to why we think our Frege structures would be better suited for natural
languages; we hope that semanticists understand that as type theory was the
weakest theory that could work for mathematics, it is unlikely to be powerful
enough for the semantics of natural languages either. (This is not only because it is
weak mathematically but because it has been claimed by linguists that type theory
does not cope with certain issues.) It is straightforward to list many defects of type
theory that mathematicians complained about years ago, and to demonstrate that
they generate corresponding problems for linguistics. Take again the example of a set
that contains itself: mathematicians realised years ago that this concept was
impossible in type theory - and this is one of the reasons which led to ZF set theory.
Linguists only lately122 recognised their analogous problem: namely that they could
not predicate a property of itself. As another example, consider quantification. In
type theory, there is a different set of natural numbers at each level, and the
quantifier ranged over each level separately. The analogous linguistic problem is that
there is no way to say everything has a_ property but only: everything of level n. has
122 The reader is referred to Parsons work in [PA5] and Turner's work in [TU7].
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a_ property of level n+1. These and many other problems of type theory for
mathematics are also problems of natural language semantics based on type theory.
This does not mean, of course, that we should follow mathematics blindly - for this
might make us lose philosophical insights. For instance, it is enough for analysis to
use B-G (Bernays-Godel) set theory - but in Natural Language semantics we are also
looking for philosophical insights from the theories we use. Frege structures,
embodying as they do Frege's ideas, have philosophical motivations.
This chapter is concerned with showing why type theory in Montague's sense is
problematic for nominalisation, and then building a type theory similar to Montague's
inside our framework. The result will be that we avoid the disadvantages of
Montague's system and yet retain all the good things that type theory has to offer.
We start first by showing the inadequacy of Montague's typing in IL.
In IL, we can have a function of type <a,b > applied to an element of type a
but we can never apply a function to itself or to any other function of the same type.
The typing of any item is fixed in advance, by the syntactic and translation rules. As
mentioned already, to each category of the English fragment there corresponds a type
in IL such that all the expressions of that category are translated into logical
expressions of that type. In Montague's approach, categories are defined recursively.
A complex category of the form X/Y labels an expression that takes expressions of
category Y as arguments and yields an expression of category X. As an example, the
category IAV is defined to be IV/IV and it takes expressions of type IV, returning
expressions of type IV. Similarly, T=t/IV takes an intransitive verb and gives a
sentence. Types are also defined recursively in Montague's IL and there is a
homomorphism from categories to types. The important point to make here is that
the function f which maps categories into types always makes sure that the type of
the category built out of two old ones is higher than the type of its input; so for
example, the type of T is higher than the type of IV. It is essentially this typing
- 165 -
constraint that creates a problem for nominalisation. We illustrate this by the
following few examples.
(la). John runs
(lb). To run is fun
(lc). John is fun
(id), fun is fun.
Let us assume that in each case the predicate denotes a function which applies to the
denotation of the subject. Thus, in (la), John is of type e and runs is of type <e,t>.
Let us assume that in (lb), to run (which is syntactically built out of run ) is of
type <&,t>. In (lc), it is obvious that is fun is of type <h,t>while in (lb), it must be
of type equal or higher than «e,t>,t>. This is a problem; we seem to have two
different types for is fun. Now if we take (id), we see that according to the
Montagovian approach , one fun must be of higher level than the other. Just this
simple sentence on its own creates an infinite number of fun's in the syntax. For
assume we say funQ is fun^. then we also want to say fun^ is fmu and again frn^ is
fun^ and so on. We do not have this problem with Frege structures, since
nominalised forms there take interpretations in SET, IVs are interpreted as
propositional functions, and terms as elements of Fq - and everything fits well
together because of the isomorphism between sets and propositional functions.
However, for those people who like Montague's IL, and especially its type theory, we
introduce the following typing in our framework.
PART B. A TYPE THEORYT^
Let us assume that Fq, SET and PROP constitute three basic intensional domains
where Fq is the domain of objects, SET is the domain of properties and PROP is the
domain of propositions together with the conditions that SET CFq and PROP £Fq.
Then we define other intensional domains out of those ones as follows:
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A — > B = {a in A : for every x in A, app (a,x) is in B}
As a special case Fq — > PROP is the collection of all the unary propositional
functions (actually the nominals of these propositional functions). In fact, in a Frege
structure, (Fq — > PROP) = SET as is shown in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: In a Frege structure, SET = Fq — >PROP.
Proof:
(i) If a is in SET £Fq, then for every x in Fq, app (a,x) is in PROP, and hence
a is in Fq ~ > PROP.
(ii) If a is in FQ — > PROP, then a is in Fq and for every x in Fq, app (a,x) is
in PROP, and hence a is in SET.
Hence SET = FQ — > PROP. □
In what follows we assume we are working with Frege structures where PROP fl
SET is empty. Note that PROP — > PROP need not be empty even in the case where
PROP fl SET is empty. If a is in PROP — > PROP, then a is in PROP and for every x
in PROP, app (a,x) is in PROP. But a is not in SET, since we have no guarantee that
app (a,x) is in PROP for arbitrary x in Fq.
Even though PROP—>PROP may not be empty, we do not allow &, etc to be
objects of Fq. They are in the Frege structure, but as functionals rather than objects.
Another non-empty domain in a Frege structure is ( Fq ~>PROP )—>PROP = {a in
(Fq — > PROP) : for every x in Fq — > PROP, app(a,x) is in PROP }. It is non-empty
because it contains <x=b/x>. The above domain is the domain of properties of sets
and is similar to Montague's denotation of terms.
Note that the domains defined above have the property that if A and B are domains
then (A— >B) Q A. This is the fact which will enable us to interpret nominalisation.
These domains also have the properties given by the following lemma:
Lemma 2: If A and B are domains built as above then:
(1) If A CA' then (A— >B) 2(A fl(A'—>B)).
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(2) If B CB' then (A— >B) C(A-->B').
Proof: Easy.D
Types are defined recursively as follows:
p, e are fixed objects.
1. p is a non-empty intensional type.123
2. e is a non-empty intensional type.
3. If a, b are intensional types then <a,b> is an intensional type.124
A. The basic expressions of T^q^ are as follows:
1. For each type a, there is a denumerably infinite number of constants; Cona
is the collection of all non-logical constants of type a.
2. For each type a, there is a denumerably infinite number of variables; Vara
is the collection of all variables of type a.
3. There is also a set of functional? which take arguments in a particular type
and return values in particular types. For instance the function which takes
elements u in <e,p > and returns Xv <<fe>P ^»P ^appCv.u) is a functional which
takes arguments of type <e,p > and returns values of type <«e,p >,p >,p >. If
G is such a functional, we denote it by and we denote its
type by ME<<^ »p>p»? We do not have variables over functionals
but we have constants over them. Functionals are going to provide
interpretations for determiners, verb phrase adverbs, etc. This is acceptable
because, we have only a denumerably infinite number of determiners, verb
phrase adverbs and infinitive complement verbs and their translation will be
given in Part C. Here is a list of some of the functionals that we assume to be
in our language:
that' is the functional such that for any u of type p,
that'(u) = Xv^'P^appCv.u).
123 The notion of empty type does not occur in Montague. Yet I introduce it here as it makes things
more elegant.
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to' is the functional such that u of type <h,p >,
to'(u) = Av<<e'p>'p>app(v,u).
ing' is the functional such that u of type <h,p>,
ing'(u) = Av<<fe'p>'p>app(v,u).
every' is the functional such that for any u of type e,
every'(u) = Av >Vwe(app(u,w) -»app(v,w)).
the' is the functional such that for any u of type e,
the'(u) = Av<fe'p>^we Voe(app(u,o)^o=w))&app(v,w).
aj is the functional such that for any u of type e,
a'(u) = Au<e'p>Av<fe,p>3we(app(u,w)&app(v,w)).
We also have a set of empty types, i.e. types <b,a> where
(1) a = b = <e,p>
(2) a = «h,p >,p > and b = <e,p > or
( 3) a = <e,p > and b = <<£,p >,p >.
Note that if we have a type <a,b> which is empty, then the type <alb>need not be
empty.125 We have types where the syntactic categories such as terms, verbs,
common nouns, nominals, etc. will take translations. We also have functionals which
operate on those types. For instance every gets translated as a functional which takes
arguments from the type of common nouns and returns arguments of type terms. The
idea of restricting the type hierarchy to three layers (objects, functions and
functionals) is not novel - see for instance [CH3], page 77.
B. The syntactic rules ofT^
MEa, the collection of meaningful expressions of type a, is defined recursively as
follows:
Bl. Intensional expressions: If a and b are intensional non-empty types then
1. Each variable of type a is in MEa.
12S Note that one could do away with empty types and use a free logic instead.
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2. Each constant of type a is in MEa-
3. If a is in ME0 and u is a variable of type b and <b,a> is a non-empty type
a
then \u.a is inME^ a>.
4. If a is in and /3 is in ME&, then app(a,|3) is in ME^ and
pred(a,j3) is in ME&.
5. If a, (i are in MEa then a=/3 is in ME^.





10. O = I'¬
ll. If O is in MEp and u is a variable of any intensional type then Vu3> is in
MEp.
12. If 0 is in MEp and u is a variable of any intensional type then ] u<l> is in
MEp.
13. If a is in MDE then Da is in ME .
e e
14. If a is in ME then a is in ME .
a e
15. If a is in ME . then a is in ME .
<h,b> a
16. If G& is a functional in ME<^|^)>and a is in ME& then G& Ca) is in ME^.
If a is in ME_^ ^ c>>, /3 is in ME& and S is in ME^, then we write app2(a,/3,8) for
app(app(o!,/3),8) which is in MEc.
The semantics ofT^
A model structure is a Frege structure where the constants j, m, w, etc.. in Cong -
which correspond to proper names in English - are not propositions nor sets nor
composed out of other objects using app or pred.
The set of denotations of type a is defined as follows:126






<a b > = ~~ > w^ere > ^ non-empty and a, b are intensional.
An assignment function g is a function which assigns an element of Da to each
variable u of intensional type a.
We also need a function C which assigns an element of Da to each constant of type a.
Also C assigns an F-functional of the Frege structure F to each constant functional in
Tp0j. Hence a model M is a 2-tuple <F, C>. Now we move to the semantic clauses of
T
pol
1. If a is a non-logical constant then [[a]]^'8 = C(o0.
2. If a is a variable, then [[a]]^8 = g(a).
3. If a is in MEa, u is a variable of type b, a and b are intensional and <a,b> is
non-empty, then [[Au.a]]^'8 = an element h of such that for every x in D^, app
(h,x) = [[a]]^[x/u]Ml
In the previous chapter, we defined Xe[f] to be [Af].
4. If a is in ME^ ^ > and /3 is in MEa and a and b are intensional then
[[app(a,/3)]]M'8 = app ([[a]]™*8,[[jS]]1^8).
4'. If Cab is in ME > and j3 is in ME& then
[[CabO)]]M'g = [[Cab]]M'g([[^]]M'S).128
5. If a, /3 are in MEa and a is an intensional type, then [[a = /3]]^b8 = ([[a]]^'8 =
6. If <F is in ME then [[- (F]]1^8 = _ [[<F]]M'2
Jr
7. If <F and ¥are in MEp then [[(Ffc*]]1^8 = [[<F]]M'g & M]1^8
IxT
<s,e>; e.g. take the pope to denote a function in Dg which picks out a different individual at each mo¬
ment of time. However, there are a number of articles in the literature which dispute the utility of this
type, see for instance [DOl].
127 Note that we impose on our models the very important property needed for clause 3, namely, that
the element h exists. We will have something to say about that in Part C.
128 As remarked earlier, this enables us to deal with determiners, verb phrase adverbs and infinitive
complement verbs whose denotations are not inside Fq but are functional which operate on Fq.
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8. If $ and ^ are in MEp then [[W^]]1^8 = [[3#1,8 V M]1^8
9. If <D and ¥are in ME then [[fc-^]]1^8 = [[<1>]]M'8 ->[[¥]]M'8.
XT
10. If O and ¥are in MEp then [[Oee^]]1^8 = [[fc]]1^8 ^M]1^8.
11. If <I> is in MEp and u is a variable then [[Vu<t>]]^'8 = V <[[<h]]^'8^x/'uVx >.
12. If 3> is in MEp and u is a variable then [[ } US]]™-8 = ] <[[4»]]M'8[x/u]/x>.
The following theorem shows that the above semantics is well defined.
Theorem 4: If a is in MEa then [[a]]^8 is in Da- Also if C^ is in ME^|b > and is in
MEq then [[C^CiS)]]1^8 is in D. .a a O
Proof: We prove this theorem by induction on a.
Clauses 1 and 2 are obvious due to the definitions of g and C.
Clause 3: If a is in MEa and a, b are intensional then [[a]]^8^1^ is in D0 for
a a
any x in by induction. But [[Xu.a]]^'8 = h in such that for every x in
D, , app (h,x) = [[a]]^'8'-x/'u-' which is in D . Hence [[Xu.a]]^'8 is in D. ~ >D .O a O a
The proof of clause 4 is as follows:
If a is in ME<^^)> and j3 is in ME& and a, b are intensional, then
[[app(a,j3)]]^'8 = app ([[a]]^8,[[/3]]^'8), with the condition (from induction)
that
[[a]]1^8 is in D^ b > = Da " > Db and
[t/3]]^8 is in Da.
Hence app C[[q:]]^^'8,[[/3]]^*8) is in by definition of Da — >Db.
The proof of clauses 5-12 are obvious from the logical schemas of the
connectives.□
Now with our type theory Tpo^ and our typed domains inside Fq, let us see how
Montague's approach could be accommodated. There are two routes one could follow
for this purpose:
(1) Interpret the PTQ fragment of Montague inside Tpo^.
(2) Interpret IL inside Tp()j.
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We shall describe in detail the first route in the next section and avoid commenting
on the second route as we have seen in the previous chapter the difficulty of defining
sense and reference inside the Frege structure using the equivalence relation. There
may be other ways to do so but we shall not have anything to say about it here.
PART C. Interpreting FTQ in T
Now that we have the type theory and the semantics, let us interpret an
extension of the PTQ fragment of Montague inside Tp0^. This extension contains
nominalisation, present tense, and deals better with intensionality. Consider the
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IVGerllV <<&,p >1 «fe,p >,p» ing
ele <&,e> be
Note that here we are not dealing with prepositions. Note also that the words to^ ing
and that are expressions in the syntactic categories IVInfllV, IVGerllV and Tip which
are introduced to deal with the nominalisation of verbs and sentences.
The domains
De= Fq, Dp= PROP, DIV= SET, DT= SET->PROP, DCN= SET,
Dp/p= PROP—>PROP, and DIV/ = PROP->SET,
are all subsets of Fq. By contrast, if we had postulated the domains
DIV||IV = SET—>SET, Ddet = SET->(SET- >PROP),
then they would be empty. This is seen from the following theorem:
Theorem 6: The following domains are empty in a Frege structure where PROP fl SET
is empty:129
(1) SET—>SET,
(2) SET— >(SET— >PROP),
(3) (SET— >PROP)— >SET and
(4) Every type built recursively out of the above three types using — >.
Proof:
(1) is empty because if a is in SET then for every x in SET, app( a, x) is in
SET. But, app( a, x) is also in PROP, as a is a set. Hence PROP fl SET is not
empty. Contradiction.
(2) is empty because if a is in SET—>PROP and therefore in SET, then for
every b in SET, app( a,b) is in SET, but since a is in SET,
129 Perhaps here one can prove a more general theorem; that is:
X— >Y is empty for X,Y ^ SET, where X ^ Y is defined inductively as follows:
(i) X = SET or
(ii) X = X'~ >Y and X' < SET.
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appC a,b) is also in PROP. Hence PROP fl SET is not empty. Contradiction.
(3) is empty because if a is in (SET—>PROP) such that for every b in
(SET— >PROP), app (a,b) is in SET, then as a is in SET, we have that
app (a,b) is in PROP. I.e. app (a,b) is in SET fl PROP. Absurd.
(4) is obvious. □
This implies that verb phrase adverbs, and determiners should be given denotations
outside Fq. They actually will be treated as functionals which operate over F0'
Transitive verbs however will be given denotations in Fq—>SET.
Now we start by translating our basic expressions of PTQ into Tp0j and see how
the type-raising of various items could be accommodated here. We take John first.
John translates to John' of type «e,p >,p > where John' = \u<i'P'>app(u,j). Now we
have to make sure that for any model M and assignment function g, [[John']]^^ is in
the model. I.e. we have to show that there exists an element h of D . such
«e,p>,p>
that for every x in D^ >, app (h,x) = [[app(u,j)]]M'g'-x/u-' = app(x,j). This is seen
as follows:
For any object a in Fq, we are going to construct another object t(a) in SET—>PROP
which also belongs to the structure such that for any set b, app(t(a),b) = app(b,a).
This is done as follows:
Assume a, and let = <app(x,a)/x >.
Take f' (x) to be the conditional proposition: If x is in SET, then f (x) else J_.<X o.
f is a propositional function because:
If x is in SET then f'&(x) = app(x,a) is in PROP,
else C_(x) = I is in PROP.
d.
Now if we take t(a) to be Af'a, then t(a) is in SET— >PROP
Proof: t(a) is obviously in SET because f* is a propositional function.
Moreover, for every x in SET, app(t(a),x) is in PROP.
t(a) also has the property that app(t(a),b) = f'a(b) = app(b,a) for any b in SET.
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Now take [[John']]^^ which is [[Xu.app(u,j)]]^'£ to be t ([[j]]^'^). We have to show
that [[John']]^^ is an element of D<<fe p>p> and also that it satisfies the conditions
of semantic clause 3 which defined [[Xu.a]]^'^. This is seen as follows:
[[John']]M'8 = t([[j]]M'8),
app ( t C[[j]]M'g),x) = appUKj]]^) for any x in SET by definition of t.
[[appCuj)]]^^ = app ([[u]]M'^x/ul [[j]]^^) =
app Cx,[[j]]M'gCx/u]) = app (x,[[j]]M'£). Hence h of clause 3 is t ([[j]]^^).130
Of course we also translate Mary and Bill to Mary' and Bill' in a similar way to John'.
and follow the same procedure to build [[Mary']]^'^ and [[Bill']]^^.
Now we come to translate our basic expressions which belong to the syntactic
category IV. We will take IV to be the category of untensed verb phrases. We start
with run, which translates as run' of type <e,p>. In the model, we assume that a
primitive propositional function run belongs to Fj and that [[ run' ]]^8= Xrun =
run'. Due to issues of type raising, which are a major concern of linguists, it is
interesting to ask what is the semantic effect of type raising run'. If in we define
, run" to be Xu<<k'f>>'I,>app(u,run'), then what is [[run"]]^'^ going to be?
run' = Xrun is in SET, and we construct run" in ((SET—>PROP)—>PROP)
such that app(John',run') = app(run",John'), as follows:
we take f = <app(x,run')/x> and then consider f_„„(x) to be: if x is inrun rr " run
SET then frun(x) else I ,131
run" = Xf'run is in SET and for every x in SET, app(run" ,x) is in PROP.
It is easy to show that run" is in ((SET—>PROP)—>PROP) and that for every
set x, app(run",x) = app(x,run').
Before finishing with run we introduce its extension run#= [Xrun] is in SET/[],
This same process is followed for the intransitive verbs walk, talk, rise and change.
130 One still has to show that h is unique. For this one has to extend the notion of extensionality so
that it applies to app inside each subtype.
131 This is the same process we followed for John'.
-176-
It is now the turn of common nouns. We start with man, which translates into man'
of type <e,p >, and in the model we assume a primitive propositional function man
and that [[man']]^^ = Xman. We apply the same process for woman, park, fish, pen
and unicorn. Also here, the process of constructing [[man"]]^^ is similar to that of
constructing [[run"]]^'^ above, where man" = \u.app(u,man').
Now we come to transitive verbs. We start with find. We assume in our model the
existence of a primitive binary propositional function find, find translates into
Tr(find) of type <t, <fe,p», where Tr(find)=AueAveapp2(find',u,v). [[Tr(find)]]^^ is
in Fq—>SET, because find is a binary propositional function in the Frege structure,
2
hence, Aq find is in SET and it is also in Fq—>SET. This is because for every x in Fq,
2 9
app(A.q find,x) is in SET, as for every y in F0' app(app(AQ find,x),y) =
aPP2(XQ^find,x,y). Now we can show that [[Tr(find)]]*^'^ = XQ^find satisfies
semantic clause 3.
In the same way we get the translations of lose, eat, love, seek. We will leave be for
now and work through some examples.
We have already introduced the category IV of untensed verb phrases. Tense
verb phrases are assigned to a distinct category VP. For some discussion, see [CH3].
Tense Rule S,
tns
If a is in Bjy, then Ft(a) is the present tense third person singular form of a.
and is in MEyp.
Translation rule T{ns:
If a is in Bjy and a translates to a' then Ft(a) translates to Axpred(a',x).
Hence walk in Bjy translates as walk' and walks translates as Axepred(walk',x).
Next we need the following rule of functional application:
Subject-predicate rule S^:
If a is in Pp or in Pjyjnp or in PjyQer and S is in Pyp then F^(a,S) is in P^
where F^(a,8)=aS.132
132 Of course in a more serious fragment we would find a way to avoid this disjunction.
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Translation rule T^:
If a in Prp or in Pjyjnf or i11 PjvGer an<* ^ ^ ^VP anc* a' ^ translate i11*0 «'»S'
respectively, then F^(a,S) translates into app(a',8').
For example, John walks translates into app(John',Xupred(walk',u)) =
app(Xuapp(u,j),Xupred(walk',u)) = app(Xupred(walk',u),j) = pred(walk',j) and
[[pred(walk',j)]]^'£ = pred(Xwalk,j). In order to determine the reference of John
walks, we have [[upred(walk',j)]]^'£ = [ [[pred((walk',j)]]^'^ ]
= [ pred(Xwalk,j) ] = [ app(Xwalk,j) ], as app(Xwalk,j) —pred(Xwalk,j)
= appe([Xwalkl [j])
= appe(walk#,j)
with the assumption that the representative of [j] is j.
If we wanted to look for [[" upred(walk',j)]]^^, it is
Sen([[upred(walk',j)]]^'S) = SenC app(walk#,j) ) and we cannot go any further.
Now we give the following rule:
Determiner-noun rule
If S is in P-picn and | is in Pq^> then F2(8,|) is in P-p where ^2^,0 =
and S' is S except if S is a and the first word in | begins with a vowel, then 8'
is an.
Translation rule T^
If 8 is in P^icn anc* £ ^CN'an<^ ^ translate as f respectively, then
F2(S,|) translates into 8'(£).
Before we illustrate with examples, we need to give the translations of the
determiners. We start with every:
every translates to every' and
[[every']]^'^ is that F-functional such that for any a in Fq,
[[every']]M'g(a) = [[Xv^'P>Vwe(app(u,w)-app(v,w))]]M'g[u/a]
which is an F-functional according to the explicit closure condition on a Frege
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structure. Now [[Av^'P>Vwe(app(u,w)-»app(v,w))]]"v^U//x-' is an hx in
D«e,p>,p>such that for every y * D<*,p>
app(hx,y) = [[Vwe(app(u,w)^pp(v,w))]]M'^u,/x^v'/y-' = V <app(x,z)-*app(y,z)/z>
Similarly, a_translates to aland
[[a']]^£ is that F-functional such that for any a in Fq,
[[a#«(a) = [[Av^'P^we(app(u,w)&app(v,w))]]^[u/x]/x>
Now we come to the, which translates to the' and
[[the']]^ is that F-functional such that for any a in Fq,
[[the']]^2(a) _ [[\v<i'P:>Gw-e[Voe(app(u,o)3(o=w))&app(v,w)]]^'^u^a-l
Lemma 3: [[every']]^®, [[a']]^'£ and [[the']]^'& are F-functionals in the Frege
\
structure which when given elements in SET return elements in SET—>PROP.
Proof: That they are F-functionals is obvious.
Take a in SET, [[every']]^£(a) = [[Av<a'P>.Vwe(app(u,w) -appCv.w))]]^^11^
= ha in D<<fe)p>jp>such that for every y in D^ ^ app(h&,y) =
Vz(app(a,z)->app(y,z)). IfyisinD<fep> = SET then app(y,z) is in PROP and as
app(a,z) is in PROP then Vz(app(a,z)->app(y,z)) is in PROP. Hence, [[every']]^'^
takes elements in SET and returns elements in SET—>PROP. The same proof applies
to [[a']]M'§ and [[the']]M'S. □
For example: every man translates to
every'(man') = Av^'P^V we(app(man',w)-»app(v,w)).
[[every'(man')]]^'^ = [[every']]^'^([[man']]^^) = h such that for every y inman
D<a,p>' app^man'y^ = vz(app(man,z)^app(y,z)).




[[every man talks]]^'& = Vx(man(x)-»pred(Atalk(x)).
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The treatment of conjunction is the same as with Montague, hence we omit discussion
of it.
Transitive verb rule S^:
If S is in P-py and (3 is in Pp then F^(S,/3) is in Pjy where F^(S,/3) = S/3 if /8
does not have the form he_, and F-(S,he ) = Shim .n j n n
Translation rule Ty
If S is in P-py and (3 is in Pp and if S translates to 8' and (3 translates to f3'
then Fj(8,j8) translates to appCS',/3').
We illustrate here how transitive verbs combine with other constituents to result in
sentences. For instance: Mary finds John. First, find John translates to:
app(A.ue\veapp2( find',u,v),John') = Xveapp2(find',v,John').





Mary finds John gets in the model the denotation: app2(find, m, [[John']]M'S)
Note that even though the formula Tr(Mary finds John) was reduced to contain only
m instead of Mary, this formula could not be reduced so that John' is replaced by
Following Montague, this is what will enable us to distinguish between de-re/de-dicto
readings of sentences. Take the sentence Mary finds a unicorn.
a unicorn translates as : a'( unicorn') =
Xv ^'P >jwe(app(unicorn',w)&app(v,w)).
5* Xv<fe'P>^we(app(centaur',w)&app(v,w)) which is the translation of
centaur.
The extension of the above two expressions are empty sets for Montague. According to





We would like to make sure that this inference is blocked in the case of John seeks a
unicorn, yet goes through in the case of John finds a unicorn.
Here is how this is done: We invoke Montague's meaning postulate (4), pl63 of PTQ
(in [TH2]). In our notation, Montague's MP(4) looks like:
(MP4) }S<fe'<fe'p>>VxeVy<<i'p>'p>Iapp2(a!,x,y) = app(y,app(S,x)],
where translates as TrCfind). Tr(eat). Tr(kiss). etc. And if a is
Tr(/3) then S is written as /3*.133
This should combine with the translation of Mary finds John to yield the equivalent
app(app(find*,m),j) = app2(find*,m,j).
We will still owe some explanation of the typing of the constituents of MP4.
app(a,x) is of type <e,p > and hence can be applied to y of type «e,p >,p > (which is
also of type e). app(app(a;,x),y) = app2(a;,x,y) is of type p. Also, app(S,x) is of type
<e,p>and app(y,app(S,x)) is of type p.
For the sake of uniformity, we treat nominalised verb phrases and sentences as
having the same type as term phrases of type «fe,p>,p>. This has the consequence
that they can occur in subject position without requiring any change to the type of
tensed verb phrases.
We need the following rule:
Infnitive rule Snomf-
If a is in MEjy, then Fnomj(a) = to a is in MEjyjnf
Translation rule T
If a is in MEjy and a translates as a' then Fnomi^a) translates as to'CcF).
to translates as to'.
133 j\j0te that one still needs to show that there exists a model for (MP4).
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Hence to run translates as: Xv<<fe'P>'P>app(v,run').
Now we deal with gerunds:
Gerundive rule ^nom2
If a is in Bjy, then Fnom2(a) = «ing is in MEjVGer.
Translation rule ^nom2
If a is in Bjy and a translates as a' then Fnom2^Q!^ translates as
Xv«e'P>'P>app(v,a').
Now it seems that to and ing have the same eifect. Yet the difference is that Snom2
applies to Bjy only, whereas SnQmj accepts any IV. For instance, one can say:
To run and talk is tiring, which is the same as To run and to talk is tiring.
Yet for gerunds we have only one way of saying it. That is:
Running and talking is tiring.
Now we come to self-application. Let's say that fun belongs to two categories, namely
T and AP (adjective phrase), and that be belongs to category e/e.
If fun is in Brp then Tr(fun) = Xx^'P'appCx.fun')134
If be is in Bg2e, then Tr(be) =Xxex
If fun is in B^p, Tr(fun) = fun' of type <e,p>.
be fun in PIV translates as app(Xxx,fun') of type <fe,p>.135
to be fun in P|VTnf translates Xx^'P^" app(x,fun')
is fun in PVP translates as Xzepred(app(Xxx, fun'),z) = Xze pred(fun',z) of type
<£,p>.136
to be fun is fun translates as:
app(Xx ^»P 'appCx.funO.Xz^redCfun'.z)) =
app(Xzpred(fun',z), fun') =
134 This is acceptable because fun' is in <e,p >, and thus fun' is in e according to B1.16.
135 Note that we could apply be to fun of type <e,p> as fun is also of type e. The result of app(\xx,
fun') is fun' of type <e,p >.
13« Note we are dealing with tensed and untensed verbs. Basic untensed verb phrases (e.g. to be




As it is seen from above, we have succeeded in getting nominalisation and self-
application to work. Also, being fun and fun (as a member of Prp) get the same
translation as to be fun, we get the same translation when they occur as subjects of
the predication is fun.
Now we come to the translation of that:
Sentence nominalisation
If a is in ME then F.. ,(a) = that a is in
p that <<fe,p>,p>.
Translation rule
If a is in MEp and a translates as a' and that translates as that' then that a
translates as that' (a').
That translates as the functional that'.
Note that since p£ e, we do not have any problem with typing. For instance, John
runs translates as pred(run',j) and that John runs translates as: Xv^'^appCv,
pred(run',j)).
Now, pred(run',j) is of type p, hence it is of type e and so we can apply v of type
<h,p>to pred(run',j).
Mary believes that John runs translates as




The following section illustrates few more examples of translating English sentences
into Tpol.
woodchuck translates as woodchuck' of type <e,p>,
a woodchuck translates as
Xv^'P^xfappCwoodchuck',x)&app(p,x)] of type «fe,p>,p>or
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be a woodchuck translates as
Av^'P^xfappCwoodchuck',x)&app(p,x)] of type «fe,p>,p>
is a woodchuck. translates as
Az^redCXv^'P^xfappCwoodchuck',x)&app(p,x)],z) of type <<e,p>,p>
wally translates to wally' of type «e,p>,p>.
wallv is a woodchuck translates as
pred(Av<e'P>3x[app(woodchuck',x)&app(p,x)],w')
that wally is a woodchuck translates as
Au '^ppCu.predCAv ^xfappCwoodchuck',x)&app(p,x)],w'))
John believes that wallv is a_ woodchuck translates as
app2(believe', j,Au >app(u,pred(Av ^xfappCwoodchuck',x)&app(p,x)],w'))) =
aPP2(believe', j,pred(Av ^xfappCwoodchuck',x)&app(p,x)],wO).






Now we come to discuss why believe is of type <fe, <e,p». This is to enable us to deal
with all the following sentences:
(1) Mary believes John.
(2) Mary believes John runs.
(3) Mary believes that John runs.
Both John and that John runs are of type M&p hence the typing of believe works for
those two cases, believe also works for John runs because the type of the latter is p
and hence it is e.




This is because app(groundhog',x) is not equal to app(woodchuck',x), even though
they both have the same truth value. Hence we haven't invalidated Leibniz' law.137
137 We have omitted discussion of the validity of existential generalisation out of opaque contexts.
That is, we would like to see whether from John believes f(a), we can deduce that there exists an x such
that x=a and John believes f(x). In other words:
J believes f(a) I- x=a & lx(j believes f(x).
We shall say something about this in future work.
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CHATTER 7. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON
We have provided in this thesis a new approach to semantics using Frege
structures. The first chapter explained two problems of nominalisation which, along
with intensionality, provided the motivation for the thesis.
The oscillation of previous accounts between restricted comprehension and many
valued logics, and the problems concealed by this oscillation (full quantification and
property existence problems), awakened considerable curiosity as to what properties
we could have: what should we quantify over and what should be nominalised?
Similarly the large number of attempts at solving the problems of the propositional
attitudes aroused curiosity as to how much intensionality one should have. How
could intensionality be accommodated and how could extensionality be restored from
such intensionality if the latter was to be considered basic? Finally the interesting idea
of accommodating types (intensional and extensional ones) in this type free highly
intensional language could not be missed.
There are many other interesting topics that could be accommodated within the
present framework - topics I intend to address in future work. Among them are the
study of temporal logics in Frege structures. It certainly seems that accommodating
temporal logics based on events (such as Kamp's in [KAl]) is most convenient in a
framework using Frege structures. Also it is straightforward to implement other
systems of time (such as McDermott's work in [MC3]) in Frege structures if one
considers a collection of Frege structures, each of them corresponding to a point in
time. However, I do not have any comments on how to implement a theory of times
based on intervals (such as Allen's in [AL2] and [AL3]) as I am not sure how this
could be done as even though points could be gathered into sets, we know that those
sets may not be defined.
Leaving temporal logics and coming to non-monotonic logics, Frege structures
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from the point of view of self-reference seem to have some advantages over other
non-monotonic approaches which have to refer to metalanguages to deal with self-
referentiality. All these fascinating areas could be studied within the present
framework and we shall do so in future work. For now however, let us end this
thesis by showing the difference between the treatment of quantifiers in Scott domains
and Frege structures and finally summarizing a few advantages of the present
framework.
PART A. QUANTIFICATION
Both semanticians and computer scientists share an interest in quantification. I
have referred to the topic quite often throughout this thesis and would now like to
show the foundational difference between quantification in a semantics using Frege
structures and that in a semantics using Scott domains. This point is a major issue for
those interested in the semantics of either computer or natural languages and who
base their work on Scott domains. The quantification problem that faced Turner (in
[TU2]) can be described as follows: Assume a language which has both objects and
functions and assume that wffs are built out of other ones using &, V, V, j,... If the
model is a Scott domain EM then there is no problem interpreting anything which is
not a quantified sentence, as the interpretations of all such things are continuous
functions and hence belong to the model. Let us choose the following interpretation
for the quantifiers V and ]
[[Vx0]]gwt =
1 if for each d in D, [[0Hg[d/x]wt= 1
0 if for some d in D, H0]]g[d/X]wt= 0
I otherwise
[Nx0]]gwt =
1 if for some d in D, [[«^>]]g[cl/x]wt= 1
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0 if for each d in D, tt0Bg[d/x]wt= 0
I otherwise.
Then the following is a proof of the continuity of the quantifier clause for V. Assume
by induction that we have [[0]] is continuous where <f> does not involve quantifiers. To
prove the continuity of [[Vx<£]] (i.e. to prove it in [ASG— >[S— >EXT] ] where ASG is
the collection of assignment functions, S is the collection of states consisting of
worlds and times and EXT is the extensional domain of values), we prove it
continuous separately in each of its arguments, according to a theorem we proved in
appendix I. Let us prove the continuity of [[Vx0]] for g in ASG. Take an w-sequence
(gn)n anc* Prove that:
[[v^]]lVrt= U[[V*«]]gnW,
Assume [[Vx^]]^ wt = 0 <==>ton
GdeD)([[0]]^[d/x]wt = o) ^=>
G d €D)( uMgjd/x]wt = 0) <^=>
(3 d€D)G n€wX[[0]]g [d/x]wt = 0) <=
Gn€wXi d€D)([[0]]g [d/x]wt = 0) <=





by the structure of BOOL,
<==> by logical laws,
> by definition,
by the structure of BOOL,
Assume [[Vx^]]^ wt = 1 <==>"n
(Vd€DX[W]%[d/x]wt-l)
= 1 <==> by definition,
by induction,
(] n£wXVd€D)([[<£]]g [d/x]wt = 1) <==>by definition,
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Therefore [[Vx0]] is continuous. □
Note that this interpretation of quantifiers is abandoned later by Turner (in [TU4]
and [TU5]) and he decided to adopt the following clauses instead:
"Vx<^gwt=
1 iff for each dGE^- UEq, [[<£]]g[d/x]wt = 1
0 iff for some dGE^- UEn, [[0]]g[d/x]wt = 0
J otherwise
& * x^]]gwt=
1 iff for some aGE^- UEn, [[0]]g[a/x]wt = 1
0 iff for each aGE^- LEn, [[0]]g[a/x]wt = 0
I otherwise
Of course working with Scott domains, you have always to check for continuity and
this is the case with the new clauses. It can easily be proved that continuity does in
fact hold and so we can still think of Scott domains as models.
We now describe the problem which made Turner move from the first definition
of quantifiers to the second one. By adopting the first definition, we had:
- 1 Iff (Vd In D)C[[0]]g[d/x]wt - 1)
As [[0]] is continuous, therefore monotonic and as uQl (where, as noted above, u is
the undefined) for each d in D then we get:
(Vd in E>)C[[0]]g£d/xjwt - 1) iff [[^]]g[ll/x]wt - 1.
This clause has serious consequences. I shall illustrate this by taking in the formal
language an element u' which names u. I.e. [[u']]gWt =u always. Now see what
happens if we take cf> to be: x=u\ Applying the above clause we get:
[[x=U']]g[u/x]wt = 1 iff (Vd in D)([[x=u'%d/x]wt = 1}
which implies:
u=u iff (Yd GD)(d=u).
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That is absurd. We have to do something about this and the first solution that one
thinks of is to exclude the undefined element from the quantifier clause. Therefore,
instead of letting d range over all of D, we let it range over D* (i.e. D-{u}). But now
Scott domains can no longer be models under this interpretation, for we no longer
have [[Vx0]] is continuous. If we go back to the proof of continuity given above, we
see that we had to use the undefined element in order to prove continuity. Turner,
realising this, exploits an important aspect of the structure of Scott domains. We
explained in Chapter 1 the existence of finite and infinite elements in and said that
for each element d of E . d is the limit of (e )„ where e„ belongs to E„ and each E„cd nn n°n n
is the domain of finite elements. The infinite (or ideal elements) are those which are in
Em- UE^. By restricting the quantification over these ideal elements only, we can
prove again the closure of Scott models. Although Turner's trick is very clever,
unfortunately it does not work. By so restricting quantification, only infinite elements
can be quantified over and finite elements are ignored. This is unsatisfactory as is
illustrated in the following example:
Take the sequence given by Turner,
(i) John is fun
(ii) John runs
(iii) To run is fun.
We can agree with Turner that is fun and runs should both be infinite elements, to be
able to apply them to everything in the domain especially their nominals. But if we
take 4> to be x is fun and apply Turner's quantifier clause for V where [[Vx</>]] = 1, we
get: for each ideal element d, fun'(d) which means that we can only quantify over
those ideal elements. But John, Mary, one's Table and so on are finite elements - how
can we quantify over them? In [TU3], Turner makes the domain of individuals A a
basic domain and builds all other domains out of superclasses of A. This restriction of
quantification to the ideal elements makes us lose the power of ascribing properties to
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our individuals and prevents quantifiers like every from having any of their usual
natural language interpretation.
Having seen that this solution to quantification in Scott domains is unsatisfactory,
why is it that Frege structures do not have this problem, even though they themselves
can be built on top of a Scott domain? It is because Scott domains themselves do not
have any logic on them. Turner tried to incorporate a logic (and in consequence an
interpretation of all the connectives) by attaching Kleene's three-valued logic to a
Scott domain. In a Frege structure on the other hand quantifiers and other
connectives are built inductively step by step so that at the fixed point one gets all
these logical constants.
PART B. FURTHER ADVANTAGES
Now we assess further the advantages one obtains with Frege structures. We
start with type freeness and the fact that SET is isomorphic to Propositional
functions Fn
— >PROP and that SET Q Fq. Also, we have the two following
functionals in a Scott domain:
I \t : SET — >PF1
X : PF1-- > SET.
If we assume that the interpretation of verbs takes place in F. for i^ 1 and thus that
[[walk]] is in F^, then we get:
[[to walk]]^ = X.[[walk]]g
Now it is straightforward to interpret things like to walk hurts, for:
[[to walk hurts]] = [[hurt]] ([[to walk]] )
o o o
= [[hurt]]g(\.[[walk]]g).
The advantage of what we just offered lies in the elegance of classifying the
denotation of our items. With Montague's and Turner's approaches, one has always to
check whether the denotation of an item is in the right domain. With our approach,
- 191 -
we do not need to check whether [[to walk]] is in FQ or not using some confusing
o
domain equations. All we had to say was that [[walk]] is in F.; therefore X[[walk]]
O O
is in Fq. This actually seems to be an encouraging advantage about Frege structures:
nominalisation is a natural process inside the Frege structure. It also seems that we
have real application, unlike in Scott domains where application is only through the
isomorphic embedding. This is because instead of interpreting things as above into F^,
for i^ 0, we can restrict everything to Fq. We did this in the previous chapter and
obtained that
[[fun is fun]]^ = pred ([[fun]]g,[[fun]]g)
Therefore it seems that by using Frege structures we get the following advantages
over Scott domains,
(1) Real self application
(2) No cumbersome checking for the right typing
(3) No redundant semantic types
(4) Nominalisation seems to flow naturally
(5) Quantification
For the sake of completeness, we mention a new approach to a theory of properties
proposed by Turner (in [TU9]) which abandons completely the use of Scott domains.
Turner's new theory is one which starts from Frege's comprehension principle and
restricts it in such a way that the paradox is no longer derivable. Turner starts with
a first order theory which has a pairing system and adds to this theory a new
operator p (to serve as the predication operator) together with the lambda operator.
Then in this case, if one assumes full classical logic and Frege's comprehension
principle, one will certainly derive the paradox;
for, take a = \x.->p(x,x),
p(a,a) <->-i p(x,x)[a/x]
<- > -i p(a,a). Contradiction.
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Of course, the problem does not come from contraction, i.e. p(Xx.A,t) -» A(t,x) is
always true. But the converse implication (i.e. expansion) is problematic. This is due
to negation, i.e. if A is atomic then we can accept A(t,x) -»p(Xx.A,t). But we cannot
accept it when A is like Russell's property, an atomic term proceeded by a negation
sign. This is exactly what guides Turner in setting his theory. For the theory now will
have the following axioms replacing Frege's comprehension principle:
(El) A(t,x) -» p(Xx.A,t) when A is atomic.
(R) p(Xx.A,t) -»A(t,x).
(I) p(Xx.p(Xy.A,t),u) <->p(Xy.p(Xx.A,u),t)
Now the abandonment of Frege's full comprehension axiom will impose the use of
two logics, one inside the predication operator in addition to the usual one for wffs.
This is due to the fact that breaking the equivalence between p(Xx.A,t) and A(t,x)
will disconnect the reasoning about wffs and properties. To build models for T above,
one uses the fixed point operator to turn an ordinary model of the first order theory
into a model which will validate in it as many instances of the comprehension axiom
as possible. It will of course validate only the safe instances whereas the paradoxical
ones will oscillate in truth-values. The inductive step to build the model should be
obvious. As an example, one can start with the first order model, and an operator PI
which is empty at the beginning. Then at the next step, extend PI to also contain the
pairs <f[Xx.A]],[[t]]gjyj> such that [[A]]g[[[t]] /x] = * anc* so on unt^ one §ets a limit
ordinal £ where PI then is to have in it all the pairs <e,d > such that for some ordinal
smaller than this |, <e,d> belongs to all the intermediate Pi's. Now we no longer
have a full comprehension principle and we cannot do with properties what we can do
with formulae. But there are still a great deal of things that one can identify between
properties and wlfs; for example, from P(Xx.A,t) and P(Xx.B,t) one can derive
p(Xx.A&B,t). Turner showed however that theories of Frege structures are weaker
than his theory of properties which is a fact that may stand to our advantage for the
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following reasons. Firstly, Turner can prove at least as much in his theory as one can
in a theory based on Frege structures. Secondly, Turner is paying a price for the
strength of his theory - mainly his use of two logics (internal and external) rather
than one only. On balance it seems better to use a theory based on Frege structures
for properties. Doing so gains the advantages of Turner without the complications.
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AFPENDIX I. FOUNDATIONS OF DOMAIN THEORY
In the main chapters of the thesis, I assumed that the reader knew what models
of the lambda calculus were and that he was able to build them. In this appendix, I
show how these models can be built and cite important properties about them. My
introduction to those models is not definitive however, and the interested reader is
referred to [BAl] and [BA2].
I. Definitions:
Defl: semantic domains: A domain D with a binary relation Q on D is a semantic
domain iff:
(i) D is a set which has a bottom element u satisfying:
(Vx€D) [u CX],
Cii) The binary relation Q is a partial ordering on D. I.e:
(1) C is reflexive: (Vx€D) [x Cx]
(2) C is antisymmetric:
(Vx€D) (Vx'€D) [Cx Cf and x' Cx) ==>x=x']
(3) C is transitive:
(Vx,y,z6D) [(x £y and y Cz) ==> x=z].
(iii) every co-sequence has a least upper bound in D. (see Def2,3,4)
We denote the least upper bound of (x ) by U , xn ntco J n€co n
and when no confusion occurs, we write U xn.
We denote a semantic domain by (D, C ).
De/2: u-sequences: An co-sequence in a semantic domain (D, C) is a sequence (x^^g^
of elements of D such that (Vn^O) [xn Cxn+^]. When no confusion occurs, we write
(xn}n-
Deft: Upper bound: An element d in D is an upper bound of a subset X of D, iff
(Yd'€X) [d' Cd],
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Def4: Least upper bound: An element d in D is the least upper bound of a subset X of
D iff
(1) d is an upper bound of X
(2) (Vd'GD) [(d' is an upper bound of X) ==>d Cd']
Deft: Continuous functions: A function f from a semantic domain D into another
semantic domain D' is continuous iff
(for each co-sequence (dn)n6D) [f(Udn) = Uf(dn)]
Hereafter, D* will denote the domain D without its bottom element. I.e. D* = D-{u}.
II. Domains out ofother domains: Now that we have the notion of a domain, we need
to do useful things with it and for that we should be able to build domains out of
other domains. These constructions will be based upon three functors:
II. 1. Domains out ofold ones using '+':
II.l.l. Sum of two domains: Let (Dp C^) and (D2, be two semantic domains. We
define (D^hT^. £) to be:
D1+D2 = {(dpi) such that d^GDA} U {u}139
and (Vd = (d^,i), d' = (d'j,j) €D^+D2) [d Cd'<==>(d=u or (i=j and d^ C^dL))]
Lemma: (Dj+Dj, £) as constructed above is a semantic domain:
Proof:
(i) u is the bottom element because:
(YdGD^HTi^) [u £d] following the definition of Q.
(ii) C is a partial order on
(1) £ is reflexive:
Let dGDj+D2-
If d=u then d C d.
Otherwise d = (dpi) where d -GD-*. But £ is reflexive,
then d^ Q d^. Hence, d Q d.
139 - (u e d1ud2)
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(2) C is antisymmetric:
Let d,d'£D^+D2 such that d £d' and d' Cd.
If d=u then also d'=u and so d=d'.
Otherwise d = (d^i) and d' = (d'j,j),
d C d' == > i=j and d^ C^d'j
d' Cd =>d'j ^di
but Q is antisymmetric, then dpd'j and therefore d=d'.
(3) C is transitive:
Let d, d', d" be € Dj+D2 such that d Cd' and d' £d".
If d=u then d Cd" (definition of C)
Otherwise d = (d^,i) where d-£ D-*
d Cd' ==> d' = Cd*j,j) where d'j£Dj*, i=j and d^ £^d'j,
d' Cd" ==> d" = (d"^,k) where d"^£D^*, j=k and dL £.d"
therefore i=j=k, d- CdL and dL Cd"
But £ is transitive hence i=k and d. £d"
by definition, this is: d Cd".
Hence C is transitive.
Combining (l), (2) and (3), we get that C is a partial order,
(iii) Every sequence of D^+Dj has a least upper bound in Dj+D2^
Let (dn)n£w be an oi-sequence in Dj+D2«
If the (d ) ,, is of the form:u Cu.... Cu.,., then u is the limit,n ntfti
Otherwise, there is a certain natural number k such that the
elements of indices ^ k are ^ u and
(Vn^k) [dn£Dj*] or (Vn^k) [dn€D2*]. This is because:
1. If d^€D^* then so is d^+j (as d^ Cd^)
by induction assume that d €D.*. As d Cd , 1 we get
n 1 n n+1 0
dn+l £D1*- So (Vn^k^ [dn6Di*J
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2. If dj,€D2*, we prove as above that (Vn^k) [dn€D2*L
(a) If (Vn>k) [dn€Dt*] then:
(dn)n^k an ^-sequence of and so it has a limit in D^.
Actually it does not matter if we start at k instead of 0, because
we can always stick bottom to the first k places of the sequence.
Let d be the limit of (d ) >. in D. then,n n^k l
d is the limit of (d)„ _ in D.+D-. To see this:n new l 2
(1) d is an upper bound in
Vn, ifO ^ n < k == > dn=u
==>dn Cd (by definition of £)
if n^k ==> d Qd ==> d £d (definition of £)
n 1 n
So (Vn6oj) tdQ Cd].
(2) d is the least upper bound of (dn)n in D^+D2*
If d' is an upper bound of (dn)n € D^+D2 then:
d' is an upper bound of because
Vn^kd Cd' and d'€D * ==> d £,d'n In 1
d £d' ==> (Vn^k) [dn £^d']. But d is the least upper
bound in ==> d £^d\
Therefore d is the least upper bound of (dn)Q in
(b) If (Vn^k) [dn6D2*] the proof goes as in (a)
Hence (iii)
From (i), (ii) and (iii) we conclude that Dj+Dj is a semantic domain.D
77.7.2. Sum of any number (possibly infinite) of domains: Let (D-)-be a set of
semantic domains with the ordering
C^ on each D-.
Let D = { <d,i>: d in D-*} U {u}, we denote D by U D^. For d, d' in D we define:
d £d' <==> (d=u or (] i£l) (] x,y£Dp [x <^y and d = <x,i>and d'=<y,i>] )
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Lemma: (D, £) as defined above is a semantic domain:
Proof:
(1) u is the least element (bottom) of D:
following the definition of £, (Vd€D) [u £d].
(2) £ is a partial ordering:
(i) £ is reflexive
Let d€D,
If d=u, nothing to prove.
If d=u then (5 i€l) (5 d^€D^*) [<d^,i> = d]
But £ is reflexive, then d- £d-
Therefore d £ d.
(ii) £ is antisymmetric
Let d, d' be in D such that d £ d' and d' £ d
If d=u or d'=u nothing to prove
Otherwise:
(I) d £d' ==>
(3 i€I) (3 x^,y. 6D-*) [xi £yi and
d = <x.,i> and
d'=<y.,i>]
(II)d' £d ==>




d = <x-,i> = <Xj',j>==>i=j and x.=Xj'.
d'=<yi,i>= <yj',j>==>i=j and y/=yj.
The set of equations {x- £y. and y/ £Xj'} reduces to
{xi £lYi and Yi £Xi}.
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But C is antisymmetric, so we get x^y-.
Therefore d = <xi,i>= <yi,i>and C is antisymmetric,
(hi) C is transitive:
Let d, d\ d" € D such that d Cd' and d' Cd"
If d=u then d Q d"
Otherwise,
d Cd' ==> (3 [d = <x^,i>, d'=<xi',i>and xi ^x^],
d' Cd" ==>(] j»Xj',Xj") [d'= <xy,j >, d" = <Xj",j > and xj CjXj"].
d'=<x.',i>= <x.',j> ==> x-'=x.'and i=j.1 j J I j J
The set of equations: {x- Cx-' and Xj' —jxj'} reduces to:
{xi Qxd and x^ £Xj"}.
But C is transitive ==> x- ^Xj" and Xj" GD-.
d = <x-,i> and d" = <Xj",i> and x- Qxj" ==> d Cd".
Therefore C is transitive.
(3) The least upper bound of sequences exist:
Let (x ) be an to-sequence. Each x is of the form <d■ ,i>,
n ntoj ^ n l '
n
where d^ is in D^*. It should be clear now that if (d-,i) C(d.,j) then
n J
d. and dj belong to the same domain and i=j.
Therefore for each i, (d- )n is an oi-sequence of D-.
n
But D- is a semantic domain, so let d. = U d. in D-.
i i n I l
n
The task now is to prove that d = <d.,i> = U x .r inn
(i) (VnGcu) ,i> C <di?i>]?
n
d. = U d. ==> d. £d-
l n€w i l 11
n n
So by definition of C, xn C <H-,i>= d.
Therefore (VnGto) [x Cd]
(2i) Let d' in D such that (VnGai) [x Cd'], prove d Cd'?
d'is of the form <dj',j> where j in I and dj in Dj.
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(VnGca) [xn £d'] ==>
(Vn€w) [<d. ,i> C <d ' j>].
n J
(VnGto) [Ci=j) and (d^ ==>
n -1
d.' is an upper bound of (d. ) c,k in D;.
1 i_ ntw 1J n
But d- is the least upper bound so:
d. Qdj' and <dj,i> £ <d\i>,
hence d Q d'.
Therefore d is the least upper bound of (x ) in D.rr n ntw
Using (l), (2) and (3) we get: (D, Q) is a semantic domain. □
II.2. Domains out ofold domains using 'x': Let (D', C) and (D", C) be two semantic
domains. We define (D'xD", C) as follows:
D = D'xD" = { <d', d" > where d' GD' and d" GD"} and
(V<d'0,d"0>, <d'1,d"1>GD'xD")
[<d'0,d"0> C <d'1,d"1X==>d'0 Cd'j and d"0 Cd"^
Lemma: (D'xD", O is a semantic domain.
Proof: (1) Let u=<u',u" > where u' is the bottom of D' and
u" is the bottom of D".
u is the bottom of D'xD" because:
If <&', d" >GD, then d' GD' and d" GD"
==>u' 2d' and u" Cd",
hence by definition of Q, <u',u" > Q <d',d" >.
(2) Q is a partial order:
(0 C is reflexive:
Let <d',d" >be in D ==>(d'GD') and (d" GD") ==>
d' Cd' and d" C'd" ==>
<d',d'> C <d',d">.
Cii) c is transitive:
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Let X, Y, Z be in D'xD" such that X Cy and Y £Z.
X= <x',x" >, Y= <y',y" > and Z= <z',z" >.
X CY ==>x' Cy* and x" £'y"
Y £Z ==>y' £z' and y" G'z"
By transitivity of £ and £' we get:
x' £z' and x" £'z".
Hence, X £Z.
(hi) c is antisymmetric:
Let X and Y be in D'xD" such that X C y and Y £X.
X= <x',x" > and Y=<y\y" >.
X £Y==>x' Gy' and x" C'y"
Y cx ==>y' Cx' and y" C'x"
==> (by transitivity of e, e1),
x'=y' and x"=y" ==>X=Y
Using (i),(ii) and (hi) we get that £ is a partial order.
(3) o>-sequences have limits in D'xD":
Let (xp^gj be an to-sequence in D'xD".
Each X- is of the form <x-',x." >.
As (X.p.gw is an to-sequence in D, we can prove that:
((xpigi is an to-sequence in D' and
(xi")igl is an to-sequence in D"}
But D' and D" are semantic domains, So:
Let d' be the limit of (x.'); c, in D'1 ltto
and d" be the limit of (x."). , in D".
1 ICto
Our task now is to prove that:
<d',d" > is the limit of (Xp^£a) in D.
(a) (Vi€to) [(x.' Gd') and (X|" G'd")]
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because d' and d" are the limits.
Hence (Vi€w) [ <xT,x/' > Q <d',d" >]
and so (View) [x^ Q <d',d" >].
Therefore <d',d" >is an upper bound of (X.)^^ in D'xD".
(b) Let dj be an upper bound of (X-)^^ in D'xD".
d^=<ii^',d^" > where ((d^'GD') and (d^" €D")).
(View) [x- Cd^ therefore
(View) [(x2 Qd^') and x^" C'd^"].
Because d^' is an upper bound of (X'p^^ in D' and
d^" is an upper bound of CX".)^g in D",
d' Q d^' and d" £'d^" hence
<d',d" > £ <d^\dj" >.
Hence <d',d" >is the least upper bound of (X-)|gw in D'xD"
Using (l), (2) and (3), we get that D'xD" is a semantic domain.D
I1.3. New domains out ofold ones using —>
Let [Dj—>02] be the set of continuous functions from the domain (D^
to the domain (D2, ^,).
We shall define a binary relation on [D^—^2]
as follows:
(Vf,g in [D1->D2] ) [f Cg <==>(VdeD) [f(d) ^gCd)] ].
Lemma:
([Dj— >02], S) as defined above is a semantic domain.
Proof:
(l) Let us take u = Ad^, u is the bottom of D.
(i) u is well defined:
Obvious, for u is the constant function.
(ii) u is continuous:
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For each w-sequence (dn)n£&J in D^,
u( U dn) = u2 = U u2 = U Cu(dn)).
(iii) u is the bottom of D:
Let f be in D.
(VdeD1) [u(d) = Uj]. But Uj ==>
(VdGDj) [u(d) S^fCd)] ==>
u Cf,
Therefore u is the bottom of D.
(2) C is a partial order
CO C is reflexive:
Let f be in [D>02],
(VdGD) [f(d) S^f(d)].
Therefore, f Cf.
(ii) C is antisymmetric:
Let f,g in D such that f £g and g Cjf.
Consider d in D^.
(a) f Cg ==>f(d) C^g(d).
(b) g Cf ==>g(d) C^f(d).
But ^ ^ antisymmetric, hence (a)+(b) ==> f(d) =g(d).
Therefore (Vd€D) [f(d) =g(d)]
Using extensionality, we get f =g.
Hence C is antisymmetric.
(iii) C is transitive:
Let f,g,h be in D such that f Cg and g Ch.
Consider d in D,
(a) f Cg==>f(d) £^g(d)
(b)g £h==>g(d) C^h(d)
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But £2 is transitive, hence (a)+(b) ==>f(d) C^hXd).
Hence: (Vd€D) [f(d) C^hCd)] and so f £h.
By (i), (ii) and (iii) C is a partial order.
(3)Every ca-sequence has a least upper bound.
Let be an ta-sequence of [D^— ^2] and
consider f = Ad. U fn(d).
f = U f because:
n
(i) f is well defined:
Let d in D. 6 (f (d)) - is an (a-sequence of D~ because:1 n ntw ^ 2
(Vn€ca) [fnCfn+1] ==>
(VnGfa) [fn(d) Cjfn+1(d)] ==>
(fn(d))ngw is an ca-sequence of D2 and
its limit U f (d) is well defined,
n
So f = Ad.Uf (d) is well-defined,
n
(ii) f is continuous:
Let (d )„, c, be an ca-sequence of D-,.m mcca 1
f(Udm) = Unfn( Umdm) = Un(Umfn(dm):) (fn 18 continuous).
= Um( LJ^fnCdm)) (using next lemma).
= Umf(dm) (by definition of f).
Therefore f( U dm) = U f(dm) and f is continuous.
Before continuing the proof that f = U f , we need the following lemma:
Lemma: Let (fn)n and (dm)m be ca-sequences of [Dj—>D2] and respectively.
Then U (U f (d )) = U (U f (d))
nmnm mnnm
Proof: First we need to prove a little sublemma:
Sublemma: Let (a_)_ c,, and (b )„, be ca-sequences of an ntw m mtca n
semantic domain D such that (Vn€ca) [an £t>nl
Then U a C u b .
n n
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Proof: Vn€w, an £t>n (hyp.)
and b £ Ub (def. of limit)
n n
But Q is transitive ==>
(Vntco) [an GUbJ.
Therefore Ubn is an upper bound of (an)ngcu == >
U a £Ub . Hence the proof of the sublemma.n n
(f (d )) r. is an co-sequence in D~ because (f) is an co-sequence in D.n m ntco ^ 2 n n
Therefore U_f_(d_) exists in D~ and (Vntco) [f_(d ) U f (d )].
nnm 2 n m 2 n n m
But Cf (d )) is an co-sequence because :
n m mtco ^
f is continuous ==>
n
fn is monotonic, i.e (Vmtco) [dm £dm+1 ==>fn(dm) -fn^dm+l^'
this implies that (Vmtco) [fn(dm) —
==> ^fn^dm^m6<o is an co-sequence.
Also ( U f (d )) ,, is an co-sequence because:n n m mtco ^
(Vmtco) [dm Cdm+1] ==>
(Vmtco) [fQ(dm) as fn is monotonic ==>
Unfn(dm) ^Unfn(dm+j) using above sublemma ==>
( U f (dj) _ is an co-sequence,n n m m tco ^
Applying the above sublemma on ( unfn(dm))m6(U and (fn(dm):)mtco'
we get U f (d ) CL U ( U f (d )).° mnm 2m nnm
This means that U ( U f (dJ) is an upper bound of ( U f(d )) _m nnm mnm ntco
~>(a) : Un(Umfn(dm» =2Um(Unfn(dtn»-
Now let us prove that UmC Unfn(dm) ^ Un(Vn(dm)):
d C. U d
m m m
==>(Vn€co) [f Cd ) Q,f (UId)] as f is monotonic.n m 2 n mm
==>(Vntco) [f Cd ) U f (d )] as f is continuous,
n m 2 m n m
However (f (dm))„ - and ( U f (d )) _ are co-sequences,n ntco m n m ntco 1
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Therefore by the above sublemma: unfn(dm) '"mg^f^d^).
Therefore Ufl( umfn(dm^ is an upper bound of ( unfn(dm))met0-
-Xb): Um(Unfn(dm)) %Un(Umfn(dm)).
But ^2 is antisymmetric, hence Ca)+(b) == >
U (U f (d )) = U (U f (d )). End of proof of lemma,nmnm mnnm r
Now back to the proof that every co-sequence of [D^~ ^2]
has a least upper bound. We continue as follows:
(iii) f is the limit of (f ) c :n ntco
VnGco, f Cf because:
n
If deDj ==>f(d) = Ufn(d) ==>fn(d) CjfCd).
Therefore f is an upper bound of (f ) ,, .rr n ntco
Suppose g is an upper bound of and consider d in D.
fCd) = UfnCd).
(Vneco) [fn Cg] ==>(Vn€co) [fQ(d) C^gCd)] ==>
Ufn(d) Cjg(d) == > f(d) Cjg(d).
Therefore (Vd€D) [f(d) ^gCd)] ==>f Cg.
Hence each co-sequence in [D*~ ^2] has a limit,
using (l),(2) and (3) we get that ([D^—^jL £) is a semantic domain.D
So far we have seen a way of building a domain out of two (or more) old domains.
Later, we shall see that we are really interested in domains E which satisfy an
equation of the form: E— [E— >£]. We define B the set of truth values, i.e. B =
{0,1,Uq} where Uq C 1, Uq CO (B is a semantic domain). We build our domain E by
building a sequence of domains (by induction). We start with Eq= B and build En+1=
B + [En~ >Enl for n>0. For all n, En is a semantic domain. We would like, however,
to relate all those domains with an ordering relation and find the limit of such a
sequence. This limit is going to be the required E. We start with some definitions:
Definition.: A projection pair of on D2 is a pair <<I>,T> such that:
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<h: D-j— >D2, ®2~^1 anc*
(a) <F, IF are both continuous,
(b) (VxCDj) [¥(4(x)) =x]
(c) CVxeD2) [SC^Kx)) Cjx]
For each n^O, we define a proiection pair The aim of each <J>n is to embed
En into En+j, whereas ?n is a surjection from En+^ to En> Our construction of
(<!>„)„ is done by induction as follows:140n nto) J
% : E0" ^1 *0 : El" ^0
<I>q(x) = x GB* > x,u^ = x > x'u0
(iQ) % is well defined and is an injection: obvious.
C21q) Tq is well defined and is a surjection: obvious.




(41q) OqC^qCx)) for all x in Ej:
<t>0OQ(x)) = xGB* >4>q(x),<1>q(uq)
= xGB* >x,Uj
If <Fq(>Fq(x)) = x ==> QqCVqCx)) CjX as is reflexive.
If <5>q(^q(x)) = u^ ==> <Fq("^q(x)) C^x (bottom element).
Therefore (VxGEj) [OqCiFqCx)) £^x].
(5i0) *0 is continuous:
Let (xn)ngw be an cu-sequence of Eq. Two cases arise:
(a)Uxn=UQ ==>
U xn^ = ui and [x - Uq] ==>
<S0(Uxn) = Uj and (VnGca) [3>0(xn) = Uj] ==>
140 (the notation "f(x) =p(x) >a, b" is to be understood as: if p(x) is true then f(x) =a otherwise
f(x) =b)
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*0( U x ) = Uj and U = U1 ==>
(b)Ux is in B* ==>
n
<I>o(UXn)= Uxn and k6ca) (Vn^k) [x^= xn = Uxn€B*] ==>
<E>a(Ux ) = Ux = x = x, GB* for all n^k ==>On n n k
(a>0( u xn) = U xn) and (OqCx^) = xn= xfc = U xfl for all n^k) == >
C<3>0( U xn) = U xn) and ( U 3>0(xn) = = U xQ) == >
W-UW
Therefore we always have 4>q( U x ) = U <I>Q(xn).
(6ig) is continuous:
Let (x ) g be an oj-sequence of E.. Two cases arise:
Ca) Uxn€B*: the proof as in (b) above.
Cb) Uxn is in [Eg~>E0]U {Uj}
(i) If Ux = u1:n l
the proof is as in (5iQ,a) with interchanging Uq, u^.
Cii)lf U xn 6 [Eq—>Eq] then:
G k€ca) (Vn^k) [xn€ [Eq~>Eq] ] (definition of '+') ==>
V u xn) = uQ and (Vn>k) [TqCx^ = uQ] ==>
*0C U xn^ = u0 and U ^xn^ = u0 ==>
Therefore, we always have 1Pq( Ux^) = U TqCx^.
By induction, we build <5n+^ and ¥ j assuming that <£>n and Tn have been
defined satisfying (in), (2in), (3in), (4in), (5in) and (6in).
^n+l: En+l-->En+2
Vl(x) = X6B*-—>x, (x= un+1-->un+2,fnoxoV
^n+l: En+2" ^n+l
Vl(x) = x6B* >x' (x= un+2 >un+l'Vxo<I>n)
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(in+P ^n+j is well defined and injective:
Well defined: obvious.
Injective: Let x,x' be in En+^such that On+^(x) = 4>n+^(x').
If x€B* ==> On+1(x) = x£B* ==>
x' is in B and 3>n+.(x') = x'
== > x= x'.
If x= un+l ==> Vl(x) = un+2 = Vl(x'}
==> X'= un+1 ==> x=x\
If x€ [En-^Bn] ==>
x'€ [En->En] and <Dn+1(x) = <J>n+1(x') ==>
$oxo = G> ox'o1ir., ==>n n n n
f o$ oxof = ¥o<I> ox'oTL ==>
n n n n n n
xo"*p = x'oML (by induction o<I> (x) = x) ==>n n J n n
xoT o<J> = x'oT o<L ==> x= x\
n n n n
Therefore 3>n+^(x) = <J>n+^(x') ==>x= x'. Hence 0+. is injective
(2in+j) Tn is surjective and well-defined:
Well defined: obvious.
Surjective: Let f in En+r
If f = U1 then u26En+2 and *n+1(u2) = ur
If f 6B* then f 6En+2 and ^n+1(f) = f.
Otherwise f e [En~ >En] ==> <hn+1(f) SEn+2
'5r:a+^(<I>n+j(f)) = f As we shall prove in (3i ^).
Therefore is surjective.
(3in+p Tn+^(<I>n+^(f)) = f: (remember our notation f(x) =p(x) >a,
Vl'Vl™ -
(f - un+l Vl(Vf0'
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= f€B»-—>f,
(f = un+l >un+l'V(VfoW
But ofo? )o$„ = ((lPo$ )ofo(lP o<l> )nn n n nn n n
= f because o<3> = the identity function,n n J
Therefore = E
(4v+i>WVi(t))W-f°r a11 f 1,1W
L« f in E„+2'
(f - vr-^/uJ.VitV0*.)'
= f 6B* >f,
(f = un+2 >un+2>V(Vfo<I>n)olpn)-
Let x in En+1>
(4>no(Vfo<I>n)o^n)(x) =W«WX»»
But 4> (f) QL,-.f and $no? is monotonic ==>n n n+1 n n
$n°( ^nof0$n)0 x) Ti+1f^*n^^xX)-
But again ^(SE^Cx)) ~n+lx and f is continuous (monotonic)
~>f(®n(^(x») ^+1f(x).
Using transitivity of ^n+j we get:
(<E> ("SLofoOJoNUXx) C f(x) for all x in E_ ==>
n n n n n+1 n+1
®„o(tfofo®,)o* C fn n n n n+2
f —n+2^ (refLexivity)
un+2 —n+2^ (bottom element)
Therefore always ~n+2f*
(5in+j) <£^1 is continuous:
Let (xn)nea) be an co-sequence of En+^.
VUxn)= Uxn€B»—->Uxn,




(a) If U xn is in B*, the proof goes as in (5iQ,b)
and we get 4>n+1( Uxfl)=UVl(xnX
(b) If Uxn= un+i» the proof goes as in (5iQ,a)
and we getwuv -uVi(V-
(c) Otherwise, U is in [E— >Eq] and we can use the
continuity together with the definition of U f , where
f is a function, to prove that <E> o( Ux„)o^„ = U (<E> oxoMLn n n n n n
And we getWUI.'-UVW'
(a), (b) and (c) ==> $>n+1(Uxn) = U ^n+1(xn)
==> ^>n+^ is continuous.
l°in+]_) is continuous:
Let Cxn)ngw be an co-sequence of En+2-
WUxn)=UxneB*-->UV
( U xn= un+2 >Un+l'V( U xn)o<I>n)
*n(xn) = xneB* >xn'
(xn= un+2 >un+l'Vxn0<I,n)
(a) If Uxn€B*, the proof goes as in (a) above
and we have ML ,( U x ) = U ML ,(x„)n+l n n+1 n
(b) If Uxn= un+j» then the proof goes as in (b) above
and we have Mrn+1C U xn) = U M'n+^(xn)
(c) If Uxn is in [En+^ >Bn+l-' tBen we can use tBe
continuity of Mf together with the definition of
U xn where x is a function, to prove that:
MLo( Uxn)o$ = U (MLox o<I> ).n n n n n n
And so we get Mrn+j( U xfl) = U M^^^Cx^.
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(a), (b) and (c) ==> ^n+1( Uxn) = u^n+i(xn)
==> ¥ j is continuous.
To conclude the construction, we draw the picture which shows the relations clearly:
%
E0 E1 E2 En En+1
<— <— <—
Where: For all n^O,
$n is injective continuous,
IP is surjective continuous,
Wf» =n+A
•p (4 (f)) . f
n n
<&n and IP can be so extended so that instead of running through two consecutive
domains, they run through any 2 domains. This is done as follows:
: E„— >33 such that:nm n m
for all n,m in N,
n= m ==> = Id„ = AxGE .xnm n n
n <m == > <5 = O .o<D .
nm m-1 nm-1
n>m==>4> =<F . ..
nm n-lm n-1
Lemma: (Vn,m^0) [<t>nrn is continuous]
Proof:
Sublemmal: Let n^O, (V m^n) [<3> „ is continuous]nm
Proof: By induction,
case n=m true because O = Id continuous.
nm n
Assume that (V m^n) [<l>nm is continuous],
and prove that <l)nm+j is continuous.
5> , = o<Pnm+1 m nm
and <Pr|rn are continuous (induction hypotheses),
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Then <£> o<I> is continuous.
m nm
Therefore (V m^n) [<J>nm is continuous].
Sublemma2: (V n^m) [^nm is continuous].
Proof: similar to above.
Using sublemmal,2 we get 4>nm continuous, for all n,m ^0. □
Lemma: (V n,m: 0 ^ n ^ m) [<I>rnn(<I>r|rn(f)) = f].
Proof: If m=n ==> O (4> (f)) = ®__(f) = f.
mn nm mn
Assume that the property is true for all m^n^O such that m-n ^c.
Let us prove the property holds for m^n^O such that m=n+k+l.
$mn(V(f)) = $mn((Vl°Vl)(f)) as n<m
= (Vln°VlX(Vl0<I)nm-lXf)) as m>n
= 4)m_lll((>lfn_10<I)m ^)(<l)nm_1)(f))) as o is associative.
= <I> -i-.(f)) as V ,o<I> 1(x) = x.m-ln nm-1 m-1 m-1
= f by induction, because m-n-l=k ^k. □
Note that here a stronger lemma could be proved. That is:<^mi0<^nm = ^np Our above
lemma will be a special case of this one by taking l=n.
Lemma: <£> ("IhCg)) £ g for 0 <n ^ m.nm mn ° m°
Proof: By induction as above.
1. n=m ==> Dnm($mn(g)) = g Cmg (reflexivity)
2. Suppose that for all 0 ^ n ^ m such that m-n ^ k and k^O,
the property that <l>rirr|COrnr|(g)) C^g holds.
3. Let us prove that it also holds for m^n^O such that m=n+k+l:
$nm(<I>mn(S)) = <1>nm((4>m-ln0^m-l)(8)) as m>n
= ^m-l0°nm-lX(Vln^m-P^^ as n<m
= Vl(Vl(Vln(Vl(S)))} as 0 18 associative-
However, m-l-n <k, so following the hypotheses of induction we get:
(a) Vl(Vln(x)) ~m-lx*
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But (VnGoi) [4>n is continuous] ==>
(Vn€n>) [<3>n is monotonic] ==>
4> * is monotonic.
m-1




As C is transitive, we get from (b)+(c):
<£ ($> Cg)) £ g.nm mn° m5
And so for all 0 <n <m, Onrr,(Orrir,(g)) £mg. □
We still have not found a domain E—[E— >E]. Here we see how to do it.
Having constructed all the (E ) ,, , we can construct a domain E which will° n nfcGr oo
contain all the E forn€o>.
n
Eoo-l<fn>AeEnand','n(fn+l)-fn>-
The ordering relation on Emwill be:
(V <fn>, ^n> (EEJ [<fn>new C <^n>n6ftJ <==>(Vn<Eca) [fn S^gJ ]
we shall prove next that (E^ C) is a semantic domain.
Lemma: (E^ O is a semantic domain.
Proof:
(l) Bottom element:
Let <u„ > where u is the bottom element of E .n n n n
<u„ > is the bottom element of E :n n oo
(i) <li > is in E :
n n oo
u is in E„ for all n,n n
L(u„,i) = u by definition of V ,
Therefore <u > is in E .
n n oo
(ii) <u„ > is the bottom element of E :n n co
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Let <f > GE
n n oo
(Vn6w) [u is the bottom element of En] ==>
(VneaO [un CfJ „>
<lln>n=<rn>n->
<u > is the bottom element of E.
n n oo
(2) C is a partial order:
(i) Q is reflexive:
Let <f > be in E .
n n oo
As fn is in En which is a semantic domain, fn C^f^ (refLexivity)
==>(Vn6w) [fn Vn] _> <fn>n C <fn>n.
Hence C is reflexive.
(ii) C is transitive:
Let <f > , <? > and <h > be in E such that:
n n °n n n n oo
<fn> C <^n>and <gn> C <hn> ==>
(VnGw) [fn Cngn] and (Vn€w) [gn ^hQ] =>
(Vn€o>) [fn £ngn and gn ^nhn], but is transitive ==>
(Vn€<u) [fn -> <fn>n C <hn>n _>
Q is transitive.
(hi) C is antisymmetric:
Let <f > and <? > be in E such that:
n n °n n 00
<T_ > Q <%_ > and <g > Q <f >■ . Then,n n °n n °n n n n
(VnGoj) [fn and (VnGw) [gn C^fJ ==>
(VnGca) [fn Cngn and gn Qjj, but is antisymmetric.
==>(VnGca) [fn-gn] ==> <?n> = <£n>
Hence, Q is antisymmetric.
Using (i), (ii) and (hi) we get that £ is a partial order on E .
(3) Every w-sequence has a limit in E :
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Let (X ) be an (^-sequence in E .mm 00
Every X is of the form <f__ > where:^ m. nm n
f is in E„ and ¥_(f_ , 1 „) = f„„.nm n n n+lm nm
But (VmGca) [Xm ==>
(VmGeu) [(Vn€&>) [fnm ^fnm+1] ] ==>
(Vneco) [CVm€<a) [fnm I ==>
(Vn€ca) [Cf )m is an co-sequence of En].
En is a semantic domain == > (fnm)m has a limit gn = Urr|frirr| in En>
Let X= <g„ > , then X is the limit of (X_) in E :°n n m m 00
Proof:
(a)X is in E :
OO
(VnGco) [gn€En],
(Vn€co) [> (g ,).?(U f , )L msn+ly nv m n+lnr
- U (f ,. ) (as IP is continuous),m n n+lm n
= U f (as X =<f > ==>>P (f ) = f ).
m nm m nm n n n+lm nm
=gn
So X is in E .
OO
(b)X is the limit of (Xm)m6w in E^:
(i) X is an upper bound:
Let m 6w, then X„= <f > ,m nm n
Let us prove that Xm Q X.
For n in to, Xnm= f _ £,g„ = Ufnm n°n nm ==>
(Vn«») lfm q,gn] ~> xmcX„>
(VmGco) [X £X] ==>X is an upper bound of (X-m) .
(ii) X is the least upper bound:
Let Y be an upper bound of (X )„, - in E„==> Y=<v > .rr m mtea 00 •'n n
For n€co,
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(Vm€o>) [Xm CY] ==>
(Vm€w) [fnm ~nyn] ==>
yn is an upper bound for (fnm)mew ==>
Umfnm ~nyn == >
(VnGw) [gn Cnyn] ==> <%n>n C <yn>n ==>X CY.
Therefore X is the least upper bound of (X„)„ in E .mm co
Using (l), (2) and (3) we get that E^is a semantic domain. □
We define $ : E -- >E and <I> : E -- >E„ such that:noo n co ocn oo n
*nJ«-<®nk®>kimd'Wf)-fn-
Lemma: <I> is well defined and is continuous for all n€o>.
oqtl
Proof:
(1) Well defined: Obvious.
(2) Continuous: Obvious, as being the nth projection.





(Vk€w) [^nkCf)€Ek and *k(»nk+l«» "V®'
Therefore O (f) €E .
noo oo
(2) Continuous:
Let (f„)„ be an &>-sequence is in E .mm ^ n
LiUf) = «*> t(Uf )>,noo m nk m k
" <Um3>nk(fm) >k (as °nk 15 continuous)
= Um<<I)nk^fm')\ ^can be Proved)
= U <5 (f )
m noov m
Hence 0 is continuous. □
noo
Lemma: <£>(<!> „If)) = f for all n,f.ocn noo
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Proof:
= "X> (<<!> V(f)>Joca noo oca nK K
= 0 (f) = f. □
nn
Lemma: ^^C'P^Cg)) Cg for all n,g.
Proof:
UW?" = ^noo^n3 =<<1>nk(g)>k
= ^no^^^nl^n^-^nn^n^^nn+l^n)'" >
= ^O'gl—Sn^n^n^- > ^n^n+P =Sn)
(a) (Vm<n) [C<I>nooCg)))mth=gm £mgJ (refl.)^!
Actually this is not necessary.
(b) We shall prove that:
(Vm^n) [(l»noo(^oqI1(g))mth = ~mgnr'
Ci) m=n <I> (g„) =g„ Q,g =g„,.nm °n °n ii0n °m
Cii) Suppose that the property holds for m>n.
(iii) Prove it for m+1:
^nm+l(^ = V^nm^
But §m -VWP ==>
= Wgm+1)) -m+lSm+1 but
V+l^ = ^m(^nm(^n)) hence
$nm+l(§n)
(by induction and monotonicity of <l>m).
Therefore(Vm>n) K®noo(®oen(g)))mth Smgm]
(a)+(b) implies (Vm€oi) ^gm ==>
V(V(8)} D
141 We use mth to say that it is element m in the sequence. If there was no parenthesis, then we can
say fn< meaning the nth element in the sequence (fn)n- However, for the above case, it will be confusing
to say (<t,noo(<bocn(g)))m, as we will not understand whether we mean the sequence or the element.
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Lemma: (VfGE^ [(f €En) ==>(f = fn)].
Proof: f is in E ==>
oo
f = < ^f),f,<Kf),<K<Kf)) >
And so f = f. □
n
Lemma: (VfGE^) [(f €En) ==>(<I>n(f) = f)].
Proof: (S> (f) is in E ) ==> <X> (f) in E is written as:
n co n co
V fn(OXfn(f),'Vl(0n(f»- >.
I.e^O^Cf))^^ - ^n+lkC^n^f))' ^ut ° ^ associat^ve:
= (fl>j£_jO...G>nXf) for k>n+l.
(®n<f»n+lth " Vln+l(*n(t» " *n<«-
(°n(f):)kth = ^>n+lk^n^^'^,ut 0 ^ assoc^a^ve:
= (¥to....o1Ir o<I> )(f), but ¥oO = Id :k n n n n n
= (^c°..."$n_j)(f) for k<ti+l.
f is in E„ == >n
fk = (f)kth = °nk(f) = (4>k_i°....°4>nXf) for k>n+l.
fn+l = ^«n+lth = <Wf> = *n(f>
fk = (f)kth = °nk(f) = (V-o\-1)(f) k<n<n+l.
Therefore, f = 3>n(f). □
Lemma: CVfGEj t(f€En+1) ==>On(f) Cf)].
Proof: (^n(f))k = f°r all k €&>, as ^(f) is in E
k>n+l >n ==>
(^nCf^k = but o is associative. =
-
and fk = (^.1°—o$n+1Xf)




Hence, (Vk>n+l) [(^(f))^ ^fjJ-
We conclude from here that: lP„(f) Q f.n
Note: Here, we do not have to go through the cases
k <n+l, But I shall do it for the sake of completeness:
ClPCf)) = ¥_(f) because ^(f) is in E.n n n n n
f = M'(f) because f is in E„ . 1.n n n+l
<*n«»n+l " W "d fn+l" f (f En+1>
->0Pn(f))n+l SwlW
k ^n ==>C^_(f))i, = o...o^„ i)('4r„(f)), o is associative:n K. k n-1 n
= Oko...o^n(f)
=fk
Therefore, (Vk^o) [On(f))k %fkl ==>^n(f) Cf. □
Lemma: In E^ f^- fmin(n>m).
Proof: fnm = <I»nm(f)
n= m ==>fnm = 4>nn(fn) = fn = fmin(n,n0-
n> m == >fnm = (V-oVpCy, as Vl(fn} = fn-l
By induction
^m^m+P ^m ^min(n,m)'
n<m ==>fnm = (*m_l0...o®n)(fn), as <I>n(fn) = fQ for fn in En.
But f = <X> (f ) is in E -. ==> 3> -,(fn) = f.n n n n+l n+l n
By induction we prove that = fn for all k^n.
Therefore, f^ = fn = fmin(n>m). □
Lemma: n ^ m then f Q f C f.
n m
Proof:
(a) fn £=fn+i for all n^O:
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We proved that if f is in En+j then ^(f) Cf,
So as fn+1 is in En+1, *n(fn+P Cfn+r
ButVW " fn' fn =fn+l-
(b) We could therefore prove by induction that:
(Vm^n^O) [fn Cfm].
This is by using (a)+transitivity+refl.exivity of Q.
(c) f =<f > . So to prove f £f,ve have to prove that:n n n
(View) [(fn). ^f.].
Let i€<y,
f _ £ni min(n,i)
= (n<i) >fn,fr
But f Cf. for n<i, and L Cf- ==>
men.) £&]-> fn Cf.
Therefore,(V m>n»0) [fn Cfm Cf]. □
Lemma: f = U f
n
Proof: We proved above that: (Vn ^ m) [fn Q fm].
Therefore (fn)n is an gj-sequence in
and so its limit U f exists in E .
n co
We also proved that: (Vn€oi) [fn Cf].
Therefore f is an upper bound of (f„V in E .n n oo
Let us prove that f = U f :




But(Vn>0) [fno = f0] ==>
U f = fn. The same for Uf, = f, for all k^O.n no 0 n nk k
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and we get: U fn = <^Q»f > = <f->^ = f. □
Now we define application in E^.
Let f,e be in E„and define f»e = Uf x1(eJ' oo n+1 n
Lemma: Application is well defined.
Proof:






_ ^n+l^en^ as ^nm ~ ^min(n,m)
= fn+l('en')
Therefore it makes sense to talk of fn+l*en as application
from E_ .xE -- >E_.n+1 n n
Cii)We know that we are talking about limits here for co-sequences,
therefore we have to show that (fn+i(en))n is an ^-sequence.
Proof:
e^ Ce^ and fj £f2 ==>
f^Ce^) Cf^Ce^). But f2 is continuous == >monotonic ==>
^2^e(P — ^2^el^* ®ut ^ ^ transi*-ive
fl(e0) Cf2(e1).
By induction we can assume that f (e J Cf (e ).n n-1 n+1 n
We prove that fn+1(en) ^fn+2(en+i):
en Cen+j and fn+j monotonic ==>
fn+l^en"* ~fn+l^en+P" But fn+l ~fn+2==>
fn+l(en+l) £fn+2(en+l)- But - is transitive ==>
- 223 -
fn+l(en) -fn+2(en+l)*
Therefore (fn+^(en))n is an o>-sequence in E^and
Ufn+l(en) exists in Eco
Therefore the application from E^xE^ to E^as above is well defined.
Lemma: Let f: DjxD2~ >D^ (3 semantic domains),
Then f is continuous iff
f is continuous in terms of its arguments taken separately.
Proof:
(a)Assume f is continuous and let a in D^.
We will show that f : D~—>D~ such that f (x) = f(a, x) is continuous.
a Z> j a
f ( U x ) = f(a, U x ) = f( U a, U x ) = f( U (a, x )). But f is continuous == >
a. 11 n n n
= U fCa, xn)
- UW-
We can do the same to prove that g (x) = f(x,a) is continuous.cL
(b)Assume f is continuous in terms of each of its arguments separately.
f( U an) = f( U Cxn,yn)) = f( U xn, U y ). But f is continuous in terms of its 1st argument:
= Unf(xn, U y ). But f is continuous in terms of its 2nd argument:
" "aVVrn''
" Uf(Vyn)'D
Lemma: Let Dj,D2 be two semantic domains and f: D^—
f is continuous ==> f is mono tonic.
Proof: Take x,y in Dj such that x C^y.
we construct the w-sequence (xn)n where Xq = x and xn =y V nX).
This is obviously an (o-sequence and its limit is y= Ux^.
But f is continuous ==>f(y) = f(Ux ) = Uf(x ).n n
<*xn»n is an (o-sequence which has U f(xn) as a limit == >
Kxq) = f(x) C^UfCx^. Therefore f(x) ^f(y) and so
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every continuous function is monotonic. □
Lemma: Application App: E^xE^-- is continuous.
Proof: we have that g: En. jxEn+i~ >En+^such that
g^-fn+l,en^ = fn+l^en^ is continuous.
We also have that App(f,e) = U fn+^en)-
So App is the limit of continuous functions.
Therefore App is continuous. □
Lemma: (Vm^n) Kfn+lm+1(em)) = fn+l(en)]
Proof: By induction.
(1) m=n: obvious.
(2) assume the property holds for m and prove it for m+1.
(3) ^fn+i)m+2^em+l^ = ^®m+l^fn+Pin+l^em+P
= (^>mo(fn+l)m+l°^m)(em+l)" But ° 18 associative:
= V(Wm+l(*m(em+l):))- But \(em+l} =em:
=Wm+lM'
But the argument of G> is in E :° mm
= ^n+Pm+l^em^' B^ Eduction hypotheses we get:
= fn+l^en^*
Therefore, (Vm^n) K(fn+1)m+1)Cem) = fn+1(en)]. □
femma:fn+1.e = fn+1(en)
Proof: fn+1.e = Um((fn+1)m+1(em))
= U«fn+iWmM
m^n
= Ufn+l(en)' by previous lemma,
m^n
= fn+l(en>> by independence of m. □
Lemma: (Vm)n) [(fm+1(enm))n = fn+1(en)]
Proof:
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Cl) m=n ==> (fm+1(enm))n = fn+1(en).
(2) Assume the property holds for m.




= $m.(L , i(e ))n m+1 nm
= ^m+lW But by induction:
= fn+l(en)-
Therefore fn+1(e) = fn+1(en) = (fCen))n. □
Lemma: (f(e)n)n = fn+1(en)
Proof: (fCe )) -(Uf.Ce J)
n n m m+1 nm n
= Um(fm+l(enm))nth But by above lemma:
- UmWen>
= fn+l(-enX
Therefore, fn+^*e = fn+l(en) = (f*en}nth' for a11 n€w" D
We have still not proved that E — [E — >E 1.
Let us see how to do it.
First we shall need the following theorem:
Theorem: (Vf€ [E^->Ej ) Q XftEj [(VeGE^ [f(e) =Xf*e] ].
Proof: Let f be in E^and take Xf = U(\yGEn(f(y))n).
Xf is what we are looking for because:
(i) Xf is well defined and is in E (Obvious).
OO
(ii) Let e be in E .
OO
Xf»e = E|mXfm+j(em), by definition of application.
= Um(Xf*em)m> by above lemma.
= Um(C Un(XyeEn(f(y))n))»em)m, by definition of Xf.
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= Um( Un((Xy€En(f(y))n))»em)m, by continuity in terms of Un.
= umun((:xy6En(f(y))n)*em)m' by contirLuity in terms of Um.
= Uk((Xy€Ek(fCy))k)«ek)k, by a lemma.
= Uk(f(ek))k> by X-conversion.
= U (f(e ))n by a lemma.
n,m
= Un^ Umf^em^n by continuity-
= Un(f( Umem))n, by continuity.
= U (f(e)) .
n n
= f(e), by continuity of f. □
Theorem: -^oJ-
Proof: Let R: [E^— >EQJ — ^^such that R(f) =Xf (as above).
(i) R is well defined: obvious.
(ii) R is injective:
R(f) =R(g) == >Xf =Xg == > f =g?
f(e) =Xf«e = Xg*e = g(e), Assuming extensionality we get f =g.
(iii) R is surjective: obvious.
(iv) R is continuous:
R( U f ) =XUf
n n
= um^yeEm( using contilluity ==>
= Um(Un(XyeEm(fn(y))m)), using limit ==>




Therefore R is an isomorphism and so we have:
Actually, E^ is the least upper bound of the sequence of domains (En)n, but as it
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takes a lot of work to prove it, I shall ignore the proof.
That was a short introduction to how one can define the Scott domain E^.
However, what I have not given is a definition of the model of a lambda calculus in
general. For such a definition, the reader is referred to [MEl].142
142 For those who are familiar with category theory, it is worth
side of this construction. They would have guessed already that <t> is
category of domains and continuous functions and that E = (E-,W ).OO 11
reminding them of the categorical
a contraction if the category is the
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